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ABSTRACT 
 
PRO-SOCIAL CONSUMER AND FIRM BEHAVIOR IN IMPERFECTLY 
COMPETITIVE REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL MARKETS 
 
FEBRUARY 2019 
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 Directed by: Nathalie Lavoie and Daniel Lass  
 
In this dissertation, I combine field research, econometric methods, and economic 
theory to analyze a market in which both firms’ and consumers’ choices are motivated by 
social preferences. This work contributes to the fields of behavioral economics, industrial 
organization, and local food systems economics. The dissertation expands the growing 
literature on social preferences to incorporate firms’ choices that are motivated by utility 
maximizing objectives in an environment that allows endogenous equilibrium prices and 
quantities. Firms with social preferences operate in a competitive environment in which 
they may face downstream market power. In particular, the research focuses on 
intermediated Farm to School markets for local food in which producers’ marketing 
decisions may be influenced by both market structure and the pro-social motivations 
embedded in local food markets. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation, I combine field research, econometric methods, and economic 
theory to analyze a market in which both firms’ and consumers’ choices are motivated by 
social preferences. This work contributes to the fields of behavioral economics, industrial 
organization, and local food systems economics. The dissertation expands the growing 
literature on social preferences to incorporate firms’ choices that are motivated by utility 
maximizing objectives in an environment that allows endogenous equilibrium prices and 
quantities. Firms with social preferences operate in a competitive environment in which 
they may face downstream market power. In particular, the research focuses on 
intermediated Farm to School markets for local food in which producers’ marketing 
decisions may be influenced by both market structure and the pro-social motivations 
embedded in local food markets.  
I apply the findings to provide important information regarding the effectiveness 
of different policy tools to enhance Farm to School markets for local foods. Markets for 
local foods feature agricultural firms, whose objective functions are commonly modeled 
as either profit maximizing or utility maximizing, allowing for ambiguity that is 
convenient to exploit (Lin, 1978). Firms in local food markets are frequently described as 
being motivated by goals that align easily with what behavioral economists refer to as 
pro-social motivations: they vow support common public goods such as environmental 
preservation and equitable societies (Stevenson and Pirog, 2008). Consumers in local 
foods markets consistently demonstrate an increased willingness to pay for products that 
contribute to pro-social goals (Fitzsimmons and Cicia, 2018), and agricultural producers, 
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particularly in Farm to School markets, also demonstrate that they make decisions in 
which they are willing to accept lower profits in local foods markets (Lehnerd et al., 
2018). Finally, prevailing evidence suggests that Farm to School markets are not 
demonstrably profitable to producers, suggesting that participation in these markets is 
motivated by something other than profit maximization (Sitaker, et al., 2010).  
Local food markets consist of supply chains that both move agricultural products 
and product information from upstream producers to downstream consumers, but also 
transmit information from downstream consumers upwards through the supply chain. 
Supply chains in markets for local foods are often referred to as “value chains,” to reflect 
the common set of values that supply chain actors have in common with one another, and 
that they seek to support through participation in the markets. The concept of a “value 
chain” originated with Porter (1985) as managerial economists developed theories to 
address the increasing role of information in modern markets. The “value” in this 
application is generated at each step in the series of supply chain activities that a product 
or service passes through in a given industry, linking the value created to each actor along 
the supply chain. As value is created at each step in the product or services’ development, 
the overall value of the final good or service is increased. The activities that Porter 
viewed as adding “value” included inbound logistics, outbound logistics, operations, 
marketing and sales, and service (1985). In 2008, Stevenson and Pirog applied the 
concept of the long term, inter-organizational, interdependent network of economic actors 
that comprise Porter’s “value-chain” to incorporate the strategic alliances among mid-tier 
regional food systems actors. They identified five key characteristics of local foods value 
chains: 
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• Appropriateness for situations in which economies of scale are coupled 
with complex products that differentiate and add value in the marketplace 
• Capacity to combine cooperation with competition to achieve 
collaborative advantages and adapt relatively quickly to changes in the market 
• Emphasis on shared vision, shared information (transparency), and shared 
decision making among strategic partners 
• Commitment to the welfare of all participants in the value chain, including 
fair profit margins, fair wages, and business agreements of appropriate extended 
duration. 
A number of papers identify that supply chain actors in local foods markets operate in 
value chains that reflect these characteristics. For example, local foods value chains are 
shown to be characterized by trust (Roy, Hall, and Ballantine, 2017), principles over 
profit (Poulston and Yu, 2010), mutually supportive economic relationships (Conner et 
al., 2010; Stevenson, Pirog, and Ostrom, 2011), and the achievement of the goals of local 
foods systems (Sharma, Moon, and Strohbehn, 2014). Local food systems supply chain 
actors have advanced the role of value chains, and sales of local food reached $8.7 billion 
in 2015 (NASS, 2017), but as the market has grown, so has its complexity. Local foods 
are increasingly marketed through intermediated supply chains, instead of directly to 
consumers (NASS, 2017; Ralston, 2017). Intermediated supply chains for local food 
require that supply chain information passes both downstream to consumers and 
upstream to firms, and implies that firms make choices that are influenced by pro-social 
preferences.  
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 While it is straightforward to model firms’ utility maximizing choices as a 
function of pro-social preferences and exogenous prices, to date, economists have not 
derived supply curves from those choices. Without supply curves, it has not been possible 
to model a partial equilibrium model in which prices and quantities are endogenous, or to 
model the effect of intermediary market power. 
This dissertation attempts to develop a framework for understanding the 
relationships among market forces that operate to improve economic efficiency and those 
that operate to achieve pro-social values in a way that allows prices and quantities to be 
endogenous. In addition to contributing to theory that advances the application of 
behavioral economics to firms in a competitive market environment, I seek to provide 
policy makers with a framework through which the effect of policies to promote local 
foods can be evaluated. To provide a concrete application, most of this dissertation 
focuses on understanding the key components of a specific value chain – the Farm to 
School market for local foods. The second chapter veers from the Farm to School 
application to provide empirical evidence of how human values can influence consumer 
decision making in markets for local foods. 
In the second chapter this dissertation, “Consumers’ Human Values and 
Preferences for Social Outcomes of Regional Food Attributes,” written with Gianni 
Cicia, (2018) we investigate heterogeneity in consumers’ human values and willingness 
to pay (WTP) for social outcomes of credence process attributes that might have some 
positive social impact on purchases of early potatoes in Italy and Germany. Consumers’ 
identification with cross-cultural human values is measured according to the Schwartz’ 
Portrait Values Questionnaire, and the distribution of preferences for product attributes 
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that claim a positive social impact among respondents with different human values is 
modeled using mixed logit analysis. Parallel survey studies were conducted in each 
country with the intention of comparing the impact of human values using the Schwartz 
Values framework on willingness to pay for early potatoes with several credence process 
attributes that may signal a positive social outcome as a result of purchase (price, country 
of origin, carbon footprint certification, ethical certification, and method of production). 
This paper aims to help clarify the role, if any, that pro-social consumer values have in 
influencing the willingness to pay for specific food credence process attributes that claim 
to have a social impact. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to focus on the 
role human values have in influencing the willingness to pay for specific extrinsic 
credence food attributes. 
In the third chapter, “Food Service Authorities’ Motivations to Buy Regional 
Food,” and fourth chapter, “Market Channel and School Meal Costs in Farm to School 
Programs” written with Jeffrey O’Hara, I analyze school food authorities’ local food 
procurement choices. The third chapter uses primary historical data from the 
Massachusetts Farm to School program to analyze how different social forces converge 
to promote a common goal of increasing the volume of local food in Massachusetts’ 
schools. The paper identifies the role of state government, non-profit organizations, 
agricultural business organizations, public health and nutrition organizations, food 
service organizations, and economic development agencies in creating partnerships to 
develop viable farm to institution markets. I investigate barriers to implementation, and 
frame the potential trade-offs that need to be considered when stakeholders invest in 
infrastructure needed to sustain the markets.  
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The fourth chapter analyzes perceptions of costs of procuring local foods in 
regards to school food authorities’ choice of procurement channel. We combine two 
years’ of USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service national Farm to School Census data with 
USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service Census of Agriculture and Local Food 
Marketing Practices Survey data to test, among schools participating in farm to school 
programs, whether procuring directly from producers is more likely to lower costs than 
procuring through a distributor. Procuring local foods may add costs to school food 
programs, since procuring local foods requires additional staff effort and local foods may 
command a premium price. If the costs of locally procured foods are higher than those of 
alternative products, we would expect to see constraints on local foods procurement in 
the absence of continued policy interventions to mitigate costs. If, however, certain local 
food procurement strategies are more effective at reducing school meal costs relative to 
others, we might expect to see school food authorities (SFA) purchase local foods in 
greater quantities. Procurement through intermediated channels, such as distributors, is 
hypothesized by Farm to School advocates to provide economies of scale to the market to 
reduce overall costs for SFAs, as well as to provide a supply chain capable of aggregating 
product from small and medium sized farms that could not individually meet volume 
requirements of institutional buyers. Alternatively, intermediated market channels may 
provide the opportunity for relatively concentrated distributors to exercise market power, 
limiting the ability of SFAs to negotiate prices and procurement terms, and resulting in 
overall higher costs to procurement. We find that schools that exclusively buy from 
intermediaries are five percentage points less likely to report lower costs from 
undertaking Farm to School procurement initiatives. In contrast, schools that procure 
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local foods from both producers and intermediaries are four percentage points more likely 
to report lower costs. There are several possible mechanisms that can explain our finding. 
One possible mechanism is that profit maximizing producers who market directly to 
schools are offering a low price to cultivate a diverse marketing portfolio, or that utility 
maximizing producers are offering a low price to supply product to schools to achieve 
social objectives. Alternatively, intermediaries either may not be achieving cost savings 
when aggregating from local producers or if they are, not passing the cost-savings along 
to SFAs.     
In the fifth chapter, “Producer Costs and Returns from New England Farm to 
Institution Sales,” I present the results of field research that inform the development of 
the theoretical model of utility maximizing producer choice of markets in Chapter 6 that 
allows price and quantity to be endogenous when both firms and consumers choices are 
influenced by social preferences. I interviewed producers in six New England states who 
market at least some product to Farm to Institution markets about their costs and returns 
in selling to farm to institution markets. Interviewees represented diversified fruit and 
vegetable growers in each of the six New England states, and a broad range of farm 
operations sizes and farm marketing strategies. Farm to Institution marketing ranged from 
less than 1% of total sales to about 11% of total sales of the farm operations interviewed. 
Notably, while very few farm operations specifically track costs and returns to farm to 
institution marketing, only two producers target this market for future growth. The 
barriers cited to increased participation include low prices, volume requirements, and 
logistical challenges. 
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The sixth chapter of my dissertation, “Equilibria and Welfare in Markets With 
Social Preferences,” written with Nathalie Lavoie and Dan Lass, develops a behavioral 
model of producer choice for high-quality local food markets in which marketing choices 
may be influenced by social preferences, while allowing price and quantity to be 
determined in the market. We draw upon theory from behavioral economics and 
industrial organization, as well as field research results, to develop a theoretical model 
that advances the existing literature on producer choice of market channels, in which 
price is treated as exogenous. Non-pecuniary motivations in marketing choices are 
increasingly identified in the literature as relevant to producer decision making. The 
paper provides a theoretical framework to model the potential effects of policy 
interventions when producers may be motivated by non-pecuniary factors and 
downstream intermediaries may exercise oligopsony power. The model is informed by an 
analysis of structured interview results from in-depth field interviews with agricultural 
producers in six New England states and a literature review. We apply the model to 
producer marketing choices in farm to school markets, which policy makers currently 
provide demand-side support by subsidizing school food purchasers’ procurement of 
local foods. We find that if policy makers wish to increase the quantity of local product 
supplied to schools, supply-side subsidies are likely to more effective than demand-side 
subsidies. Effective interventions could include mitigating producers’ transaction costs. 
We also find that market power in the distribution sector may, in certain cases, serve to 
counteract policy-makers’ goals to increase quantity of local foods supplied to schools. It 
is also possible that distributors enjoy higher efficiency, perhaps as a result of economies 
of scale, which can increase the quantity supplied to the market. Future work using this 
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framework will include evaluating interventions like promoting farm to school markets to 
producers, or providing technical assistance to producers, to establish contracts with 
intermediaries that support price pass-through and communicate information about 
downstream market activity.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 CONSUMERS’ HUMAN VALUES AND PREFERENCES FOR SOCIAL 
OUTCOMES OF REGIONAL FOOD ATTRIBUTES 
Authors: Jill Fitzsimmons and Gianni Cicia 
2.1 Introduction 
For decades, research has suggested that consumer decisions are not exclusively 
rational and self-regarding (Camerer and Fehr, 2006), that consumers within 
demographic classes have widely varying preferences that are not fully explained by 
basic demographic profiles (Bruno et al., 1972; Worlsey and Lea, 2008), and that 
preferences for product attributes measured in choice experiments may not be complete 
and stable (Lusk and Briggeman, 2009). Consumer choices for credence process 
attributes may be influenced by other-regarding preferences or bounded rationality, or 
they may represent an intermediate stage of decision making. Credence process quality 
attributes of products indicate “the characteristics of the processes used to produce them,” 
for which consumers are unable to judge the quality of the product, even after they have 
inspected, purchased, and used the product (Caswell, 1998). Consumers who purchase 
products with credence process product attributes that signify social outcomes provide a 
context to test the hypothesis that some consumer purchases are motivated by other-
regarding preferences, given that the attributes expressly indicate that the purchase has an 
impact on public goods.  
Consumers might consider some process attributes to increase individual welfare 
while simultaneously creating positive social outcomes (Hughner, et al., 2007; Lusk, 
Norwood et al., 2006). For example, consumers might benefit individually from the 
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characteristics of processes used to produce food products; Food produced organically or 
locally might be perceived as fresher, more nutritious, or safer (Lusk, Brown et al., 2006). 
At the same time, consumers might also believe that organic or local foods benefit others, 
in addition to benefiting themselves, by reducing environmental impacts or making a 
positive contribution to the consumer’s regional economy (Caswell, 1998). Other process 
attributes, such as “fair trade” or “low carbon emissions” labeling, are less likely to have 
a distinct and noticeable impact on a given individual’s welfare. Instead, these process 
attributes are intended to promote social values of equitable treatment of labor, and 
environmentalism. Individuals who make choices to promote social values are likely 
motivated by something in addition to gains in individual welfare, and researchers may 
be able to identify those motivations, beyond simply attributing the motivation to a 
“warm glow” (Andreoni, 1990).  
To help clarify the role that values have in influencing willingness to pay (WTP) 
for specific credence process attributes that promote social outcomes, we use the 
Schwartz Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) to provide a conceptual and empirical 
framework to measure human values, and relate consumers’ WTP for social outcome 
attributes to their human values profile (Schwartz et al., 2001). Our results suggest that 
there is an empirical relationship between Schwartz Human values and a stated 
preference for credence process product attributes that promote values-related social 
outcomes for a potato product. Consumers in both Italy and Germany who value the 
environment and social equitability have a higher WTP for product attributes that 
promote environmental benefits, labor, etc. and consumers who value self-gratification, 
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personal success, and social power have a lower WTP for these product attributes, all else 
equal. 
Consumers’ affinities for products with credence process attributes that promote 
social outcomes such as environmentalism, social equitability, or ethnocentrism, are more 
likely to be based on consumers’ values than their demographic characteristics. An 
emerging body of economic literature seeks to identify and measure the role that these 
previously unobserved consumer values have on influencing consumers’ WTP for 
product attributes, in general. In this paper, we use a robust cross-cultural survey tool, the 
PVQ, to identify consumer heterogeneity in WTP for a potato product with attributes that 
promote social outcomes based on human values. We apply the tool to consumers in 
Germany and Italy and analyze the results using a mixed logit model to capture additional 
heterogeneity by allowing coefficients to have a distribution. Instead of imposing the a 
priori framework of Schwartz Human Values, we allow our econometric models to 
identify significant relationships in the data, and find that these relationships confirm the 
Schwartz Values framework, suggesting that the PVQ has promise as a tool for 
identifying future relationships between consumers’ heterogeneous values and valuations 
for credence process attributes.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
relationship between human values and consumer decision-making; Section 3 describes 
the data collection methodology; Section 4 describes the model applied to uncover the 
effect of human values on consumer decision making in the two new potato markets; 
Section 5 presents the results of our analysis, and Section 6 concludes. 
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2.2 Human Values and Willingness to Pay for Food Attributes  
Consumer demand analyses have focused on a wide range of credence attributes. 
Food safety, nutrition information, and product traceability have been widely shown to be 
important to consumers (Hobbs, 2003; Golan et al., 2004; Verbeke & Ward, 2006; Van 
Rijswijk et al., 2008; Lusk & Briggeman, 2009; Ubilava & Foster, 2009; Louriero, et al., 
2007). Food safety, nutrition, and traceability attributes are primarily vertically 
differentiated, but consumers have heterogeneous preferences for many process 
attributes. Consumers may interpret process attributes as important signals of other types 
of attributes that we would expect all consumers to value. For example, consumers may 
perceive that products grown near to the point of purchase are fresher, more nutritious, 
taste better, and are safer (Boyle, 2004; Scarpa and Del Giudice, 2004; Feldmann and 
Hamm, 2015; Cavallo and Piqueras‐ Fiszman, 2017). On the other hand, the growth in 
“conscious consumerism” suggests that consumers who value process attributes beyond 
the utility given by consumption of the product may not be solely motivated by self-
interest (Manieri et al., 1997). Examples of credence process attributes that a “conscious 
consumer” might purchase include credence process attributes like environmental 
production and protection, sustainable development, assurances towards worker 
protections, and equal labor remuneration.  
In this paper, we suggest that the concept of food quality extends from food 
characteristics that benefit the purchaser to social outcomes that result from purchase. We 
identify and measure the relationship between human values and consumers’ choices for 
products that claim a social outcome by labeling products as possessing credence process 
attributes (Bond et al., 2007; Lusk and Briggeman, 2009). Therefore, we try to examine 
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whether individuals’ values explain product choices with attribute claims for social 
outcomes.  
Economic studies that rely on demographic market segmentation alone are 
inadequate to account for consumer decisions that are motivated by other-regarding 
preferences (Bruno et al., 1972; Kamakura and Novak, 1992; Cicia, 1993; Camerer and 
Fehr, 2006; Lusk and Briggeman, 2009; Cicia et al., 2010; Naspetti and Zanoli, 2011; 
Cembalo et al., 2016; Caracciolo et al., 2016; Roselli et al., 2018). These studies tend to 
predict consumers’ choices based on food attributes and consumers’ observable 
demographic characteristics. Little research is available on the influence of personal 
values on consumer’s purchasing decisions, though values and beliefs are likely pivotal 
predictors of food consumption (Cicia, et a., 2002; Rigby and Burton 2003; Alfnes, 2004; 
Scarpa and Del Giudice, 2004; Michaelidou and Hassan, 2008; Lusk, Norwood et al., 
2006; Ubilava and Foster, 2009).  
To address this gap, an emerging body of economic and other social science 
research investigates how values and beliefs likely affect consumers’ food choices for 
vegetarian diets, organic production, environmental outcomes, food safety, country-of-
origin labeling and preferences for domestic or local products (Allen and Baines, 2002; 
Umberger et al., 2003; Lea and Worsley, 2005; Lusk, Brown et al., 2006; Spash and 
Vatn, 2006). Many of the economic studies have used ad hoc mechanisms to identify the 
values and beliefs that drive decision making, but there is progress in linking the 
measurement tools economists use with more robust tools from other disciplines that 
measure values and beliefs. Prominent social psychologists such as Rokeach (1973); 
Azjen (1985); Inglehart et al. (1998); Schwartz (1994) have developed different 
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conceptual frameworks to identify how individuals’ values and beliefs influence choices. 
The conceptual frameworks include both theoretical mechanisms by which values are 
filtered through intermediate stages of decision making, and decision-making contexts 
and tools based on these frameworks to identify and measure stable values that persist in 
individuals over time. These tools have been extended to apply to individuals’ economic 
choices in different circumstances, and additional tools such Food Values (Lusk and 
Briggeman, 2009) have further extended the application of social psychologists modeling 
of values-based decision making to the sphere of food decisions. Behavioral economists 
have also used experimental tools, for example, Ultimatum and Dictator Games and 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism to measure individual consumers’ preferences for 
pro-social outcomes, like altruism and fairness.  
The Food Values (FV) tool developed by Lusk and Briggeman (2009) eliminates 
the malleability of stated and revealed preferences for food attributes by determining 
consumers’ food values systems. Lusk and Briggeman point out that consumer choices 
for unfamiliar food attributes may not be complete and stable representations of 
preferences. Instead, choices reflect decisions made as trial and error, and within the 
context of a decision task; the choices made, then, represent an intermediate stage of 
decision making and not an absolute, time-invariant statement of preference. To address 
this, Lusk and Briggeman designed the FV tool to identify and measure abstract 
attributes, consequences, and end states (186) of food consumption that may be able to 
explain consumers’ choices between food products, referred to as “food values”. Lusk 
and Briggeman applied the FV tool to consumers’ preferences for organic food. They 
found that, on average, consumers placed the most importance on price, food safety, 
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nutrition, and taste, as expected, but also that there is significant heterogeneity across 
consumers. Respondents who ranked naturalness, fairness, and the environment as very 
important were more likely to have purchased organic food in the past, and stated higher 
willingness to pay for organic food. Consumers for whom price was the highest ranked 
food value were the least likely to have purchased organic food, and stated the lowest 
willingness to pay. The authors also found interesting relationships between FV – for 
example, people who placed high importance on fairness place lower importance on self-
centered values of price, taste, convenience and appearance. Results from additional 
applications of the FV tool reinforce these findings (Lusk, 2011; Pappalardo and Lusk, 
2016; Lee et al., 2014).  
Finally, the Schwartz Human Values tool has been used to demonstrate how an 
underlying set of stable human values influences individuals’ choices, primarily in the 
public health and psychological literature. Schwartz (2007) proposed that humans across 
cultures share a core set of relatively stable “value orientations”. Schwartz distinguishes 
these underlying values from their expression as attitudes, norms, opinions, and actions 
that are commonly measured in social sciences. The underlying values “guide the 
selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people and events” (Schwartz, 2007, p. 297), 
and remain stable for individuals throughout their lives. 
Ten universal human values are identified by Schwartz: Self-Direction, 
Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security, Conformity, Tradition, 
Universalism and Benevolence. Descriptions of these values are provided in Table 1. 
Each value relates to the others either appositionally or complementarily. For example, an 
individual whose values are positively correlated with Tradition would express values 
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that were negatively correlated with Hedonism, but positively correlated with 
Conformity. As such, Schwartz grouped the ten human values into opposite meta-values, 
organizing them in a circular-spatial manner. The meta-values and their respective 
individual values are shown in Figure 1: Openness to change (stimulation, self-direction 
and hedonism) versus Conservation (security, conformity and tradition); Self-
transcendence (benevolence and universalism) versus Self-enhancement (hedonism, 
achievement and power). In the theoretical Schwartz framework, hedonism can either 
stand-alone or can be a part of Openness to change or Self-enhancement meta-values 
(Caracciolo et al., 2016). 
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Table 1 Schwartz Values and Defining Goals 
   VALUES   DEFINING GOALS 
      
SELF-DIRECTION   Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring (creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals, self-respect, intelligent, privacy) 
STIMULATION   Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life (a varied life, an exciting life, daring) 
HEDONISM   Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgent) 
ACHIEVEMENT   Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards (successful, capable, ambitious, influential, intelligent, self-respect, social recognition) 
POWER   Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources (social power, authority, wealth, preserving my public image, social recognition) 
SECURITY   Safety, harmony and stability of society and of relationships (family security, national security, social order, clean, reciprocation of favors, healthy, moderate, sense of belonging) 
CONFORMITY   Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms (obedient, self-discipline, politeness, honoring parents and elders, loyal, responsible) 
TRADITION   Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or religion provides (respect for tradition, humble, devout, accepting my portion in life, moderate, spiritual life) 
BENEVOLENCE   Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact [the ‘in-group’] (helpful, honest, forgiving, responsible, loyal, true friendship, mature love, sense of belonging, meaning in life, a spiritual life) 
UNIVERSALISM   Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature (broadminded, social justice, equality, world at peace, world of beauty, unity with nature, wisdom, protecting the environment, inner harmony, a spiritual life) 
      
Source: Caracciolo et al., 2016 
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How consumers identify themselves in relation to these values is unveiled through 
the Schwartz 21-item Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ). Each of the 21 items in the 
PVQ addresses one of the ten human values. The survey provides respondents with 
statements that describe an unknown person’s profile, such as “she thinks it is important 
that every person in the world be treated equally. She believes everyone should have 
equal opportunities in life”, and asks respondents to rank the extent to which they 
identify with this person, using a six-point scale, where one indicates a low level of 
identification (not like me at all) and 6 ranks a high level of identification (very much 
like me). 
 
 
Figure 1 Schwartz Human Values 
 
 
The Schwartz human values (SHV) tool has been used in a handful of economic 
studies on consumer food choices. Lombardi and colleagues (2015) use food related 
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lifestyle (FRL) and SHV to identify consumer participation in a Solidarity Purchasing 
Group (SPG) in Italy, which is a consumer cooperative that works directly with regional 
farmers to source products for its members with the intention of supporting local 
economies. Caracciolo et al. (2016) analyzed the relationship between consumers’ 
preferences for sustainable pig farming practices and SHV in five different European 
countries. This study (n=2437) suggests a strong relationship between consumers who 
value protection of welfare and nature, and an increased valuation of product attributes 
that promote environmentally cleaner pork production systems; while consumers who 
value self-gratification, personal success, and social power demonstrate a decreased 
valuation for these product attributes. 
Our paper extends this research by identifying and measuring human values to 
explain willingness to pay for credence process attributes for early potatoes. We chose 
the SHV framework to identify human values and the PVQ tool to measure these values 
for a number of reasons. The SHV framework is well-established in the choice literature, 
and has been shown to be valid across cultures, which is particularly valuable as we seek 
to compare consumers in different countries. The PVQ tool, with only 21 scale questions, 
places a low burden on respondents, which reduces fatigue and increases the reliability of 
results. The simplicity of the PVQ also reduces the variability in researcher subjectivity 
that burdens other approaches, such as means-end laddering. There are, of course, 
critiques of the SHV framework and PVQ tool that we take into consideration in our 
analyses. SHV do not include measures that might provide insight into consumers’ 
relative preferences for a credence attribute that signals both social outcomes and 
fundamentally important product attributes, such as food safety, nutrition, convenience, 
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or appearance (Lusk and Briggeman, 2009) and we are not able to separate consumers’ 
beliefs regarding the meanings of attributes claims and their preferences for those claims 
(Costanigro and Lusk, 2014). Therefore, we are not able to empirically disaggregate 
respondents’ preferences for social impacts versus their preferences for increased 
individual welfare. However, we feel comfortable interpreting our results as upper bound 
preferences for social impacts, as food safety in Italian and German produce markets is 
likely considered to be adequately addressed by government regulation (Groulleau and 
Caswell, 2006) and we believe that product nutrition, convenience, and appearance for a 
potato product would be equivalent across the product attributes that we do vary in our 
study. We also focus our interpretation on product attributes that are less likely to bundle 
personal and social benefits. 
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Human Values and Product Attributes Measurement 
Our analysis explicitly considers consumers’ human values using the framework 
proposed by Shalom H. Schwartz (1992) and the 21-item Schwartz Portrait Values 
Questionnaire (Schwartz, 2001). The early potato product was chosen because it 
conforms with many of the relevant process attributes in which we were interested. The 
early potato is differentiated, in Italy and Germany by regional and national origin, 
environmental production, ethical certification, and carbon footprint. In Italy, early potato 
cultivation is concentrated mainly in the southern regions, especially in pockets that have 
evolved to resemble informal “territorial districts” that bind their agricultural economy to 
this crop. Early potatoes grown in these regions are sold on the national market and are 
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exported, mainly to Germany. Early potatoes from other Mediterranean countries are also 
widely available in Italy and Germany. Unlike storage potatoes, early potatoes are not 
stored prior to sale, and are considered to be a perishable product with a short window of 
freshness. Italian producers use conventional, organic or low-input cultivation methods to 
grow early potatoes. The product may be certified and branded as ethically produced in 
accordance with the SA8000 certification1, and it may be certified as being a part of a 
low-carbon emissions supply chain, featuring a carbon logo. The characteristics of early 
potato, like its production in specific territorial districts, freshness, the development of 
more sustainable cultivation methods, the increasing competition with potatoes from 
other countries, and its ethical and carbon-footprint certifications make it an interesting 
case to test this relationship in modern markets. 
The set of potato attributes and attribute levels we chose to study are specific to 
the new potato product, and were selected as a result of a multi-step process. We began 
with a literature review, based on which we conducted in-depth interviews with Italian 
and German stakeholders in the early potato supply chain. Next, we narrowed down the 
relative importance of different new potato attributes through focus groups held with 
consumers, allowing us to identify the most relevant different quality dimensions of early 
potatoes. This qualitative approach to content validity2 (Yaghmale, 2009), allowed us to 
finalize the questionnaire and identify the attributes and levels used to analyze consumers 
preferences. The attributes that emerged as most important to consumers included local 
production in specific territorial districts, freshness, sustainable cultivation methods, the 
                                                 
1 SA8000 is an auditable certification standard that encourages organizations to develop, maintain, and 
apply socially acceptable practices in the workplace (Henkle, 2005) 
2 Content validity refers to the degree of coverage as regards the content, which the instrument is supposed 
to measure (Yaghmale, 2009). Special attention was paid to identify first the attributes and than the levels 
that define each attribute in order to define the specific quality dimension. 
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perception of an increase in undocumented migrants among agricultural workers, and 
competitive pressures from imported new potatoes. The credence attributes that we 
ultimately selected to model were those that indicated territorial origin, ethical 
certification, production method and carbon footprint certification. 
We expect that consumers who exhibit meta-values that reflect outward looking, 
pro-social human values will have a higher WTP for credence process attributes that 
claim positive social impact, and consumers who exhibit meta-vales that reflect inward, 
self-interested human values will have a lower WTP for these attributes. In particular, we 
expect that consumers with “self-transcendent” Schwartz meta-values will be willing to 
pay more for product attributes that indicate social outcomes like environmentalism and 
equitability. We also expect that these consumers will be WTP more for environmental 
production methods, but our survey design does not allow us to disaggregate what part of 
this increased WTP is driven by self-interest for healthful, safe, fresh foods versus what 
part is driven by preferences for pro-social outcomes. We would expect that consumers 
who exhibit self-enhancement, conservative, or hedonistic meta-values will have lower 
WTP for product attributes that indicate social outcomes. Finally, we would expect that 
consumers who exhibit conservative meta-values would express higher WTP for 
ethnocentric attributes, like own-country of origin labeling. 
2.3.2 Study Participants 
Our research compares heterogeneity in preferences and consumers’ human 
values in Italy and Germany. We use a unique set of cross-sectional survey data from a 
representative sample of 1,009 German and 1,004 Italian consumers, conducted by a 
professional marketing company. People interviewed were responsible for household 
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major food purchasing decisions. The sample has been selected and stratified by 
geographical area, city size, gender and age (Table 2).
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Table 2 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 
 Germany  Italy 
      
Gender (%)     
Male  45.5 13.3 
Female  54.5 86.7 
      
Age (years): mean and (st.dev)  
42.4 (13.1) 52.5 (14.4) 
      
Children<10 years old (%)      
Yes  20.60 18.30 
No  79.40 81.70 
      
Economic situation of the family (%)     
Poor 22.80 25.20 
Moderate 39.30 36.90 
Good 23.30 36.60 
No answer 14.60 1.20 
      
Highest qualification completed (%)     
<High School  11.80 31.30 
High School  22.50 40.40 
University Degree  28.90 15.00 
      
Sample Size  1,009 1,004 
      
      
The first section of the questionnaire assessed the perception of the quality of 
fresh food products from consumers and their level of knowledge about product attributes 
through a set of exploratory questions. The second section focused on the early potato. 
Respondents were introduced to the main characteristics of the new potato, and then were 
asked about past purchases of new potatoes, including frequency of consumption, the 
country of origin (if known), and the importance attached to the various attributes of 
early potatoes. In the third section, each respondent was asked to choose a preferred early 
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potato product from a labeled hypothetical choice sets containing four different early 
potato products, or to ‘opt-out’ and choose “none of these products”. Each early potato 
product label featured a combination of five different extrinsic attributes and price. Each 
extrinsic attribute was varied between two or three “levels” of attribute-specific options. 
Attributes and levels included in the randomized questionnaire design are shown in Table 
3. Each individual consumer faced five different choice sets, with four different products 
and the opt-out alternative. Each of the four products offered featured a different label 
showing one level of each of the product attributes. The order of choice sets offered was 
varied between respondents in order to avoid order bias. Choice sets were the result of a 
randomized CBC (Choice-Based Conjoint) advanced design with complete enumeration. 
The D-optimal coefficient of the experimental design was equal to 0.99.
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Table 3 Choice Experiment Attributes and Levels 
Attributes Levels 
 
Attributes Levels 
     Production Method 
  
Country of Origin 
 
 
Organic  
 
Italy/Germany 
 
Environmental Friendly  
 
Non-Domestic product 
(but COOL known) 
 
No information  
 
No information 
     Carbon Footprint 
  
Price (Euro/kg) 
 
 
Carbon footprint logo 
  
0.60 
 
No information 
  
0.80 
    
1.00 
    
1.40 
Ethical certification 
    
 
SA8000 certification 
   
 
No information 
         
     
2.4 Model and Analysis 
We model previously unobserved heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences for 
product attributes of new potatoes both by explicitly estimating consumers’ preferences 
according to their SHV profiles, and by modeling the distribution of those consumers’ 
preference profiles using a mixed logit, or random parameters logit, model. We first 
evaluate the reliability of the PVQ results. Upon satisfactory reliability, we conduct a 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation to reduce the number of 
variables and identify human values principal component weights to create value profiles 
for respondents. We then use the principal component weights for individual level human 
values profiles and extrinsic product attributes in a mixed logit model (ML) to determine 
preference heterogeneity within different Schwartz values profiles. The ML model also 
allows us to avoid the assumption that observations from a given individual are 
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independent of one another, which is a shortcoming of the standard logit model (Revelt 
and Train, 1998; McFadden and Train, 2000). 
2.4.1 Values Reliability 
To determine reliability of the Schwartz Portrait Value results, we compute 
Cronbach’s alpha scores for each of the 10 Schwartz Values. For nine out of the ten 
Schwartz Values, reliability was a function of responses to two of the PVQ questions; for 
the Schwartz Value “Universalism,” the reliability was calculated as a function of the 
responses to three questions (Brunso et al., 2004; Schwatz, 2001).  
Alpha scores for the Italian and German data sets are reported below in Table 4. 
According to the literature, alpha scores of above 0.5 are generally considered to indicate 
moderate/high reliability3. All of the Values, except “tradition” in the Italian data set, 
meet this standard. We retain this value, however, because retention of this variable had 
negligible impact on subsequent analyses.
                                                 3 “There is much debate among researchers as to where the appropriate cut-off points are 
for reliability. A good guide is: 0.9 and above shows excellent reliability; 0.7 to 0.9 
shows high reliability; 0.5 to 0.7 shows moderate reliability; 0.5 and below shows low 
reliability “ (Hinton et al., 2014, p. 364) 
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Table 4 Reliability of the Portrait Values Questionnaire scores (Cronbach's 
alpha) 
  German data   Italian Data 
Values   C. alpha   C. alpha 
     
Power  0.64  0.63 
Achievement 0.76  0.81 
Hedonism  0.66  0.61 
Stimulation 0.57  0.71 
Self-Direction 0.56  0.56 
Universalism 0.59  0.68 
Benevolence 0.72  0.62 
Tradition  0.50  0.35 
Conformity 0.59  0.54 
Security  0.72  0.57 
          
2.4.2 Principal Component Analysis 
To reduce the number of variables and obtain principal components weights to be 
used as regressors in our ML model, we conducted a PCA of the 21 PVQ scores, using 
varimax rotation. These components represent the relative weight of each observation on 
the composition of components. The orthogonality conditions of the varimax rotation are 
critical in this analysis because of the oppositional tension inherent in the Schwartz value 
design (Cembalo et al., 2016). Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin tests (KMO) verify the validity of the 
initial data applied to the model. According to the Schwartz Human Values literature, we 
would expect the ten human values to be reduced to five principal components 
corresponding to the meta-values described above. Our analysis identified three 
explained principal components for the Italian data and four explained components for 
the German data, a significant reduction from the original 21 questions. The resulting 
primary components align with the meta-value categories described above, and are 
consistent with the SHV framework although they fall along slightly different boundaries 
 30 
 
due to the smaller number of components. We refer to these components as “values 
profiles”.  
The three values profiles identified from the Italian PCA and included as 
regressors in the mixed logit model below are therefore: “Self-Transcendence/ Openness-
to-Change,” “Self-Enhancement/ Openness-to- Change,” and “Conservation”. The 
component analysis results for Italy are presented below in Tables 5. The four values 
profiles resulting from the German PCA consist of four meta-values, including “Self-
Transcendence / Openness-to-Change,” “Self-Enhancement,” Conservation,” and 
“Hedonism.” The component analysis results for Germany are presented below in Table 
6. 
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Table 5 Italian Principle Component Analysis Result 
 
 Meta-Values  
 
Values 
 
Self-Enhancement/ 
Openness-to -Change 
Self-
Transcendence/ 
Openness-to- 
Change 
Conservation  Unexplained 
       
Achievement  0.52 -0.08 0.03  0.23 
Hedonism  0.44 0.05 0.05  0.33 
Power  0.51 -0.15 0.11  0.27 
Stimulation  0.45 0.17 -0.12  0.27 
Benevolence  -0.09 0.55 0.11  0.23 
Self-
direction  0.25 0.49 -0.23  0.30 
Universalism  -0.09 0.61 0.05  0.19 
Conformity  0.05 -0.01 0.60  0.30 
Security  -0.01 0.17 0.45  0.37 
Tradition  0.01 -0.03 0.59  0.38 
              
Variance explained : 71.5%     
 
 
 32 
 
Table 6 German Principle Components Analysis Results  
  
Meta-Values 
  
Values  Conservation 
Self-
Transcendence/ 
Openness-to-
Change 
Self 
Enhancement Hedonism  Unexplained 
Conformity  0.53 0.05 0.23 -0.14  0.30 
Security  0.53 -0.16 -0.13 0.40  0.19 
Tradition  0.54 0.09 0.06 -0.14  0.30 
Benevolence  0.24 0.32 -0.26 0.23  0.25 
Self-
direction  -0.15 0.60 0.07 0.04  0.30 
Stimulation  -0.19 0.33 0.20 0.32  0.28 
Universalism  0.14 0.61 -0.09 -0.17  0.23 
Achievement  -0.03 0.06 0.60 0.07  0.21 
Power  0.08 -0.06 0.67 0.00  0.17 
Hedonism  -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.78  0.15 
                
Variation explained: 76.47%      
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2.4.3 Mixed Logit Analysis Results 
2.4.3.1 Mixed Logit Model 
The values profiles were included in our Mixed Logit model analysis as 
observable consumer attributes. The mixed logit model is then used to estimate the 
posterior probability of Italian and German consumers’ selection, and their WTP for 
different credence process attributes of the new potato in both willingness to pay and 
preference space. The mixed logit discrete choice model addresses two of the most 
critical concerns associated with the traditional logit model. The model accounts for 
additional unobserved consumer heterogeneity by allowing parameters to vary randomly 
(Revelt and Train, 1998). As a result, our model does not suffer from the inappropriate 
imposition of independence of irrelevant alternatives. In addition, the mixed logit model 
allows unobserved utility to be correlated over individuals in our panel (Revelt and Train, 
1998). The mixed logit model is widely used for food and consumer choice research.  
In the discrete choice model, consumers n = 1,…,N maximize utility 
'njt n njt njtU xβ ε= +  , where nβ is a vector of individual-specific coefficients, njtx is a vector of 
observed attributes relating to individual n and alternative j on choice occasion t , and njtε
is a random term that is assumed to be an independently and identically distributed 
extreme value. The density for β is denoted as ( | )f β θ , where θ are the parameters of the 
distribution. Conditional on knowing nβ  , the probability of respondent n  choosing 
alternative i  on choice occasion t  is given by the conditional logit formula (McFadden, 
1974) 
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Where j = 1,…, J denotes the product alternatives, and t = 1,…,T denotes the 
choice sets. The vector of observed variables includes all of the product attributes for the 
alternative offered to the consumer 
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Where ( , )i n t  is the alternative chosen by individual n  on choice occasion t . The 
unconditional probability of the sequence of choices that are observed is the conditional 
probability integrated over the distribution of β : 
 ( ) ( ) ( | )n n nP S f dθ β β θ β= ∫   (2.2) 
This is a weighted average of a product of logit formulas evaluated at different 
values of β , with the weights provided by the density f . 
The goal is to estimate the mean and covariance of nβ , or the population 
parameters θ . Since we suggest that there is consumer heterogeneity, the population 
parameters provide us with the distribution of individual parameters. The probability 
estimation must be approximated by simulation, as the integral 1.3 does not exist in 
closed form and cannot be calculated analytically. Details on the simulation procedure 
are provided by Hole (2007).  
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2.4.3.2 Model Specifications 
We include in the model five product attributes with two or three levels each to 
represent extrinsic credence attributes for early potatoes. We interacted these attributes 
variables with values profiles to create variables that capture heterogeneity in preferences 
for attributes based on human values. The Italian model includes interactions between 
Self-Transcendence/Openness-to-Change and attribute variables, and Self-
Enhancement/Openness-to-Change and attribute variables; the base, or omitted, case is 
Conservation. The German model includes interactions between Self-Transcendence/ 
Openness-to-Change and attribute variables, Self-Enhancement and attribute variables; 
and Conservation and attribute variables; the base, or omitted, case is Hedonism4.  
Following Hole (2007) and Hole (2008) we tested a number of different model 
specifications to identify which coefficients to vary or to leave as fixed, and which 
distributions (normal or log normal) these coefficients should follow5. As a result, the 
models estimated for the Italian and German data sets vary slightly, in order to best fit the 
respective data. In both cases, we find that allowing normal price variables to vary 
improves model fit (Hole, 2008; Meijer and Rouwendal, 2006). In both data sets, we 
tested whether coefficients were independently distributed, and finding that they were not 
we followed Hole (2007) and Train (2003) to estimate the parameters in the covariance 
matrices6 and allow for correlated normal coefficients.  
 
                                                 4 The models were tested with different base cases. These specifications fit the data best. 5 If we had found that the log-normal distribution fit best, it may not have been the case 
that coefficients were correlated. 6 Not estimated directly, but through the lower-triangular matrix L, where covariance 
matrix is LL’ 
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2.4.3.3 Mixed Logit Model Results 
Given the results of the PCA, we expect that Italian and German consumers 
whose values profiles align principally with Self-Transcendence/ Openness-to-Change 
will demonstrate a coefficient with positive effects for process attributes that may 
promote a social outcome, including potatoes that are labeled to indicate ethical labor 
practices, and low carbon impact. We would also expect these coefficients to be positive 
for sustainable production methods, such as Organic or Environmental Production, but 
we are not able to disaggregate these effects from preferences for increased individual 
welfare. We expect that Italian and German consumers who express the meta-value of 
Self-Enhancement will demonstrate a decreased willingness to pay for potatoes that do 
not confer an individual benefit, including ethical certification and carbon logo. Mean 
coefficient estimates and standard deviations for the ML model are reported in Tables 7 
and 8. We will focus our analysis on the statistically significant parameters. We do not 
have strong priors about the effects of COOL. On one hand, we might expect that a 
person who exhibits a Self-Enhancement values profile might indicate an ethnocentric 
perspective, giving Own-Country origin labeling a positive effect, but Other-country 
Origin labeling a negative effect. On the other hand, a truly self-regarding values profile 
might indicate a disregard for anyone other than oneself, resulting in a negative effect. 
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Table 7 Models Estimation (Italy)  
          Italian Logit  Italian Mixed Logit  
Attributes  Values 
 
Coefficients   Coefficients  
Standard 
Deviations 
   
  
  
 
     
     
Coef. Std. Err. 
 Coef. Std. Err.  Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
     
  
 
     
Price 
    
-1.05 0.06  -0.94 0.10  1.45 0.14 
 
X  Self Enhancement 0.15 0.03 
 0.15 0.06  0.36 0.13 
 
X  Self Transcendence -0.10 0.03 
 0.06 0.08  0.47 0.16 
Production  
  
  
 
     
 
Environmentally friendly  0.16 0.05  0.32 0.05    
 
X  Self Enhancement -0.03 0.03 
 -0.12 0.04    
 
X  Self Transcendence 0.05 0.03 
 0.13 0.04    
 
Organic 
 
0.01 0.05  0.29 0.06    
 
X  Self Enhancement 0.00 0.03 
 -0.13 0.04    
 
X  Self Transcendence 0.07 0.03 
 0.18 0.04    
Carbon Logo 
 
0.40 0.04  0.40 0.04  0.43 0.10 
 
X  Self Enhancement -0.03 0.02 
 -0.06 0.03  0.18 0.05 
 
X  Self Transcendence 0.05 0.03 
 0.07 0.04  0.21 0.06 
Origin 
    
  
 
     
 
Labeled Italian 2.25 0.05  2.50 0.11  1.54 0.12 
 
X  Self Enhancement -0.18 0.03 
 -0.39 0.07  0.42 0.10 
 
X  Self Transcendence 0.11 0.03 
 0.29 0.08  0.40 0.11 
 
Labeled Not Italian 0.66 0.06  0.66 0.10  1.08 0.11 
 
X  Self Enhancement 0.01 0.03 
 -0.11 0.06    
 
X  Self Transcendence -0.06 0.04 
 0.07 0.07    
SA8000 Certification 0.32 0.04  0.45 0.05    
 
X  Self Enhancement -0.07 0.02 
 -0.16 0.04  0.24 0.06 
 
X  Self Transcendence 0.05 0.03 
 0.13 0.04  0.21 0.07 
Opt-Out  
  
-1.07 0.10  -4.74 0.59  4.26 0.41 
 
X  Self Enhancement 0.16 0.04 
 0.23 0.29  0.87 0.24 
 
X  Self Transcendence -0.20 0.04 
 0.94 0.31  1.77 0.30 
Constant 
    
-1.81 0.08       
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Table 8 Models estimation (Germany) 
        German Logit   German Mixed Logit  
Attributes Values 
 
Coefficients   Coefficients  
Standard 
Deviations 
    
Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. 
Std. 
Err.  Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Price 
  
-2.12 0.06   -3.07 0.17  2.77 0.21 
 
X Self Enhancement 0.30 0.04   0.26 0.12  1.25 0.19 
 
X Self Transcendence 0.07 0.04   0.49 0.15  2.02 0.25 
 
X Conservation -0.06 0.04   -0.15 0.13  0.77 0.17 
Production 
    
  
     
 
Environmentally friendly  0.18 0.05   0.58 0.07  
  
 
X Self Enhancement 0.01 0.04   -0.26 0.06  0.62 0.09 
 
X Self Transcendence -0.12 0.03   0.16 0.07  0.56 0.09 
 
X Conservation 0.06 0.04   0.09 0.06  
  
 
Organic 
 
0.25 0.05   0.73 0.07  
  
 
X Self Enhancement -0.09 0.03   -0.27 0.06  0.60 0.09 
 
X Self Transcendence 0.03 0.04   0.20 0.07  0.54 0.08 
 
X Conservation 0.03 0.04   0.11 0.06  
  Carbon Logo 
 
0.31 0.04   0.38 0.05  
  
 
X Self Enhancement -0.06 0.03   -0.13 0.04  0.29 0.07 
 
X Self Transcendence 0.02 0.03   0.11 0.05  0.51 0.08 
 
X Conservation -0.02 0.03   -0.02 0.04  
  Origin 
     
  
     
 
Labeled German 1.73 0.05   2.00 0.08  
  
 
X Self Enhancement -0.17 0.03   -0.36 0.06  
  
 
X Self Transcendence -0.14 0.04   0.07 0.09  1.44 0.11 
 
X Conservation 0.14 0.04   0.23 0.06  
  
 
Labeled Not German 0.53 0.05   0.16 0.08  
  
 
X Self Enhancement 0.00 0.04   -0.17 0.07  0.60 0.09 
 
X Self Transcendence -0.16 0.04   0.09 0.08  
  
 
X Conservation -0.04 0.04   -0.11 0.07  
  SA8000 Certification 0.49 0.04   0.81 0.06  0.49 0.09 
 
X Self Enhancement -0.17 0.03   -0.30 0.05  0.53 0.07 
 
X Self Transcendence 0.07 0.03   0.20 0.06  0.46 0.09 
 
X Conservation 0.01 0.03   0.08 0.05  0.18 0.08 
Opt-Out 
   
-2.16 0.09   -6.40 0.60  5.20 0.38 
 
X Self Enhancement -0.10 0.05   -1.02 0.27  1.20 0.32 
 
X Self Transcendence -0.07 0.05   0.90 0.31  2.47 0.35 
 
X Conservation -0.15 0.05   -0.10 0.26  
  Constant 
   
-0.63 0.07   
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We created interaction variables between the values profiles discussed above and 
product attributes. Several of these interactions were statistically significant, and, 
additionally, conformed to the hypotheses regarding how human values affect consumer 
preferences for extrinsic credence attributes. For the Italian model, the interactions 
between Self-Transcendence / Openness to Change and the process attributes Organic 
and Environmental Friendly production, Italian Origin, and Ethical Certification are 
significant and positive. The interactions between Self-Enhancement and the process 
attributes Organic and Environmental Friendly production, Italian Origin, and Ethical 
Certification are significant and negative. The likelihood ratio for the model indicates a 
good fit.  
Italian and German consumers, as a whole, value process attributes as one would 
expect, based on prior research. In the ML model, the random coefficients are expected to 
vary across individuals; this variation is indicated by the estimated standard deviations of 
the coefficients. The random coefficients in both Italian and German ML models include 
Price, COOL (Country of Origin Labeling), Italian/ German Origin, Carbon Logo, and 
Ethical Certification. Each of these is significant. The Organic and Environmentally 
Friendly production methods attributes were also random, significant, and positive in the 
German model; While they are not random in the Italian model, they are significant and 
positive. Price effects and the “Opt-Out” are random, significant and negative for both 
Italian and German consumers, as expected.  
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Table 9 WTP Estimates for Mixed Logit Italy 
Attributes  Values 
 
Coefficients 
 
Standard Deviations 
Production    Coef. Std. Err.  Coef. Std. Err. 
 Environmentally friendly  0.36 0.04    
 X  Self Enhancement -0.06 0.03    
 X  Self Transcendence 0.11 0.03    
 Organic  0.34 0.04    
 X  Self Enhancement -0.03 0.03    
 X  Self Transcendence 0.13 0.03    
Carbon Logo  0.31 0.03    
 X  Self Enhancement -0.02 0.02  0.06 0.05 
 X  Self Transcendence 0.05 0.02  0.00 0.06 
Origin          
 Labeled Italian 2.10 0.14  0.90 0.10 
 X  Self Enhancement -0.23 0.05  0.23 0.05 
 X  Self Transcendence 0.22 0.06  0.29 0.06 
 Labeled Not Italian 0.71 0.08  -0.39 0.09 
 X  Self Enhancement -0.05 0.04    
 X  Self Transcendence 0.07 0.05    
SA8000 Certification 0.35 0.04  0.29 0.10 
 X  Self Enhancement -0.08 0.03  -0.12 0.06 
 X  Self Transcendence 0.10 0.03  -0.14 0.05 
Opt-Out    -6.45 0.88  4.46 0.54 
 X  Self Enhancement 0.07 0.09  0.62 0.12 
 X  Self Transcendence 0.15 0.11  1.99 0.26 
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Table 10 WTP Estimate for Mixed Logit Germany 
          German Mixed Logit  
Attributes 
 
Values 
 
Coefficients 
 
Standard Deviations 
     
Coef. Std. Err. 
 
Coef. Std. Err. 
Production 
 
       
 
Environmentally friendly  0.24 0.02  
  
 
X 
 
Self Enhancement -0.07 0.01  -0.06 0.01 
 
X 
 
Self Transcendence 0.06 0.02  0.00 0.02 
 
X 
 
Conservation 0.03 0.01 
 
  
 
Organic 
 
0.25 0.02  
  
 
X 
 
Self Enhancement -0.07 0.01  0.04 0.01 
 
X 
 
Self Transcendence 0.07 0.02  0.00 0.01 
 
X 
 
Conservation 0.02 0.01 
 
  Carbon Logo 
 
0.16 0.01  
  
 
X 
 
Self Enhancement -0.01 0.01 
 0.05 0.02 
 
X 
 
Self Transcendence 0.01 0.01 
 -0.05 0.02 
 
X 
 
Conservation -0.01 0.01 
 
  Origin 
         
 
Labeled German 0.66 0.03  
  
 
X 
 
Self Enhancement -0.08 0.02  
  
 
X 
 
Self Transcendence 0.01 0.02 
 0.30 0.03 
 
X 
 
Conservation 0.02 0.02 
 
  
 
Labeled Not German 0.18 0.03  
  
 
X 
 
Self Enhancement -0.04 0.02 
 0.16 0.02 
 
X 
 
Self Transcendence 0.01 0.02 
 
  
 
X 
 
Conservation -0.03 0.02 
 
-0.03 0.02 
SA8000 Certification 0.20 0.01    
 
X 
 
Self Enhancement -0.06 0.01  -0.06 0.02 
 
X 
 
Self Transcendence 0.05 0.01  0.02 0.02 
 
X 
 
Conservation 0.01 0.01 
 0.03 0.01 
Opt-Out 
    
-3.61 0.29  2.10 0.17 
 
X 
 
Self Enhancement -0.27 0.05  0.60 0.06 
 
X 
 
Self Transcendence -1.33 0.06  0.39 0.05 
 
X 
 
Conservation -0.13 0.05  
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To provide an intuitive interpretation of these coefficients, we calculate WTP 
estimates in willingness to pay space (Train and Weeks, 2005; Hole, 2007; Hole, 2008), 
reported in Tables 9 and 10. In contrast to specifying the distributions and then 
estimating WTP in preference space as the ratio of two coefficients, we specify the 
distributions for WTP at the estimation stage. We take this approach for three reasons. 
First, our price attribute coefficients are random, and have a distribution. To estimate 
WTP in preference space using the Delta Method, we would need to ignore the 
information presented by the coefficients of the standard deviations estimated in our 
mixed logit model and assume that our price coefficients are in fact scalar, since both 
coefficients are normally distributed. Next, our Meta Values are constructed so that 
individuals fall along a continuum such that the mean is about zero. While we could 
perform a series of transformations to achieve a defined function, this seems unwieldy. 
Finally, while there is some ambiguity about the proper approach to estimating WTP 
from a Mixed Logit model, it appears that, compared to estimation in preference space, 
coefficients estimated in WTP are less likely to be “inflated” and are therefore more 
economically realistic than estimates arrived at through the preference space approach 
Hole and Kolstad (2011). To calculate WTP in WTP space, we use the mixlogitwtp 
procedure (Hole, 2007) in STATA (v.15). We assumed normal distributions and used 500 
Halton draws. The mixlogitwtp procedure samples the independent Halton draws from the 
mixing distributions of the coefficients βk and βp . In our sample we have 
𝛽𝑘~𝑁(𝜇𝑘,𝜎𝑘2),  𝛽𝑝~𝑁(𝜇𝑝,𝜎𝑝2), where 𝜇𝑘,𝜎𝑘2, 𝜇𝑝,𝜎𝑝2 are estimated in the previous 
mixed logit model. For each draw, the WTP values are calculated according to the 
standard WTP formula, 𝑊𝑊𝑊 = −𝛽𝑘
𝛽𝑝
 (Rischatsch, 2009).  
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In general, both Italian and German consumers’ mean WTP for product attributes 
COOL (Country of Origin Labeling), Italian/ German Origin, Organic, Carbon Logo, 
EC (Ethical Certification), and Environmentally Friendly (German) are positive and 
significant (WTP estimates are statistically significant at 5% or better if the calculated 
confidence intervals do not fall over zero).  
However, we can see that these increased WTP vary importantly depending upon 
the values profiles held by the individual consumers. As hypothesized, Italian consumers 
with values profiles of Self-Transcendence / Openness to Change have a positive and 
significant WTP for Organic (€/kg 0.13) and EC (€/kg 0.10) product attributes. 
Consumers with value profiles of Self-Enhancement / Openness to change have 
significant and negative WTP for Italian Origin (€/kg -0.23) and EC ( €/kg -0.08). 
Similarly, German consumers with values profiles of Self-Transcendence / 
Openness to Change have a positive and significant WTP for Organic (€/kg 0.07), 
Environmentally Friendly (€/kg 0.06) and EC (€/kg 0.05) product attributes. Consumers 
with values profiles of Self-Enhancement have significant and negative WTP for German 
Origin (€/kg -0.08) and EC (€/kg -0.06). 
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper seeks to compare how the human values of consumers in Italy and 
Germany impact a decision to purchase early potatoes that are differentiated by extrinsic 
credence attributes. Two online surveys were conducted in the two countries to 
investigate consumers’ human values, their preferences for early potatoes with different 
extrinsic attributes, and basic demographic information. Several researches have focused 
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in recent years their attention on the relationship between human values and food choice. 
However, to the best of our knowledge this is one of the first to focus on the role human 
values have in influencing the willingness to pay for specific extrinsic food attributes. 
Results from this paper confirm not only the existence of a strong relationship between 
consumers’ human values and food choices, but also show a clear influence of human 
values on willingness to pay for extrinsic credence attributes. 
According to our results, the Schwartz Portrait Values Questionnaire identifies the 
heterogeneity in consumers’ Human Values and plausibly explains how pro-social values 
relate to consumers’ preferences for pro-social credence process attributes. This 
heterogeneity suggests that different consumers have different preferences for pro-social 
attributes. On the face of it, this conclusion seems trite – but from a policy perspective the 
implications are of considerable importance. 
While other disciplines exhibit confidence in the external validity of the Schwartz 
Values framework, there is room to compare the stated preference results with revealed 
preferences, through scanner data or non-hypothetical experimental auctions. Our two 
populations were both European, and more robust cross-cultural studies might help 
interpret the role of equivalency bias.  
Values appear to play an important role in consumers’ willingness to pay for 
credence process attributes. Italian and German consumers who express the meta-value of 
Self-Transcendence / Openness to Change have a higher WTP for product attributes such 
as Organic and Ethical Certification, demonstrating concern for the wellbeing of others. 
Consumers who express the meta-value of Conservation have an increased WTP for 
product attributes such as Italian/ German Origin, and a decreased WTP for new concepts 
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like Ethical Certification, demonstrating order, self-restriction, preservation of the past, 
and resistance to change.  
The results are encouraging, but they also are limited. We are not able to 
disaggregate preferences for the individual welfare increasing aspects of double duty 
attributes from the pro social aspects. 
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CHAPTER 3  
FOOD SERVICE AUTHORITIES’ MOTIVATIONS TO BUY REGIONAL 
FOOD 
3.1 Introduction 
Like consumers in retail environments, food service authorities that purchase 
foods for cafeterias in institutions like schools, hospitals, nursing homes, and prisons 
have demonstrated an interest in buying local and regional foods. In this chapter, I 
combine field research and empirical research to analyze the relationship between 
institutions’ choices to purchase products with pro-social attributes and costs specific to 
the market structure through which those products are delivered. The first section of this 
chapter investigates the history of Farm to Institution (FTI) programs in Massachusetts 
and the relationship between the pro-social motivations of FTI regional food purchasing 
and market structure. In the second section of the chapter I present work conducted with a 
co-author, Jeffery O’Hara, in which we use USDA Farm to School Census data to test, 
among schools participating in farm to school programs, whether the market channel 
portfolio used to procure local foods impacts school meal costs. We find that schools that 
exclusively buy from intermediaries are five percentage points less likely to report lower 
costs from undertaking Farm to School ( FTS) initiatives. In contrast, schools that 
procure local foods from both producers and intermediaries are four percentage points 
more likely to report lower costs.  
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3.2 Massachusetts Farm to Institution Programs 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Farm to Institution programs seek to link institutional food service purchasers to 
local farmers, and have grown considerably throughout the country and throughout the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the last decade. Programs are generally operated by 
non-profits, institutions such as schools or hospitals, or local or regional governments or 
departments. According to advocacy groups, the first documented “Farm to School” 
program began in Santa Monica, California in 1996 (Community Food Security 
Coalition, School Food FOCUS, & National Farm to School Network, 2010). By 2001, 
there were 6 documented programs in the United States, 400 programs by 2004, and 
2,350 programs by 2011 (Community Food Security Coalition, 2012). The National Farm 
to School Network reports that in 2012 there were 2,571 programs in all 50 states, 
involving 10,217 schools and 2,470 school districts (2012). 
Farm to Institution (FTI) programs have been inspired by a range of motivations 
including: to provide consumers of institutional meals nutrition education and access to 
fresher, more appetizing, and more healthful meal options in order to combat nutrition-
related illness and disease; to provide a new market for farmers; to spur local economic 
growth by increasing the scale of locally-grown sales; and to improve the environmental 
sustainability of the food system (i.e., cutting down on “food miles” or limiting pesticide 
use). FTI programs may provide support to any of the participants in the supply chain – 
from the end consumer and the institution where they eat their meal, to the farmer. 
Nationally, FTI programs began in public elementary and secondary schools, and have 
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subsequently spread to private schools, colleges, universities, pre-schools, hospitals, 
nursing homes, and group homes.  
In 2002, the Massachusetts Department of Agricultural Resources (MDAR) 
sponsored a farm-to-college event at Tu FTS University, which resulted in an 
Institutional Sales Task Force under then-Commissioner of Agriculture Jay Healy. The 
Task Force supported Massachusetts’ colleges and private schools to purchase locally 
grown produce. By the fall of 2003 budget cuts at MDAR eliminated staffing for the Task 
Force, but the Mass. School Food Service Association (now called Mass. School 
Nutrition Association) had hired the former MDAR staff person to do a one year grant-
funded farm to school pilot project with five public school districts. The former staff 
person founded the Massachusetts Farm to School Project (M FTSP) in 2004.  
M FTSP has been at the forefront of the national FTI trend, and has contributed to 
a particularly robust landscape of programs in the Commonwealth. M FTSP was the first 
entity in Massachusetts devoted exclusively to “connect[ing] farms and institutions to 
improve access to locally grown foods and strengthen our local economy” (M FTSP, 
2012). Over the course of the eight subsequent school years, Massachusetts Public School 
Districts’ participation in Farm to School programs increased from 1% in 2004-2005, to 
44% in 2011-2012 (Erwin, 2012). This increase in the percent of public school students 
in Massachusetts who are served local food is shown in Figure 2, along with the 
concurrent rise in the percent of schools that adopt preferential purchasing of local foods 
in their school food service budgets (M FTSP, 2012). In 2013, M FTSP became a 
subsidiary of Project Bread, a non-profit organization that assists those in need of food.  
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M FTSP also reports increases in programs in hospitals, pre-schools, private 
schools, colleges and universities in the Commonwealth (Leib, 2012). A list of the 
entities that joined M FTSP to promote FTI programs in Massachusetts is listed in Figure 
3. The list includes agricultural business associations, non-profit “Buy Local” advocacy 
organizations, childhood health and nutrition organizations, municipal farm to institution 
programs, economic development and government agencies, school food service staff and 
farmers, as well as individuals in communities around the Commonwealth. 
.
 
Figure 2 MA Public School District Farm to School Participation 2004-2012 
(Erwin, 2012; DOE, 21012) 
 
Despite the increase in number of FTI programs and the volume of product sold, 
it is not yet clear how or whether these programs necessarily deliver all of the benefits 
attributed to them. Massachusetts’ diverse and deep offering of FTI programs makes it an 
ideal environment in which to study how different FTI programs may achieve these 
benefits. In particular, this paper will provide the research foundation needed to analyze 
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the market structures under which the claims that FTI contributes significantly to 
increased revenues to regional farmers. 
Figure 3 Massachusetts FTI Support Entities 
 
This paper reviews the varied origins and goals of Massachusetts FTI programs, 
describes the institutional wholesale markets for regionally grown differentiated products, 
and summarizes the current market and suggests topics for future research, based on 
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currently available data. In addition to the review of relevant published and publicly 
available literature, the author conducted interviews and reviewed internal organizational 
documents.  
This paper is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of all Farm to Institution 
programs in Massachusetts, but an outline of the markets that underlie these programs. 
3.2.2 Origins and Goals  
Farm to Institution programs have been inspired by a wide range of goals and 
pursued by a variety of organizations. The major proponents of FTI programs in 
Massachusetts have been:  
• Nutritionists, food access and public health advocates,  
• Organizations that advocate for regional economic development, and  
• Organizations that support farmers 
Environmental sustainability does not appear to have been a primary driver of FTI 
programs in Massachusetts, and this paper will not address environmental goals. This 
section will offer a brief review of the origins and goals of FTI programs like those in 
Massachusetts, and the state of current research that seeks to demonstrate the links 
between them.  
3.2.2.1 Nutrition and Access to Healthful Foods  
Evidence that nutrition and health are closely linked has motivated nutritionists, 
public health professionals, and other food access advocates to implement preventative 
measures that combat nutrition and diet-related illnesses. It is not surprising that 
institutional food service is seen as an ideal mechanism through which more healthful 
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meals can be offered to at-risk populations in schools, hospitals, nursing homes and other 
public or quasi- public settings (Briefel et al., 2009; Cohen, et al., 2012; Conner et. al, 
2012). Institutional food service providers frequently supply basic sustenance to 
consumers who are considered to be members of at-risk populations for nutrition-related 
illness or disease, such as obesity or diabetes, and who may lack access to healthful foods 
(Briefel et al. 2009, Cohen et al. 2012; Gordon, et al., 2009; Hawkes, 2009). This 
subsection will outline the proposal that increased regional foods in institutional settings 
can improve health outcomes. 
FTI is not considered to be effective to reduce nutrition-related disease and illness 
as a stand-alone program; FTI programs are pursued as one component of broad-based 
health interventions for at-risk populations (Cohen, et al. 2012). Effective programs 
comprehensively address a number of the economic, psychological and behavioral issues 
that have been identified as barriers to healthful eating (Cohen, et al. 2012; Just, et al. 
2008). For example, a comprehensive approach might offer a meal made with fresh 
produce from a local farmer with a subsidy to incentivize the purchase of healthful foods, 
a cooking class to promote the idea that healthful foods are satiating and taste good, a 
visit to a local farm to teach students where food comes from, and the removal of snack 
machines in cafeterias to help support new eating habits that include decreased 
consumption of less healthful foods. The comprehensive approach sources and procures 
healthful food; trains food service staff in nutrition and preparation of healthful foods; 
provides consumers with information about health and nutrition; offers healthful foods in 
a manner that encourages the selection of more healthful over less healthful foods; 
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reduces the availability of less healthful foods; and tracks the actual consumption of 
healthful foods (Just, et al. 2008; Briefel, et al., 2009).  
The multi-faceted nature of the comprehensive approach, in addition to the recent 
introduction of these programs, makes it difficult to isolate the importance of the role of 
FTI, in and of itself, in achieving these health and nutrition related goals. Health and 
nutrition-related studies that seek to verify the value of FTI programs in addressing these 
issues appear to be focused on Farm to School programs, as opposed to Farm to Hospital, 
or more general Farm to Cafeteria programs.  
To demonstrate the value of FTI as a component of a comprehensive approach to 
improve health outcomes, one would need to demonstrate that regional foods are 
nutritionally superior or are more likely to be consumed than non-regional foods; that 
education about and increased access to regional foods is directly linked to the increased 
purchase and consumption of these foods; and that the increased consumption leads to a 
decrease in nutrition related diseases. This is obviously a high bar, and these links have 
not yet been conclusively demonstrated (Cohen, et al. 2012). The rest of the section will 
focus on the pieces of evidence that FTI programs can impact health and nutrition 
outcomes. 
Farm to School programs operate under a specific set of constraints. These 
constraints bind school food service providers to work within very tight budgets, and 
adhere to an evolving landscape of nutritional requirements (Izumi, et al., 2010; Gordon, 
et al., 2009). Public and non-profit private schools frequently participate in the National 
School Lunch Program (NSLP) and School Breakfast Program (SBP), which subsidize 
and provide USDA food for schools which offer free and reduced cost meals that meet 
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the USDA’s dietary guidelines to eligible children (FNS, 2011). In addition, these 
schools may have access to Department of Defense (DOD) commodity foods (FNS, 
2011). Meals subsidized under NSLP and SBP are available to students whose families 
are at or below 130 percent of the federal poverty level (free meals) and to students 
whose families are between 130 and 185 percent of the federal poverty level (reduced-
price meals) (Fox et al., 2012). Many schools supplement meals offered via USDA and 
DOD programs with “competitive foods” - à la carte menu items, vending machines, 
school stores, snack bars, and fundraisers, which students pay for in cash (Gordon et al., 
2009). These competitive foods are not required by the USDA to meet specific dietary 
guidelines, although in 2010 the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Legislature revised 
Chapter 197 to regulate competitive foods (Erwin, 2012).  
The USDA’s dietary guidelines for NSLP and SBP have changed over the years 
as the understanding of the roles of different nutrients in a healthful childhood diet has 
improved (Fox et al., 2012). The most recent guidelines limit the intake of total fats, 
saturated fats, and sodium as well as recommended Dietary Allowances (RDA) or 
Dietary Reference Intakes (DRI) for vitamins and minerals. Meals offered in schools 
generally meet the dietary guidelines and NSLP nutritional requirements, but these 
requirements have not historically limited or specified guidelines regarding sodium, 
whole grains or fiber content, much less taste or palatability (Cho, et al., 2004; Clark, et 
al., 2009). The USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) periodically conducts the 
School Nutrition Dietary Assessment (SNDA) to determine student nutrient intake, 
including both NSLP and SBP participants and non-participants. The most recent SNDA, 
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which used a 24 hour student dietary recall along with 2004-2005 school menu reports, 
found that while the number of schools that offer more healthful meals has increased, 
 “…Fewer than one-third of public schools offered and served school lunches that met the 
USDA standards for total fat (no more than 30 percent of calories) or saturated fat (less 
than 10 percent of calories)…” (Gordon et al., 2007). Because many of these food service 
providers work on tight margins, often with significant public funding, school food 
service providers have prioritized meeting the NSLP nutritional requirements, at times by 
relying on low-cost inputs (Gordon, et al., 2009; Just, et al., 2008). The nutritional quality 
and palatability of meals prepared with these low-cost inputs has been questioned, and 
has fed the notion that more healthful meals would actually be consumed if better quality 
products were offered (Cho, et al., 2004).  
Research that validates the role of regionally sourced fresh fruits and vegetables 
to achieve nutrition and public health goals is in its infancy, and reports that substantiate 
this role often rely on program-level case studies and survey data (Graham, et al., 2004; 
King, et al., 2010). Many non-peer reviewed studies indicate that consumption of fruits 
and vegetables may increase when local or regional foods are offered through farmer’s 
market salad bars or other farm to institution programs (Graham, et al., 2004). In 2007, 
Faith, Monatine, Allison and Baskin reviewed different ways that institutions can address 
the problems of food consumption and obesity by changing the food environment. Few of 
the reviewed studies presented sound evidence that increased access to healthful food had 
a direct impact on consumption or changes in consumption, though they found evidence 
that indicated that subsidies for healthful food products did increase the purchase of more 
healthful foods (Faith, et al. 2007). In some non-peer reviewed reports, the Faith et al. 
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study is used to substantiate the link between increased access to -- and increased 
consumption of -- more healthful foods. The validity of this link begs further analysis that 
allows proper inference.  
However, a recent study, published in 2012 in the Journal of the Academy of 
Nutrition and Dietetics, analyzed the nutritional content of school meals offered through 
the Boston Chef Initiative compared with the nutritional content of traditional meals in 
control group schools that did not participate in the Chef Initiative program (Cohen, et 
al.). The Chef Initiative program funded four trained professional chefs to work in two 
public middle school cafeterias in Boston. The chefs worked with cafeteria staff to revise 
the school lunch menu in selected schools to offer more flavorful lunches while 
increasing whole grains, fruits and vegetables, and reducing sugar, salt, saturated fats, 
and trans fats, and to plan and train kitchen staff to prepare more nutritionally healthful 
meals. Meanwhile, two demographically comparable Boston public middle schools 
continued to offer the “traditional” school lunches as a control. Pre- and post- 
consumption weights of plates from these schools were compared to determine whether 
there was a difference in the quantity of the meal consumed. The results of this two-year 
plate-weight pilot study indicated that, compared to the control group that offered less 
healthful meals, when more healthful meals were offered to middle school students, a 
similar percentage of school meals were consumed, which resulted in higher overall 
consumption of more healthful foods (Cohen, et al. 2012). They hypothesizes that a 
broad-based program designed to incorporate more healthful foods and improve 
palatability of school meals would not negatively impact the amount of food consumed 
was validated in this study. The study results supported this hypothesis, and Cohen et al. 
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found no support for the contrary argument that students would eat less and waste more 
when healthy foods were served to them via this program. 
The Chef Initiative study did not use regionally grown food explicitly. No study 
has demonstrated conclusively that regionally grown food is healthier. One frequently 
cited and cautiously presented article, published in the Journal of the American College 
of Nutrition in 2004, did conclude that there were real declines in certain nutrients 
(protein, calcium, phosphorus, iron, riboflavin and ascorbic acid) in garden crops 
between 1950 and 1999 (Davis, et al., 2004). The authors attribute these declines to the 
increased cultivation of high-yield varieties (Davis, et al., 2004). To the author’s 
knowledge, no comparable study of farm crops has been conducted, and no study has 
demonstrated that “local” or “regional” foods have higher nutritional value than other 
foods. 
The Cohen et al. and Davis et al. studies are examples of the research currently 
being undertaken to identify how to fit the causal links proposed by those who advocate 
FTI programs to actual health outcomes. While these studies do not explicitly connect 
regionally grown food with health outcomes, they offer pieces of the puzzle. 
Understanding how, or whether, the pieces of a comprehensive campaign to prevent diet 
and nutrition related illness fit together, and the role that FTI plays in that campaign, will 
likely take many years. In the interim, public health professionals, nutritionists, and food 
access advocates continue to incorporate FTI programs as components of campaigns that 
introduce new, more healthful ways of eating to at-risk populations 
 58 
 
3.2.2.2 High Revenue Diversified Markets for Farmers 
Supporters of local and regional agriculture, including regional interest groups, 
non-profits and state departments of agriculture, advocate for FTI programs as a 
consistent high-revenue market for nearby farmers (Anderson, 2007; Conner et. al. 2012; 
Izumi et. al, 2010). Some supporters purport that the large scale of institutional food 
service providers offers access to a large market for direct sales of locally or regionally -
based differentiated products with relatively small transaction costs, compared to direct 
retail sales to consumers or smaller wholesale purchasers such as grocery stores and 
restaurants (Conner et. al, 2012; King, et al., 2010; Izumi, et al., 2010). The economic 
justification for the capacity of regional foods in the wholesale institutional market to 
deliver higher revenues to farmers thus depends upon: 
• whether the “short” supply chain is able to minimize transaction costs and 
deliver increased marginal revenues to farmers, similar to those resulting from 
regional direct sales, and  
• whether the price premium for a regionally differentiated product is able 
to capture a large enough premium over traditional wholesale products to 
deliver a higher net revenue to farmers than other available markets (Brown et 
al., 2012; Feenstra, et al., 2011; Low et al., 2010; Sexton, 2012).  
This subsection will outline the proposal that farmers can increase revenues by 
selling to the institutional market.  
Early FTI sales linked farmers to occasional wholesale direct sales at schools, 
often to prevent waste due to a bumper crop or a saturated market, or in a region where 
an export crop was already in abundance (King, et al., 2010; Izumi, et al., 2010). More 
consistent direct wholesale sales relationships followed, often coordinated by entities 
“outside” of the supply chain, including non-profits or state departments of agriculture 
 59 
 
(King, et al., 2010). As volume and regularity of sales increased, operational 
discrepancies between schools’ food procurement systems and farmers’ capacities 
became more problematic (Brayley, et al., 2012; Conner, et al., 2011; Feenstra, et al., 
2011; Fitzsimmons, 2011; Leib 2012). Farmers do not always have the capacity to 
produce large enough quantities of a particular product for delivery at a particular time, 
the capacity to coordinate with other farmers to aggregate, the ability to lightly process or 
wash produce to meet food service expectations, the ability to offer online purchasing or 
become an approved vendor for school districts, or the ability to meet the rising bar for 
on-farm food safety precautions, for example. For farmers who do have the capacity to 
participate in direct sales to institutions, there is the potential to receive almost 100% of 
the sale price. However, transaction costs absorbed by farmers associated with direct 
sales are estimated in case studies to be between 13-62% (King, et. al, 2010). As a result, 
FTI advocates have explored the addition of market intermediaries, such as wholesale 
aggregators, broadline or regional food distribution companies, to the supply chain, as 
these intermediaries’ capacities could fill the market gaps (Brayley, et al., 2012; Lieb, 
2012).  
Intermediaries can offer farmers and institutions with market services like orders, 
purchases, packaging, sanitation guarantees, delivery, and billing, which are more in line 
with a food service provider’s needs. The cost of these services must be absorbed by 
farmers and institutions. In addition to an estimated 15-25% purchase price markup to 
cover the transaction costs mentioned above, farmers can be required by intermediaries to 
meet stringent and expensive food safety liability insurance (FSLI) and on-farm 
sanitation guidelines like Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) that do not necessarily 
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reflect the nature or scale of the farm (Feenstra, et al., 2011; King et.al. 2010; Erwin, 
2012). In addition, the costs associated with transferring product information like the 
characteristics of the differentiated product -- farm’s identity, growing conditions, and 
sometimes the “local” quality of the product -- may be too high to be consistently 
communicated to the purchaser, and thus to the consumer (Feenstra, et al., 2011; King et 
al. 2010; Erwin, 2012). The exercise of market restraints, like FSLI, GAP, purchase 
minimums, and the capture of margins associated with them, is common in agricultural 
markets where downstream firms typically set contracts to protect food quality and safety 
(Sexton, 2012).  
In the recent paper, “Market Power, Misconceptions, And Modern Agricultural 
Markets,” Richard Sexton writes that: 
Market intermediaries, with even rather modest amounts of market power, can 
capture large shares of the benefits from policies intended to benefit farmers 
(2012). 
While there is evidence that farmers who participate in direct-to-consumer sales are able 
to capture a higher share of the food dollar, whether farmers who participate in 
intermediated regional markets are able to capture a similarly high portion of the food 
dollar is in question (Low & Vogel, et al., 2010). These realities challenge both the 
notion that FTI programs necessarily generate net revenues to farmers comparable to 
those seen in direct markets, as well as the idea that “regional” product differentiation 
necessarily generates a price premium to farmers (Izumi, et al., 2010; King, et al., 2010). 
These challenges, however, do not preclude the possibility that there are other 
aspects to this market that do serve to increase revenues to farmers. To the extent that off-
grade or surplus produce (smaller apples, peppers harvested at peak-season) are preferred 
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by institutional buyers, these markets could be seen to offer farmers a premium price for 
their marginal (but still regionally differentiated) products (Fitzsimmons, 2011; King, et 
al., 2010). The willingness and capacity of institutional buyers to absorb transaction costs 
or otherwise augment benefits to farmers (such as promoting the farmer through school 
events) may bolster farmers’ revenues. In addition, participating in these markets clearly 
is a way that farmers can diversify their businesses, and revenues are not thought to be 
lower than in mainstream wholesale channels (King, et al., 2010). More relevant to an 
analysis of market structure, some studies suggest that there is in fact a premium 
available for regionally differentiated produce, and that some market structures are more 
likely than others to preserve this premium for pass through to farmers (Brown, et al., 
2012; Feenstra, et al., 2011; King, et al., 2010). These concepts are explored in more 
depth in the sections below.  
There has been some indication that institutional sales in Massachusetts can be 
profitable to farmers. The Massachusetts Farm to School Project commissioned telephone 
surveys with farmers who sold institutions in 2008 and 2010 to inquire about the impact 
of FTI sales on farmers’ profits (Adams, 2011). The survey results describe 
Massachusetts farmers’ understanding of the profitability and role of FTI sales. The 2010 
survey asked farmers who sold to institutions about: 
• Gross income from institutional sales 
• Whether the sales to institutions were profitable (Yes, No, Somewhat)  
• What percent of total annual product sales were institutional sales, if 
known 
• Whether the farmer sold to a distributor that sells to institutions 
The survey had a 68% response rate; 73 farmers completed the survey. Of these 
73, 56% sold exclusively through direct sales to institutions, 14% sold both directly to 
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institutions and through distributors to institutions, and 3% sold exclusively through 
distributors to institutions. About 27% of the respondents did not sell to institutions in 
2010.  
Figure 4, Profitability of Actual Massachusetts FTI Sales, shows farmers’ 
perceptions of profitability from FTI sales. Of those farmers who sold directly to 
institutions, 55% indicated that FTI sales were profitable, 27% indicated that FTI sales 
were somewhat profitable, 14% indicated that FTI sales were not profitable, and 4% did 
not know whether FTI sales were profitable. Profitability responses from farmers who 
sold exclusively to distributors were not reported, and the profitability for farmers who 
sold both through distributors and directly to institutions did not indicate whether one 
supply chain contributed more or less to profitability than the other. 
 
Figure 3 Profitability of Actual MA FTI Sales, 2010 (Adams, 2011) 
 
About 91% of respondents who sold to institutions estimated gross income and 
the percentage of gross income from FTI sales. All of these respondents indicated that 
less than 50% of gross sales were institutional sales, about 19% indicated that FTI sales 
accounted for 10-50% of gross sales, and 81% indicated less than 10% of gross sales 
Profitability of Actual 
Mass. FTI Sales, 2010 
ProfitableSomewhat ProfitableNot ProfitableDon't know
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were FTI sales, as shown in Figure 5. Farmers’ Percent of Gross Income from FTI sales 
in Massachusetts. Dollar amounts for income from sales to institutions were provided by 
79% of respondents and totaled $1.32 million for the 2009-2010 school year. While the 
average income from FTI sales, based on these results, is about $31,474 per farm, the 
author of the report notes that correcting for a few outlying farms with large reported FTI 
sales puts the per farm average sales at $5,753 per farm. 
 
 
Figure 4 Farmer’s Percent of Gross Income from FTI Sales in MA, 2010 
(Adams, 2011) 
 
The report also noted some farmers’ comments. Farmers noted the trade-offs 
between costs associated with FTI sales and the profitability of these sales, the non-
economic benefits of FTI sales such as community “exposure”, the role of FTI sales in 
stabilizing seasonal income streams, the personal value of helping feed schoolchildren, 
and the “premium” nature of the product sold. 
In the language of economics and market structure, these comments and the 
survey results identify a need to understand the relationships between profitability of 
10-50%Less than 10 %
Farmers' Percent of Gross 
Income from FTI Sales in Mass., 
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direct sales and intermediated sales, the trade-offs associated with added transaction 
costs, the market value of the differentiated product, and the motivations beyond profit 
for farmers who sell to institutions.  
3.2.2.3 Local Food as Economic Development 
Recently, public officials and economic development organizations joined 
regional and local FTI advocates, who emphasize the role of agriculture in local and 
regional economic development (Izumi, et al., 2010). The idea that there are multiplier 
effects created from the purchase of local products flows from the idea that money is kept 
in circulation within a region, as opposed to flowing out of the region (King, et al., 2010). 
This would occur, as O’Hara and Pirog point out, if farmers subsequently purchase 
inputs, hire labor, and access capital within the region in question (Hilchey, 2013). This 
subsection will outline the proposal that increased sales of regionally grown foods to 
institutions can have a net positive effect on the regional economy. 
Studies that attempt to quantify the general or broad “impact” of local and 
regional agriculture on a regional economy generally estimate the potential economic 
value of a large increase in fruit and vegetable production and purchasing in a given 
region, often based on a “what-if” scenario. For example, “What if all of the end 
consumers for institutional food in a region consumed the USDA recommended 
quantities of fruits and vegetables, and these fruits and vegetables were all grown within 
the region?” Input-output models and tools (e.g., IMPLAN) used to calculate the direct, 
indirect, and induced effects of these “what-if” scenarios can be illuminating, but require 
a series of assumptions that may or may not reflect the actual regional economy being 
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modeled. Such assumptions include both the parameters that are assigned to different 
events within the economy, as well as the nature of the regional economy itself. 
A handful of recent studies that aim to quantify economic impact from regional or 
local food modify the parameters in standard input-output models to obtain more accurate 
results – these studies, along with the recent article “Economic Impacts of Local Food 
Systems: Future Research Priorities” offer a review of the challenges associated with 
conducting and drawing inferences from a rigorous input-output study (Gunter, 2011; 
Hilchey, 2013; Otto et al., 2005; Swenson, 2011; Tuck, et al., 2010).  
O’Hara and Pirog note four potential challenges associated with the parameters 
values of input-output models. The values may:  
• Be out of date 
• Be “at a coarser resolution than the researcher’s specified area of study” 
• Represent “average conditions”, while the researchers may be attempting 
to model specific conditions 
• May not be “based on statistical analysis” 
They further recommend that researchers who use these models customize the 
parameters in question, and document these modifications for future comparison 
(Hilchey, 2013).  
While regional economic “impact” studies of increased local production and 
consumption can include institutional purchases, most studies do not specifically address 
the role of FTI programs on economic development outcomes. An input-output study that 
pursues this line of questioning for Massachusetts would likely need to ask “What if 
Massachusetts producers grew enough fruit and vegetables to supply all of the wholesale 
institutional purchasers in Massachusetts, and these purchasers restricted their purchases 
of these products to only those products grown in Massachusetts?” Two studies, which 
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use FTI programs in Colorado and Minnesota, have made some progress towards 
answering similar questions on smaller scales. 
The Minnesota study proposed to answer the question “what is the potential 
economic impact of farm-to-school programs in Central Minnesota,” and to model impact 
that explicitly “accounted for decreased expenditures in the current supply chain and the 
potential for increased costs to the community in the form of higher lunch prices” (Tuck 
et al., 2010). Tuck et al. both conducted interviews with food service providers and 
farmers, and used pre-existing Minnesota food service survey demand data to frame 
IMPLAN scenarios. The study created scenarios under which schools serve all meals, 
some meals, or only special monthly meals, to model the “what if” shift in demand, and 
used three different prices – one price that reflects a “farm price” near to the farmer’s 
current market price, another “school price” that reflects the lower price that schools 
currently pay for equivalent product, and a third “intermediate price” that is halfway 
between the “farm price” and “school price.” The study finds that the largest multiplier 
effects result from the scenarios under which all of the products that are available locally 
are purchased, and where the farm price is used. However, the greatest positive regional 
economic effect occurs when the “school price” is used, as any higher price increases the 
costs to the public, which must pay for the increased cost of school meals. This result 
suggests that there may be a tension between achieving all FTI goals – an increase in the 
quantity of local foods served may not always be compatible with offering a price 
premium to the farmer.  
The Colorado study also uses IMPLAN to “quantify the direct impact of the Weld 
6 [School District] Farm to School program on the local economy” (Gunter, 2011). The 
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Colorado study, however, goes to greater lengths to customize IMPLAN to more 
accurately represent the direct marketing sector (Gunter, 2011). Gunter relied more 
heavily on survey and secondary data than did Tuck et al. to modify farmer decision 
making parameter values and the relative importance of key economic decisions by all 
supply chain actors. The study estimated demand for the school district in question as 
10% of all direct sales in Colorado for both fruits and vegetables, calculated with 2007 
Census data, and further assumes an allocation of sales between fruit and vegetables 
based on the school district’s purchase data. Gunter models four scenarios, but suggests 
that the most accurate scenario is that under which demand is not “new”, but shi FTS 
from already existing wholesale demand, and the above mentioned modifications to 
IMPLAN are incorporated. In this scenario, the increased local food purchases resulted in 
a modest positive net effect on the regional economy.  
An additional challenge for economic impact assessments is to appropriately 
factor in the opportunity costs of transferring land, labor and technology from one area of 
production to another (Swenson, 2010). Regions are distinct in both the existing areas of 
production that would be reduced and the potential area that could be increased. Each 
region is distinct in productivity of its farmland - the yields from an acre of land devoted 
to carrot production in Iowa may not be comparable to that of an acre of land in 
Massachusetts. Further, each region is distinct in the availability of productive farmland – 
“what if” scenarios do not generally restrict the potential supply of production.  
These caveats, along with others outlined in the reports mentioned in this section, 
suggest that “economic impact” studies conducted with input-output models warrant a 
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cautious reading, and that it is nearly impossible to extrapolate the findings of a particular 
study to predict the nature of effects in other regions.  
For example, Swenson’s 2010 report sought to quantify the economic value of 
increasing fruit and vegetable production and consumption within each of the Upper 
Midwest states, and again with selected sub-regions within that region. In this report, the 
cost of taking agricultural land out of corn and soybean production, including subtracting 
income from farm workers and revenues to local seed and supply firms, e.g., was 
weighed against the increase in employment and revenues from new fruit and vegetable 
production. Similar reports in other regions likewise used input-output models and found 
potential positive economic effects to increased regional fruit and vegetable production 
and consumption, but to date these studies appear to focus on regions that would swap 
one agricultural use of land for another (Conner, et al., 2008; Otto & Varner, et al., 2005; 
VSJF, 2011).  
To date, no comparable study has been conducted for Massachusetts, and it is 
therefore difficult to state with any confidence that increased production and 
consumption of Massachusetts produced food could be a net driver of economic 
development in the manner often suggested. In addition to the concerns above, a key 
component of these studies – i.e., the switch between agricultural uses of land - does not 
accurately represent the trade-offs that would need to be taken into consideration in 
Massachusetts. The value of land in Massachusetts is relatively high and alternative uses 
of land are likely to return higher economic values to non-agricultural uses, and perhaps 
non-FTI agricultural uses. For example, Figure 6 shows the Farm Real Estate Value of 
Land, which the USDA defines as an average of “the value at which all land and 
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buildings used for agricultural production, including dwellings, could be sold under 
current market conditions, if allowed to remain on the market for a reasonable amount of 
time” for Massachusetts was $10,500 per acre in 2012 (USDA, Land Values, 2012). The 
2012 farm real estate value per acre of land in Iowa, which had the highest average land 
value of the states used in Swenson’s report, was $7,000. Average land value in Vermont, 
which was studied in the Vermont Sustainable Jobs Fund report was $2,750 per acre, and 
the value per acre in Michigan, which was studied in the Conner et al. report, was $4,250. 
Swenson’s report used 2007 Agricultural Census and purchased IMPLAN data; the 
difference between Iowa and Massachusetts farm land values in 2007 was even greater - 
$3,958 per acre in Iowa versus $14,276 in Massachusetts (USDA, Agricultural Census, 
2007).  
 
Figure 5 2012 Farm Real Estate Value of Land (USDA, 2013)
 
Another important difference between the scenarios offered above and the 
intermediated market of interest in Massachusetts is the relationship between prices, 
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transaction costs and the availability of supply chain infrastructure. While the Swenson 
study assumes that the infrastructure required for “scaling up” is available, both the Tuck 
and Gunter studies assume that FTI sales are direct sales, and that farmers in these 
scenarios absorb the additional transaction costs associated with Farm to Institution sales 
and earn any associated increase in the share of food dollars.  
Finally, it is not entirely clear that agricultural markets for regionally 
differentiated goods are perfectly competitive markets. Input-output models are based on 
the economic assumption that the markets modeled are perfectly competitive and in 
equilibrium. If these markets are not, in fact, perfectly competitive, then input-output 
models may not have the power to illuminate economic effects of changes in the market 
inputs or parameters. 
The diversity of the origins and goals of these programs in Massachusetts has 
resulted in a number of innovative FTI programs. While increasing the amount of locally 
or regionally produced food in institutional settings is the common short-term strategy 
among the programs, the end goals diverge and are often more in line with the 
provenance of the group that has promoted or implemented the program. However, it is 
generally agreed among these groups that each of the goals contribute to a larger shared 
vision of a more equitable and just food system. Ultimately, health goals, economic 
development goals, and environmental goals of FTI all depend on whether the farmer can 
profitably sell to the institutional market. 
3.2.3 Massachusetts Grown Wholesale FTI Market 
Whether the farmer can profitably sell to the institutional market depends on 
whether the product can command a price premium, or whether the costs associated with 
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production and marketing preserve enough of the sale price for farmers. The structure of 
the market influences these conditions. This section introduces the language and structure 
of the microeconomic theories of industrial organization and information to the existing 
market in Massachusetts, as described by market participants in interviews, and internal 
organizational documents, such as annual surveys, intake sheets, and meeting notes.  
This section first describes the differentiated local or regional product and how 
the product attributes relate to unique characteristics of the market. The context and 
institutions under which this market may exist are explored, including market channels, 
supply and demand for these products, supply chain actors, and characteristics of the 
supply chain with respect to contracts, information and regulation. This section will then 
offer five different models of operational FTI supply chains within this market in 
Massachusetts. Three recent USDA reports, the 2010 report “Local Food Systems: 
Concepts, Impacts, and Issues” and “Comparing the Structure, Size, and Performance of 
Local and Mainstream Food Supply Chains,” and the 2011 “Direct and Intermediated 
Marketing of Local Foods in the United States,” offer helpful compilations of similar 
regionally-grown market studies from around the country, as well as useful common sets 
of terms, which we employ throughout this report (King, et al., 2010; Martinez, et.al., 
2010; Low & Vogel, 2011).  
The scope of this section will be limited to fresh fruits and vegetables, as they 
represent the most common products delivered through FTI supply chains, and existing 
research and policy tends to be centered on these products. Massachusetts FTI programs 
also encompass beef, poultry, fish, and dairy supply chains (Erwin, 2012).  
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3.2.3.1 “Locally” or “Regionally” Differentiated Product 
There is currently no concise, universal definition for what constitutes a “local” or 
“regional” product. The most widely referred-to guidelines are defined by Martinez et al., 
and rely on a spatial definition that links the products’ origins to their points of 
consumption, usually in terms of miles, but also in terms of the state or region (2010). 
Reports and studies that use USDA data tend to employ the NASS Census agricultural 
product designation “Direct Sales for Human Consumption” as the best proxy for 
“Local”, but acknowledge that this category is imperfect, as it omits products that are 
sold through intermediated channels, such as wholesale institutional sales through 
regional distributors.  
However, case studies and experiments indicate that the terms “local” and 
“regional” may imply more than the distance between producer and consumer (Conner et 
al., 2012; Darby et al., 2008; Dentoni, et al., 2009; Feenstra, et al., 2011; Thilmany, et al., 
2008). For consumers, these terms may carry connotations of quality and freshness, the 
impact that the growing practices may have on the consumers’ community and 
environment, and an idea that their purchase has a positive net effect on the local or 
regional economy (Cembalo, et al., 2012; Darby, et al., 2008; Dentoni, et al., 2012; 
Wirth, et al., 2012; Lusk, et al., 2006; Thilmany, et al., 2008).  
These connotations are quality attributes, or characteristics of the product which 
indicate that consumers may be willing to pay a premium for the product, compared to a 
similar product without the “local” or “regional” designation. In this sense, these products 
are differentiated from other available products, which may look and taste the same, but 
do not carry additional information about the perceived impact of the consumers 
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purchase. These quality attributes are “credence attributes,” or attributes that some 
consumers may believe to be true, but do not have means to verify (Dentoni, et al., 2009; 
Sexton, 2012). Such information about specific qualities of regionally differentiated 
products – and therefore traceability and food safety attributes – is considered to be more 
accessible in shorter supply chains.  
This implicit product differentiation is thought to create market value (Feenstra, et 
al., 2011, Izumi, et al., 2010; King et al., 2010; Thilmany, et al., 2008). In the case of 
regionally differentiated products in institutional wholesale markets, it can be difficult for 
an end consumer to know with certainty whether the product available for purchase meets 
the standards that the individual consumer has in mind. This certainty should arise from 
the consumers’ belief that each of the intermediaries, who prepared, purchased, sourced, 
transported, and grew the product, both shared these standards and verified the standards 
at each step along the way.  
For this reason, the institutional market for regionally differentiated products is 
unique from both the traditional wholesale institutional market and the direct to consumer 
market for regionally differentiated products. Market interactions carry an additional 
burden of information verification. This burden can be interpreted as one of traceability 
and labeling, which begs the question of enforceability, or as a burden of trust and 
relationships, which similarly begs the question of the dependence of the market on the 
non-market entities that foster and monitor these relationships (Feenstra, et al., 2011).  
For the purposes of this paper, we will simply allow that participants in these 
markets share mutually agreeable definitions of “regional” or “local”. We will use the 
terms “local” and “regional” interchangeably. Further discussion of the role these product 
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attributes play in the FTI market will be addressed in the Information, Regulation, and 
Contracts section below. 
3.2.3.2 Value Added vs. Not Value Added Product 
A raw product that has undergone some physical change of state prior to its 
purchase by the food service institution, such as primary and secondary processing, is 
considered a value-added product. Some examples include coined carrots or washed salad 
greens.  
The USDA’s definition of “value added” calls for the incremental market value 
added to the product by its change of state to accrue to the farmer, which can occur only 
if the product underwent this change of state prior to its purchase by the food service 
providers (USDA, Value Added Producer Grant, 2012). Primary Processing in these 
market channels is conducted on-farm. If the same kind of processing, for example, coin-
cutting carrots, is conducted in the food service kitchen by the food service management 
company, it is referred to as On-Site Processing, and the product is not considered to be 
value-added. Secondary Processing in this supply chain is assumed to be value-added 
because the secondary processor in Massachusetts is a non-profit organization that passes 
the added value on to the farmer. 
3.2.3.3 Fresh vs. Frozen or Canned Product 
Fresh marketing channels, as opposed to extended-season marketing channels, 
appear to account for the highest volume of “regional” sales in the country, and can be 
divided into intermediated supply chains and fresh direct-to-consumer supply chains 
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(Low & Vogel, 2011). Fresh marketing channels are characterized by their short supply 
chains, which allow farmers to capture a larger percentage of the sales price (Low & 
Vogel, 2011). Farms must perform additional tasks in this supply chain, such as 
marketing, storage, distribution, pricing, and sales that may increase farmers’ transaction 
costs. Generally, small and mid-sized farms selling fresh direct (“annual sales of 
agricultural products are less than $250,000 for small farms and $500,000 for mid-size 
farms - hereafter referred to as small farms”) can absorb these additional tasks given their 
smaller volumes (USDA, Small and Mid- Sized Farms, 2012; Martinez, et al., 2010).  
However, larger farms (over $500,000 in annual sales) either need to invest in on-
farm capacity, or participate in an intermediated marketing channel (Martinez, et al, 
2010; Low & Vogel, 2011). FTI advocates maintain that a consistent fresh wholesale 
sales relationship with an end purchaser in the form of a large institution allows farmers 
to minimize transaction costs, while capturing a high percentage of the sales price. Sales 
to a fresh wholesale distributor or aggregator transfer these transaction costs to the 
intermediaries, but reduce the percentage of the sales price that flows directly to the 
farmer.  
The fresh marketing channel in New England is restricted by seasonality. In 
response, a small “extended season” intermediated wholesale marketing channel has 
developed in Massachusetts. This intermediated marketing channel resembles the fresh 
intermediated marketing channel, with the addition of a secondary processor which 
purchases fresh product directly from the farmer, and freezes or cans the product for sale 
to institutions during the winter season. Frozen or canned products undergo a series of 
physical changes in state that allows the product to be consumed in the off—season. 
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Some examples include frozen broccoli or canned tomatoes. Extended-season marketing 
channels are those channels in which Secondary Processing has occurred. 
This addition incurs additional transaction costs, and likely reduces the net 
income to the farmer. However, in this case the processor is also non-profit market 
support entity with capital costs that are already invested, and the processor uses the 
regional produce market wholesale price index as a benchmark price. Thus, the processor 
does not extract economic profits and farmers receive prices for their products that 
represent their best alternative prices, which are current wholesale prices.  
3.2.3.4 Supply and Demand 
It is a challenge to estimate the supply and demand for local or regional fruits and 
vegetables, particularly with respect to intermediated markets (King, et al., 2010; Low & 
Vogel, 2011; Timmons, 2008). While publicly available data can describe who grew 
what, nationally gathered data has not historically identified product channels – it is 
difficult to say to whom products were sold. In addition, aggregated consumer purchases 
of fruits and vegetables are not publicly available, so it is difficult to describe the actual 
demand for fruits and vegetables in general, much less for fruits and vegetables that come 
from a specified area and are sold to consumers within that area. Practitioners and 
researchers do not generally have access to food distributors’ private data, which can 
track where product is purchased and where it is sold. It is a challenge to track sales of a 
product grown in a specified area, particularly in New England, with relatively small 
states and distribution networks centered in multi-state regions.  
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It is clearly a challenge, then, to further isolate the relationship between 
Massachusetts farmers and Massachusetts institutions using publicly available data. The 
supply of, and demand for, fruit and vegetable products for FTI programs in 
Massachusetts overlaps with FTI programs in other New England states. This paper will 
not attempt to quantify either supply or demand in this market. Instead, this section will 
mention some of the methods used to estimate supply and demand of local or regional 
products, and offer data that describes the overall agricultural trends in Massachusetts. 
Placed alongside national characteristics of direct-to-consumer and the intermediated 
markets described in the Massachusetts Grown Wholesale Market section above, this 
section sketches the supply and demand in the FTI intermediated wholesale market in the 
state.  
The USDA’s National Agriculture Statistical Service (NASS) takes a census of 
agriculture every five years, and conducts annual surveys. However, past data collection 
has primarily emphasized producer and product characteristics, and has not requested 
detailed information about the various supply chains through which agricultural products 
flow. Data that track the number of farms participating in direct-to-consumer supply 
chains (a farmer who sells directly to the end consumer, e.g., at a farmers’ market, 
roadside stand, or through a CSA) and the value of these sales has been collected since 
1978. However, survey questions that elicit information about intermediated supply 
chains were introduced in the 2008 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) 
survey conducted by the Economic Research Service (ERS), and only the 2011 ARMS 
separated questions on direct-to-consumer sales from intermediated sales and requested 
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information that could allow researchers to quantify the role of institutional markets in 
intermediated marketing channels (Low & Vogel, 2011).  
National 2008 ARMS data suggests that including locally marketed food that 
flows through intermediated market channels (farmers’ sales to local retail, restaurants, 
and regional distributors) increases the estimated volume of “local food” about four-fold, 
compared to the volume suggested by the NASS census that tracks direct-to-consumer 
sales (Low & Vogel, 2011). The value of the food that flows through intermediated 
channels is three times that marketed through direct-to-consumer channels. While farms 
of all sizes sell through each of these marketing channels, more large farms sell through 
intermediated market channels with more supply chain steps, and more small farms sell 
through market channels with fewer supply chain steps (Low & Vogel, 2011). Nationally, 
USDA researchers estimate that for farms of all sizes who market local foods, 61% of 
gross farm sales are local foods (Low & Vogel, 2011). Low and Vogel further suggest 
that the high share of local food sales demonstrates integration of these farms into 
existing direct-to-consumer and intermediated supply chains (2011). 
While the number of farms in Massachusetts has increased in the last 5 years, 
these farms decreased in size (USDA, 2012). At the same time, the number of farms 
engaged in direct-to-consumer sales has increased, as has the per farm sales of direct-to-
consumer marketed products (USDA, 2012). “The value of sales directly to consumers on 
a per farm basis” in 2007 was $25,356 in Massachusetts, which places the 
Commonwealth at the second highest per farm value of direct to consumer sales in the 
nation (USDA, 2011).  
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Studies do quantify the existing overall production of fresh fruits and vegetables 
in Massachusetts, and attempt to quantify the amount of production consumed locally, 
with varying degrees of success. Fruit and nut tree farms and vegetable and melon farms 
in Massachusetts reported the market value of products grown in Massachusetts in 2007 
at $58,995,669, or about 32% of the total market value of all farm products grown in the 
state; however, it is unclear what proportion of these sales were in-state, much less 
whether they were sold directly or through distributors to institutions, restaurants, 
processors, or retail operations (USDA, 2012). Timmons et al. used 2002 NASS data to 
estimate that a maximum of 5.6% of all foods grown in Massachusetts were sold as 
direct-to- consumer “local” foods (2008). For this to increase, some combination of 
increased farm productivity and the amount of land in production would need to increase. 
Increasing these factors may be a challenge in Massachusetts: “While Massachusetts has 
519,000 acres of land in farms, only 119,000 acres of that land is cropland with prime 
agricultural soils—the best land for food production” (Bowell, et al., 2008).  
It is not known how the increase in the percentage of Massachusetts schools that 
participate in FTI, described in the introduction above, translates into the dollar value or 
quantity of product sold. While some schools are committed to increasing the volume of 
product they purchase, others only buy occasionally. The University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, for example, now purchases about 25% of its produce regionally, while some 
schools purchase one delivery of apples each year (Toong, 2010). The consensus at this 
time seems to be that there are very few scenarios under which the supply of 
Massachusetts grown products could keep up with the institutional demand for these 
regionally grown products (Erwin, 2012). In 2013, the USDA’s Food and Nutrition 
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Service conducted the first-ever National Farm to School Census, which asked public 
school districts about their participation in Farm to School programs. The results, when 
available, may be able to help quantify the current dollar value of demand for Farm to 
School purchases in public school districts.  
3.2.3.5 Market Channels 
The wholesale farm to institution market in Massachusetts is an intermediated 
market for locally-based differentiated products, comprised of five different marketing 
channels that are characterized by:  
• How many times the product changes hands, or the potential “degree of 
markup”, explained in detail below.  
• Whether the product has “undergone a change in physical state” –referred 
to as value-added or not value-added (i.e., washed, peeled, or chopped), and  
• Whether the product is fresh, or frozen / canned (USDA Value-Added 
Producer Grant, 2012; Low & Vogel, 2011). 
The use of the term “direct sales” poses a challenge in this scheme. According to 
Low and Vogel, literature on FTI frequently describes sales between a farm and an 
institution as “direct”, although it is understood that there is an additional sale from the 
institution to the end consumer – the student, patient, etc. “Generally, marketing channels 
are classified as intermediated when local food products pass through one or more 
intermediate steps in the local food supply chain before reaching the consumer” (King, et 
al., 2010). The rest of this document will abandon the term “direct,” and instead refer to 
the degree of markup.  
The market channels, in turn, are comprised of supply chains. The supply chains 
are models of relationships between different “supply chain actors” -- the farm 
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businesses, aggregators, processors, distributors, food service providers, and other 
organizational entities that support markets. In this paper, end consumers, such as 
students and patients, are also referred to as supply chain actors. The life-cycle of the 
supply chain is modeled linearly, and actors are defined relative to other actors. 
“Upstream actors” refers to those firms whose actions are nearer the beginning of the 
chain, and “downstream actors” refers to those firms and consumers whose actions are 
nearer the end of the chain (Waldmen et al., 2007). For example, a food service provider 
is upstream of the consumer, but downstream of the farmer.  
3.2.3.6 Markup 
Potential “degrees of mark-up” refers to the minimum numbers of transactions 
through which the product has changed hands. Each time the product changes hands, a 
transaction cost is incurred, and there is potential to add a “markup.” The concept of 
markup arises from the ability of the supply chain actor to add an economic profit margin 
to a product, above the transaction cost to perform the supply chain step (Carlton & 
Perloff, 2005). Economic profit refers to profit that is extracted above and beyond the 
transaction costs incurred, including the cost of foregoing all other opportunities. Markup 
occurs when the supply chain actor possesses some degree of market power. In a 
perfectly competitive economy, like those modeled in the “Local Foods as Economic 
Development” section above, it is assumed that sellers do not make an economic profit 
from sales. It is difficult to say, at this stage, whether or how much market power any of 
the supply chain actors in the FTI supply chain actually have, and therefore whether any 
markup charged by a supply chain actor accrues as profit to that actor or is simply a 
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reflection of the transaction costs incurred by that actor. However, this concept is 
included because it provides terminology to differentiate between gradations of long or 
short supply chains and highlights a major question that must be asked in future research 
in order to determine the long term viability of FTI supply chains.  
It is also important to note that in FTI supply chains, market power could be 
exercised to achieve non-economic, values-based outcomes (Izumi, et al., 2010). 
A low degree of markup, or “3rd degree marginalization”, indicates that the 
product has changed hands at least twice – once from the farmer to the food service 
provider, and once from the food service provider to the final consumer (what is referred 
to as “direct sales” in much of the literature). A medium degree of markup, or “4th degree 
marginalization”, indicates that the product has changed hands three times – from the 
farmer to a distributor, and from the distributor to the food service provider, and then 
from the food service provider to the consumer. A high degree of markup, or “5th degree 
marginalization” indicates that the product has changed hands at least four times – from 
the farmer to a processor, from the processor to a distributor, from the distributor to the 
food service provider, and then from the food service provider to the consumer. Note that 
in each of these cases, an additional transaction may occur when an upstream farmer-
aggregator aggregates product from a number of different farmers prior to selling it 
downstream. This happens more frequently as the volume of product required by a 
downstream purchaser increases. 
The products that move through the 3rd and 4th degree marginalization marketing 
channels may either be completely unprocessed, fresh produce when they are delivered to 
the food service provider, or they may be products that undergo some primary 
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processing. For example, whole, unpeeled carrots without the greens are considered non-
value added products, while peeled, coin-cut carrots are considered to have gone through 
some primary processing. In Massachusetts, some farms have primary processing 
equipment on site; often these farmers will act as aggregators and purchase unprocessed 
produce from other farmers, perform some primary processing on the product, and then 
sell the product to the downstream actor. 
Unique to Massachusetts, at the time of this writing, is an operational extended-
season processing facility that has the capacity to freeze or can large quantities of product 
for sales in the off-season. This marketing channel is 5th degree marginalized. 
Direct-to-consumer sales referred to in much of the literature would be 
characterized as 2nd degree marginalization, from the farmer directly to the consumer. 
This is clearly not likely in the institutional wholesale supply chain. 
3.2.3.7 Supply Chain Actors 
This section defines and describes the people, businesses, and organizations that 
move food between farmers and institutions in Massachusetts. 
Farms that participate in FTI are generally small to mid - sized farms, with 
revenues between $50,000 and $250,000 (Low & Vogel, 2011). Some of these farmers 
play the role of aggregator. They aggregate product from other farmers to sell 
downstream (Diamond & Barham, 2012). Some of these farmers conduct Primary 
Processing.  
Aggregators need not be farmers – they can also be private firms or co-operatives 
of farmers who operate an aggregation business collectively. Aggregators source product 
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from a number of different farmers for sale downstream, often in order to meet the 
volume required by the downstream producer. Farmers may aggregate and then conduct 
Primary Processing.  
Secondary Processors, as described in this supply chain, transform freshly 
harvested product from a farmer or aggregator into a value-added product by changing its 
physical state (USDA, Value Added Producer Grant, 2012). Processors may include farm 
operations, aggregators, and processing facilities. Primary processing refers to the first 
(and often only) round of processing, peeling or chopping freshly harvested vegetables, 
for example. In some supply chains, primary processing is performed by food service 
providers, which we will refer to as on-site processing. Depending on the supply chain 
actor and their institutional capacities, this processing may be performed manually or by 
large, specialized machinery. Secondary processing preserves the product and allows it to 
be served in institutions out of season – for example, freezing or canning. Specialized 
facilities with large capacities are generally required to perform secondary processing 
efficiently and according to food safety requirements. These products are referred to as 
extended season products.  
Broadline Distribution Companies source and stock a wide range of food and 
food service products, and offer these products to institutional purchasers. Distributors 
purchase product from the farmer or processor, at times process the product, and then sell 
the product to institutions. Distributors source and provide access to a wide variety of 
perishable and non-perishable goods, and perform a number of services in institutional 
food service markets (Izumi, et al., 2006). Broadline distribution companies may require 
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food businesses to meet packaging and labeling requirements, which provide important 
information for tracking and rotating stock (Audile et al., 2012).  
Regional Produce Distribution companies source, store, and deliver usually fresh 
produce to institutional purchasers. These companies may offer a more limited range of 
specialized products. Some regional distributors adopt a “we don’t own it” policy, where 
the services contracted may include brokerage and transportation, but the distributor 
never takes ownership over the product, even when the product is in physical possession 
of the distributor. 
Food Service Providers may receive freshly harvested product (not value-added), 
value-added product, or extended season product. If they receive non-value added 
products they may need to process the product in some way (peel or chop carrots, e.g.). 
Food service providers prepare meals and sell these meals to consumers, which in this 
example are students. To sell the product to students, food service providers engage in a 
number of supply chain activities. They also plan meals, source product, meet federal and 
state nutrition guidelines, hire and train food service staff, receive, bill and invoice 
suppliers, etc.  
Institutions such as schools, hospitals, group homes, and nursing homes either 
have in-house food service staff, or contract with a food service management company. 
Many of these institutions are funded from government sources, operate as bidders on 
publicly funded contracts, or receive remittances from government sources. This funding 
goes hand in hand with requirements to provide meals that meet nutritional standards. In 
addition, certain kinds of funds (notably for schools with students who qualify for free 
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and reduced meals) correspond with the availability of very low cost food from the 
USDA.  
Food service companies that pursue procurement of locally grown foods will 
likely have more market power than individual in-house food service operations, because 
they may be able to aggregate demand from many different institutions. A very large 
institution, such as a university or urban school district that operates without a food 
service management company may also wield market power because of the ability to 
aggregate demand. The mix of public funds and à la carte payments for meals can impact 
an institution’s ability to purchase specialty items, such as regionally or locally produced 
food. Paradoxically, schools with lower à la carte sales and higher free and reduced lunch 
percentages receive larger and more regular quantities of USDA foods, which allow them 
more flexibility in their procurement budgets. This counterintuitive result arises because 
the comparatively low cost of USDA foods frees up purchasing dollars in the food budget 
for other purchases.  
Smaller institutions, institutions in agricultural regions and/or in communities that 
advocate for regional procurement, may have additional flexibility in their procurement 
options (King, et al., 2010). Some states or localities have passed ordinances that allow 
schools to bypass low-bid offers for a certain percentage of regional purchases. In some 
cases, the proximity of regional farms and community-based relationships pave the way 
for regional procurement (King, et al., 2010). Some of the incompatibilities between a 
farm operation and an institution can be mitigated by institutional infrastructure that has 
not been “updated” and therefore de-equipped, i.e., for institutional kitchens that still 
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have ovens, stovetops, blenders and choppers, instead of only microwaves and steam heat 
trays.  
Support Entities include a wide range of organizations that provide some level of 
market support to any of the supply chain actors in FTI programs. Often these entities are 
considered to be outside of the market, and are not modeled as supply chain actors, but as 
they have historically served and continue to serve certain key market roles, we include 
them in the model. The Massachusetts Department of Agricultural Resources funds 
assistance to introduce the market to both farmers and institutions. Non-profit 
organizations such as M FTSP and SEMAP act as modified brokers, in the sense that they 
collect information regarding different supply chain actors’ preferences and capacities, 
and link and encourage relationships between these actors. These organizations, along 
with others such as Community Involved in Sustaining Agriculture (CISA) and national 
organizations like the National Farm to School Network offer tools for both farmers and 
institutions to use as they navigate these new markets, including how-to’s, sample 
procurement forms, best practices, and workshops. In the extended season supply chain, 
the Franklin County Community Development Corporation (FCCDC) has a pure market 
role as processor, including negotiating prices and contracts and taking ownership of 
product. Non-profits also provide marketing services, and develop marketing tools to 
communicate the value of the differentiated product (i.e., “local food”) – some examples 
include posters, calendars, trading cards, and events, such as the Massachusetts Harvest 
for Schools Week, which takes place each September. These entities have worked to 
change the political and regulatory landscape regarding local, state, and federal levels 
with successes that range from new nutrition guidelines to new preferential purchasing 
 88 
 
agreements. Finally, the continued involvement of these entities has served the critical 
role of verifying the characteristics of the regionally differentiated product, and 
communicating that the product meets the requirement of credibility to both upstream and 
downstream actors.  
Consumers in the supply chain examples are students who purchase meals from 
food service providers and, in some cases, their parents.  
3.2.3.8 Information, Regulation, and Contracts 
End consumers and institutional purchasers may find it challenging to confirm 
information about a “local” product. As discussed above, a “local” product implies a 
number of product attributes. Some of these attributes relate to the product itself – it is 
presumed to be fresher, and therefore have better taste and texture, and perhaps an 
improved nutrient profile. Some of the attributes relate to the process that has produced 
the product; for example, consumers presume that the product was grown with fewer 
chemical inputs, it traveled fewer food miles than comparable products, it was grown 
within a certain distance from its purchase, or farmers and farm workers earned a living 
wage in its production. Process attributes may also relate to the food safety associated 
with the product – because it is grown locally, farmers may be compelled to ensure that 
the product is not spoiled or contaminated. Finally, some of these attributes relate to the 
presumed implications of purchasing the product: that purchasing the product keeps 
productive farmland in use; that money earned is used in the community and has a 
multiplier effect that benefits the entire community and that is greater than the multiplier 
for non-“local” food. Some of the attempts to verify whether these presumed attributes 
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are accurate are addressed above. To reiterate, there is no industry-accepted standard to 
date that offers, labels, or enforces whether the “local” product does exhibit any of these 
product attributes.  
The supply chain modeled in Figure 5 shows where the ownership of the product 
and/or the physical possession of the product are transferred. But each of these points 
also shows where product information is transferred, as well as where market supports 
may be offered, transaction costs may be incurred, or economic profits may be captured. 
Product attribute information may be explicitly communicated – a farmer may tell an 
institutional buyer that the product was grown without pesticides and harvested that 
morning, or a farmer may label a box of peppers with the farm name and address. The 
product attribute information may also be implicitly communicated – the product is 
labeled as “local” on a distributor’s price list, or a market support entity has 
recommended a farmer to a purchaser, but they do not exchange specific product 
information outside of price and quantity ordered.  
Contracts in this market can range from a “handshake” agreement, to standard 
arms-length contracts, to extensive site visits and requirements to become an “approved 
vendor,” to contract farming. The nature of specific contracts and the transfer of product 
information will be described below for each supply chain example. 
While the contractual arrangements vary, food service management companies 
that pursue local food increasingly require certification that the food purchased meets 
stringent food safety requirements. Farmers can be required to obtain Good Agricultural 
Practices (GAP) certification and purchase additional Food Safety Liability Insurance 
(FSLI). Processors are required to create and follow Hazard and Critical Control Point 
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(HACCP) plans and Good Manufacturing Plans (GMP), as well as meet local, state, and 
federal requirements for sanitation of processing equipment and facilities, and train 
employees in food safety. Each of these food safety regulations, while indispensable for 
ensuring the safety of the food supply, can add considerable fixed costs to a farm 
operation that sells to institutions.  
In addition to regulating food safety, some laws serve to advance the purchase of 
local foods, under the same presumptions about the social and economic impacts of 
product attributes mentioned above. Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 7, Sections 
23B contains a preferential purchasing policy for state agencies to “give preference to 
food products grown or produced in Massachusetts” (Leib, 2012). This law “requires 
state agencies to purchase food products grown in Massachusetts, unless the price is more 
than 10% higher than the price of out-of-state products” (Leib, 2012). While the 
regulations are “required,” they do not appear to be legally binding (Leib, 2012). An 
additional regulation, Chapter 30B, Section 20, however, does allow state agencies some 
latitude to justify and make individual in-state purchases up to $25,000 without seeking 
quotes (Leib, 2012). This regulation applies to all public schools.  
The roles of information, contracts, and regulations carry a heavier burden, and 
are significantly less codified in the regional wholesale FTI market than in other 
wholesale markets. Because the product does not pass directly from farmer to consumer, 
the “relationship-based” verification of product information relies upon not one, but a 
series of relationships. Individual consumers prefer certain “local” product attributes over 
others, and without either a total convergence of every intermediary buyer and sellers’ 
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preferences for “local” or a clear line of explicit information, it is unlikely that each 
consumers’ presumed menu of “local” product attributes is achieved in this market.  
3.2.9 Supply Chain Examples 
Figure 5 models five different supply chain examples for Massachusetts FTI 
markets. These five chains illustrate the variety of supply chains within the marketing 
channels observed in Massachusetts. This section describes each individual supply chain, 
and identifies which supply chain actors absorb transaction costs, which supply chain 
actors make transaction costs explicit, how information flows, and what kinds of 
contracts are common.
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Figure 6 Wholesale Regionally-Grown Intermediated  FTS Market
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3.2.3.9.1 Supply Chain #1 
Support entities introduce the market relationship concept of FTI to both farmers 
and schools. The support entities may assist or provide tools for farmers and schools to 
use to begin a market relationship, including sets of questions and expectations for each 
supply chain actor to consider. Questions and expectations might address choice of crops, 
seasonality, price, quantity, quality and specifications, ordering, packaging, delivery, 
billing, and marketing (M FTSP, 2012). Some support entities work with farmers to 
determine how entering this market might impact their farm business, and some entities 
work with institutions to determine how to best incorporate FTI purchases into their 
menus and school wellness plans, including how to train food service staff. This work is 
sometimes referred to as “building relationships.” Relationships or networks resulting 
from relationships can also be framed in terms of market interactions: providing 
assistance in market development and establishing the veracity of information and 
product attributes. Despite this initial assistance, after a market relationship between 
farmers and purchasers is established, contracts are generally standard arms – length 
transactions.  
The farmer plans the crop, purchases inputs such as seed and fertilizer, grows and 
harvests the product. The farmer contacts the food service provider to schedule delivery, 
delivers the product, usually along with a hand-written invoice. The food service 
company receives and inspects the product, and upon approval submits the invoice to the 
billing department for payment. The food service provider plans meals and menus that 
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include the product. The food service company performs any needed on-site processing, 
prepares the meal, sells, and serves the product to the consumer.  
In this supply chain, the institution conducts the On-Site primary processing. The 
institution absorbs nearly all of the transaction costs associated with this market – from 
the added cost of time spent planning with the farmer, to developing and implementing 
non-standard food procurement and payment protocols, to cleaning and chopping 
produce that staff would not otherwise need to process, and to marketing and selling the 
product to the end consumer.  
The farmer also absorbs transaction costs, but these are few compared to other 
FTI supply chains. This supply chain offers the fewest supply chain steps and the fewest 
intermediaries, and as a result should come the nearest to generating a relatively high 
margin for the farmer with relatively few external transaction costs. 
Over time, the food service provider’s role may evolve to help the farmer plan 
which and how many crops to plant, quality control, food safety, marketing, and 
additional value-added activities such as farm tours, or including farmers in institutional 
activities. These overlaps have some characteristics that are similar to vertically restricted 
supply chains present in contract farming, where the downstream purchaser begins to 
have more control over upstream activities (Carmeli, et.al, 2007). 
3.2.3.9.2 Supply Chain #2 
This supply chain is nearly identical to Supply Chain #1 described in detail above. 
Information transfer, contracting, and most transaction cost responsibility remain the 
same.  
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The distinction between Supply Chains #1 and #2 is that the Primary Processing 
supply chain step is moved from the food service company’s role to the farmer’s role. 
The farmer has primary processing capacities on-farm, and creates a value-added product 
to sell to the institution. The food service providers no longer need to perform primary 
processing on-site.  
While some institutions may be willing and able to pay a premium for this 
product, as intended by the characterization of “value-added,” this product will generally 
transfer some, if not most, of the transaction costs described above as accruing to the 
institution, to the farmer, instead.  
3.2.3.9.3 Supply Chain #3 
This supply chain builds on Supply Chain #1, and adds the supply chain steps of 
Distribution and Storage, undertaken by a broadline or regional distributor downstream of 
the farmer or aggregator. The distributor picks up fresh produce that is not value-added 
from the farmer. In some cases, a distributor may deliver the product directly to the 
institution, but usually the product is brought to a centralized storage facility and either 
aggregated or divided for delivery to an institution.  
As FTI programs have become more prevalent, the lack of operational 
compatibility between farmers and institutions has increasingly become a barrier to the 
success of many programs, particularly when the institutions are relatively large, or are 
far away from the farmers. Supply chains that include distributors which aggregate 
product and provide delivery and billing services removes these barriers by transferring 
the transaction costs to the intermediary, but may correspondingly lower the price paid to 
the farmer.  
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Most distributors take ownership of the product when they pick it up from a 
farmer. Distributors, therefore, are cautious about the quality and safety of the product 
that they distribute. Distributors can require farmers to purchase FSLI, get GAP 
certification, to use particular kinds of containers or on-farm storage facilities to control 
for heat and humidity. Farmers who work with a distributor may have to make up-front 
investments (and incur explicit transaction costs) in order to be in compliance with 
distributors’ requirements.  
Contracts in these supply chains can vary, but many of these transactions are 
conducted as arms-length transactions. The transfer of farm- and product-specific 
information can vary widely with the distribution company.  
3.2.3.9.4 Supply Chain #4 
This supply chain is like Supply Chain #2 in that the farmer conducts primary 
processing. It is like Supply Chain #3 in that it includes distribution. In this supply chain, 
the farmer adds value to the product, but then relies on distribution. Like Supply Chain 
#3, distribution can resolve operational incompatibilities between farmers and institutions 
through aggregation, billing services and distribution, but can add up front transaction 
costs for farmers and can compromise the transfer of farm- and product-specific 
information. 
3.2.3.9.5 Supply Chain #5 
This supply chain builds upon #4 above, but adds a supply chain step downstream 
of the farmer and upstream of the distributor. This step, Secondary Processing, creates 
another change in physical state, where the product is frozen or canned for sale in the off 
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season. This extended season product is then picked up by a distributor and delivered to a 
storage facility before it is delivered to the food service provider. Secondary Processing 
allows Massachusetts farm products that are locally grown to satisfy markets that were 
previously inaccessible due to seasonality. In this value chain, the processing facility 
conducts primary processing. 
Transactions costs in this supply chain are primarily absorbed by the processor. 
Federal, state and local regulations require the processor to maintain strict facility and 
employee food safety certifications and protocols. In some cases, distributors or large 
food service management companies may impose additional food safety requirements, 
and contracts between food service companies, distributors, and processors will provide 
for these requirements. Transaction costs for the farmer in this supply chain can vary. For 
the most part, these costs are similar to those in Supply Chain #4, although the 
processor’s need for a large delivery at a particular time and day adds labor, 
transportation, and storage costs. 
3.2.4 Summary and Future Research  
Massachusetts’ farm to institution programs have steadily increased in number 
and volume of product bought and sold over the last fifteen years. There are many 
inherently attractive aspects to Farm to Institution projects – it is uncommon that a 
relatively simple idea has the power to link such a wide variety of social problems with 
an enterprise-based and culturally inspiring solution. Can this simple idea actually deliver 
the hoped-for benefits to all actors in a way that satisfies all of the constraints? Can the 
large scale of institutional purchasing of Massachusetts grown food by Massachusetts 
institutions improve health outcomes, provide farmers with improved farm viability and 
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contribute to economic development? If FTI sales do not contribute to farm viability, is it 
possible to achieve the nutrition, environmental, and economic development related 
goals? 
The answers to these questions are unclear. While a significant amount of work 
and thought has been devoted to the promotion and assessment of individual programs, 
there is very little evidence available to show whether or not these goals are being, or can 
be, met on a regional scale. This paper has offered a framework by which farmer viability 
in FTI markets can be analyzed.  
The FTI market is an interesting subset of the “local foods” trend. The product 
itself is differentiated by process and product attributes, most of which are credence 
attributes. Some of these attributes relate to the product itself, but some relate to the 
perceived impact of the product. Additionally, product attributes are impacted by process 
attributes that depend on the marketing channel and supply chains through which the 
product flows. Because of this, the market for regionally produced goods and its ability to 
preserve a premium price that passes through to a farmer may depend on market 
structure, the market power of the supply chain actors, and by whom the transaction costs 
are absorbed. 
The market for the differentiated product may flow through different market 
channels. These market channels can have different opportunities for markup.  
The supply of and demand for these products is difficult to quantify, other than to 
say that both appear to be growing. That supply and demand are growing implies that the 
market will continue to grow, though it will have boundaries in the natural capacity of 
productive farmland in the area. 
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The role of information in much of this market is currently very informal, and this 
lack of formality is reflected in the preponderance of arms—length contracts between 
supply chain actors. Regulation in this market is generally pursued by private companies 
which aim to ensure food safety in supply chains with higher degrees of marginalization. 
These companies do not emphasize the role of explicit product information; larger 
distribution and food service companies appear to be slow to decide that detailed product 
information beyond the label “local” may be valuable.  
If demand for this product continues to grow, there are a number of factors that 
will need to be considered to determine whether the purported goals are being, or can be, 
achieved. These considerations are offered as possible future research areas. 
The first consideration, particularly given the relative scarcity and high 
opportunity cost of productive farmland in the Commonwealth, is whether FTI programs 
should focus on state-specific procurement or on regional procurement. Massachusetts 
has the highest population density in New England. New England, as a relatively small 
region, shares existing food system infrastructure between Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont and Rhode Island. The New England states’ 
productive farmland is much greater than Massachusetts’ alone. To connect potential 
supply to potential demand, many FTI programs in New England, including 
Massachusetts, are pursuing regional markets. The second consideration is whether the 
end consumers of institutional food prefer “local” enough to pay a premium price for it. If 
so, will that premium be enough to cover the additional transaction costs associated with 
the relative supply chain? Will that premium price generate a return to the farmer 
comparable to that returned through direct marketing, or through wholesale marketing? 
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Finally, is this market perfectly competitive or do some supply chain actors exert market 
power? Are all of the supply chain actors price-takers, or do some supply chain actors, in 
particular distribution and food service companies, have enough market power to extract 
economic profit, in addition to covering their transaction costs? 
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CHAPTER 4 
MARKET CHANNEL AND SCHOOL MEAL COSTS IN FARM TO 
SCHOOL PROGRAMS 
Authors: Jill Fitzsimmons and Jeffrey O’Hara 
4.1 Introduction 
Schools in the United States participate in “farm to school” ( FTS) programs to 
promote the health and well-being of students by engaging them in a variety of food and 
nutrition related activities. One important component of many  FTS programs is to teach 
students about agriculture by procuring and serving locally produced foods in school 
meals and snacks. Local food procurement may add costs to school food programs since 
buying local may require additional staff effort and command a premium price (Boys and 
Fraser 2017). Among the subset of schools that buy local foods, if the costs of locally 
procured foods are higher than those of alternative products, we would expect to see 
constraints on local foods procurement in the absence of continued policy interventions to 
mitigate costs. If, however, certain local food procurement strategies are more effective at 
reducing school meal costs relative to others, we might expect to see school food 
authorities (SFA) purchase local foods in greater quantities.  
In this paper we supplement school-level data from the 2013 and 2015 USDA 
Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) Farm to School Censuses with data from the Census of 
Agriculture and Food Environment Atlas to investigate, among schools with  FTS 
programs, whether the market channels from which they procure local foods reduces 
perceived school meal costs. Specifically, the procurement strategies that we use as 
independent variables include whether an SFA purchases local foods directly from 
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producers exclusively, from intermediaries exclusively, or from both producers and 
intermediaries. We control for observable factors that may impact school meal costs, 
including SFA characteristics, regional characteristics, and transaction characteristics. 
We use lagged values of these variables to control for the types of local food products 
purchased and educational motivations behind local procurement to mitigate the 
possibility of simultaneity. Regional characteristics include dummy variables for regions 
of the country and whether the SFA is located in or adjacent to a metropolitan county. 
We test whether our results are sensitive to specific types of transaction characteristics 
that may influence local food procurement costs, identified by responses to questions 
regarding procurement challenges that SFAs experience when they source local products. 
The marginal effects of our probit regressions indicate that SFAs that buy local 
foods exclusively from intermediaries (relative to SFAs that procure at least some local 
foods directly from producers) are five percentage points less likely to report lower 
school meal costs from  FTS. SFAs that procure local foods from both producers and 
intermediaries are four percentage points more likely to report lower school meal costs. 
We did not find a relationship between SFAs that procure local foods exclusively from 
producers and school meal costs, likely because this procurement method was 
uncommon. These results contradict the hypothesis that intermediated  FTS market 
channels, in contrast to direct market channels, are more likely to support the long term 
viability of  FTS procurement as a result of efficiencies and economies of scale. While 
our data don’t reveal the specific mechanism(s) by which SFAs experienced reduced 
costs due to local purchases from producers, we document that our results may occur for 
any combination of the following reasons: producers may supply foods to fulfill social 
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goals while intermediaries may supply foods to maximize profits; intermediaries may not 
efficiently source local foods; and intermediaries may efficiently source local foods, but 
do not pass savings that result from these efficiencies along to SFAs.  
To address concerns that reduced school meal costs and the choice of market 
channel are determined simultaneously, we test whether market channel choice is 
endogenous. We consider two instruments that characterize local food activity proximate 
to SFAs: county-level farmers markets per capita and county-level number of direct-to-
consumer farmers that sell to retail outlets per capita. We show that proximate local food 
market activity is correlated with market channel choice, since the market channels SFAs 
use are influenced by the types of suppliers available. We argue that these variables are 
otherwise uncorrelated with SFA decisions to reduce school meal costs through  FTS 
program participation.  
Prior to the development of the  FTS Census, research into the economic 
motivations of actors who participate in  FTS programming consisted of case-studies of a 
small number of producers in a narrow geographic region, like a state (Izumi, Wright, 
Hamm, 2010). For instance, Conner et al. (2014) found that producers sell to schools at 
lower price points (provided their costs are covered) for non-pecuniary objectives, such 
as portfolio diversification and social preferences, and that broadline distributors that 
supply local foods for profitability objectives may not have the same motivations to 
supply foods to schools at lower prices. Our results provide the first national-level 
empirical findings into factors that influence how market channel choice of local food 
procurement impacts perceived school meal costs.  
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While the  FTS Census has increased the rigor of research on  FTS 
implementation, most of the applications of this dataset to-date have examined which 
socio-demographic factors predict the adoption of  FTS programming, such as Botkins 
and Roe (2018). One exception is Christensen, Jablonski, and O’Hara (2017), who use  
FTS Census data to find a negative correlation between per-student local food 
expenditures and purchases of local foods directly from producers and from other non-
traditional suppliers. We introduce a structural model and test for a causal relationship 
between market channel portfolio choice and costs. This advances the literature on  FTS 
procurement programs and provides new insight that informs the financial sustainability 
of local foods procurement from the perspective of SFAs and policy intended to support  
FTS programming.  
4.2 Background 
4.2.1 School Meal Costs 
Schools are a strategic venue to promote healthier food consumption due to the 
long duration of time that most children in the United States (U.S.) are at school (CDC 
2018). However, SFAs must keep meal costs low without compromising participation 
rates among students and the nutritional content of the food. While SFAs that provide 
government-funded school meals are intended to operate on a cost-recovery basis to 
maintain a balanced budget, some programs operate at a loss in practice (Ralston and 
Newman 2015).  
Standard school food program costs include the cost of food purchasing, 
preparation, and program management. Food service operations can be self-operated or 
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contracted out to a food service management company, but regardless are nested within a 
SFA’s administrative management structure, which is ultimately responsible for food 
services. An average SFA reports that food purchases account for 46% of reported meal 
costs, while labor for food preparation and food service portion of management comprise 
45% of reported costs (Bartlett, Glantz, and Logan 2008). Program management costs at 
the administrative level are generally unreported, as they are incurred by the SFA’s 
administrative offices, not the food service operation. However, Bartlett, Glantz, and 
Logan (2008) estimate that on average, unreported costs account for 19% total costs, 
about 61% of which is labor. Average school per-meal costs vary depending on the 
region of the country; whether the school is in an urban, suburban, or rural area; and 
school size (Ollinger, Ralston, and Guthrie 2011, Ollinger and Guthrie 2015). 
In addition to the standard costs of school food programs,  FTS programs are 
associated with increased transaction costs resulting from the additional effort needed to 
gather information, negotiate costs, and monitor costs (Motts and Sharma, 2016). The 
effort required to deal with additional transaction costs generally enters as labor costs, 
and might manifest as additional staff hours dedicated to  FTS procurement (Fitzsimmons 
and Lass, 2015). Other  FTS specific costs may arise from the additional effort associated 
with training food service staff how to cook with local foods (labor costs), or purchasing 
new kitchen equipment to more effectively cook local foods (capital expenses) 
(Colasanti, Matts, and Hamm, 2012). Finally, an obvious source of increased costs from 
local may be a price premium associated with purchasing the higher-quality local product 
(Sharma, 2012; Ortiz, 2010).  
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The transaction costs associated with  FTS program adoption are well-
documented7. For instance, the 2013-2014 Farm to School Census asked SFAs what 
kinds of problems they experienced when they procure local foods (Appendix A). 
Product availability was the most widely reported problem (57%). High prices were a 
problem for 38% of respondents, and procurement coordination problems, alongside 
regular procurement were a problem for 26% of respondents. Overall, 25% of SFAs 
reported no problems with procurement.  
4.2.1.1 Farm to School Programs 
FAs that implement  FTS programs in the United States undertake at least one of 
following three activities: locally sourced food products, establish school gardens, or 
implement nutritional educational curriculum. Schools undertake  FTS programs to 
improve the nutritional content of school foods, support local farmers, and/or create 
interactive educational opportunities about culinary and agricultural topics (Benson 
2014). In 1997, just six  FTS programs were reported in the United States, but by 2014 
5,254 school districts reported  FTS programs (NFSN 2016, USDA FNS 2017).  
 FTS Census data reveal that SFAs procure local foods from a wide variety of 
sources (Appendix B). SFAs undertake direct purchases from individual producers (40%) 
more frequently than direct purchases from producer cooperatives (17%), farmers 
markets (8%), or CSAs (3%). SFAs source local foods most frequently from distributors 
(63%). SFAs also commonly make local food purchases from food 
                                                 7 For instance, see Izumi, Wright, and Hamm (2010); Colasanti, Matts, and Hamm 
(2012); Bateman, Engel, and Meinen (2014); Fitzsimmons and Lass (2015); Motta and 
Sharma (2016); and O’Hara and Benson (2017). 
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processors/manufacturers (38%), USDA Food Distribution Programs (31%), Department 
of Defense Fresh Program vendors (29%), and food buying cooperatives (14%).  
Numerous studies examine which factors are important in predicting institutional 
purchases of local foods. Prior to the  FTS Census, state-level  FTS studies were 
undertaken by Vo and Holcomb (2011) and Dimitri, Hanson, and Oberholtzer (2012) in 
Oklahoma and Maryland, respectively. Similar studies examining institutional purchases 
of local foods in non-school contexts include Smith, Kaiser, and Gomez (2013) and 
Oberholtzer, Dimitri, and Jaenicke (2014) with regard to hospitals and retailers, 
respectively. National-level studies of the determinants of  FTS programs using 2013  
FTS Census data include Lyson (2016); Ralston et al. (2017); McCarthy, Steiner, and 
Houser (2017); and Botkins and Roe (2018), whereas O’Hara and Benson (2017) use 
2015  FTS Census data. While the specifications, and in some instances datasets, have 
varied between the  FTS studies, collectively they have found that school characteristics, 
state  FTS policies, local agricultural conditions, and spillover effects are all important in 
predicting the  FTS engagement levels of SFAs. Examining whether the market channels 
used by SFAs impacted the cost-effectiveness of school meal programs has not been 
closely scrutinized in these studies.  
Using 2015  FTS Census data, Christensen, Jablonski, and O’Hara (2017) found a 
negative correlation between a SFAs per-student non-milk local food expenditures and 
whether they purchased local foods directly from either producers or from other non-
traditional suppliers (food hubs, cooperatives, and state  FTS program offices). However, 
their findings represent correlations since they did not develop a causal model. While 
Christensen, Jablonski, and O’Hara (2017) examine the relationship between market 
 108 
 
channel and food expenditures, they do not focus on outcome changes that schools may 
have experienced from  FTS participation. Our results suggest that SFAs may reduce 
costs by taking a portfolio approach to local foods procurement, rather than relying 
exclusively on intermediated procurement. 
While farmers selling directly to local schools seek to receive a price that 
compensates them for their costs, receiving a high price may not be the primary factor 
motivating their participation in the transaction (Conner et al. 2014, Fitzsimmons and 
Lass 2015, Barrowclaw et al. 2017, Lehnerd et al. 2018). Thus, they may be willing to 
sell to schools at a relatively low price point in order to achieve other objectives. First, 
farmers may sell to local schools in order to satisfy their own social values, such as 
supplying healthy food locally (Batemen, Engel, and Meinen 2014, Conner et al. 2014, 
Matts et al. 2016, Lehnerd et al. 2018). Farmers with such motivations may sell food to 
schools in such small volumes that it does not affect farm profitability, and they are more 
likely to donate food, visit a classroom, and/or host a field trip (Conner et al. 2012). If 
there is a high degree of trust in the relationship between the farmer and SFA, non-
traditional procurement methods may be undertaken (like delivering the food in a 
personal vehicle) in order to keep costs low (Izumi, Wright, Hamm 2010). A second 
motivation is that selling to schools offers farmers a form of market diversification and/or 
an opportunity to sell surplus produce (Izumi, Wright, Hamm 2010, Batement, Engel, and 
Meinen 2014). School sales for farmers motivated by this objective are larger, account 
for a relatively larger percentage of total sales, and are undertaken to increase their 
profitability (Conner et al. 2012).  
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There is similarly variation in the motivations of distributors in participating in 
farm to institution programs. Larger-scale distributors principally engage in farm-to-
institution markets for profitability considerations, while distributors that may be a non-
profit or have a regional focus may be more motivated by social considerations 
(Cleveland et al. 2014, Conner et al. 2014). This suggests that there may be a relationship 
between the scale and priorities of distributors and whether they pass cost savings from 
economies of scale through to SFAs. 
4.2.3 Market Channel Structure and Costs 
It is suggested that intermediaries may reduce supply costs for local food products 
relative to producers through economies of scale. Supply costs that may be reduced 
include those incurred both by farmers and by SFAs in the form of additional transaction 
costs (gathering information, negotiating terms, and enforcing terms) and marketing costs 
(packaging and distribution). If intermediaries reduce these costs and pass the cost 
savings on to SFAs, then school meal costs of local procurement should be lower when 
procured through intermediated markets than procured directly from producers. On the 
other hand, procurement from intermediaries might increase costs to SFAs. This might be 
the case if intermediaries do not pass cost savings through to SFAs, if the economies of 
scale are not significant enough, or if there are fixed adjustments costs that confront 
intermediaries in procuring local products. 
SFAs may bear additional costs from procuring local foods from two sources: the 
additional effort that schools must engage in to source, purchase, and prepare local foods, 
as well as the price of the food itself (Boys and Fraser 2015). SFAs have limited budgets 
and ability to cover additional costs associated with procuring local foods, so local food 
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procurement must be cost-effective for SFAs to commit to buying local foods in 
significant quantities in the long-term. In the last decade there has been significant 
investment in developing intermediated channels through which schools can access local 
foods (Low, et al., 2015). Such intermediated channels are hypothesized to provide 
economies of scale to the market to reduce overall costs for SFAs, as well as to provide a 
supply chain capable of aggregating product from small and medium sized farms that 
could not individually meet volume requirements of institutional buyers (Low et al. 
2015).  
Intermediaries may be able to exercise market power, limiting the ability of SFAs 
to negotiate prices and procurement terms, and resulting in overall higher costs of 
procurement (Nocke and White 2007). Economic theories rooted in industrial 
organization suggest that there is considerable ambiguity in the predicted outcome from 
market consolidation, such as from vertical integration and mergers (Ashenfelter et al. 
2015)8. In the case of vertical integration of markets, where upstream and downstream 
supply chain actors are combined, there may be efficiencies of scale that lower overall 
costs along the supply chain (Hortascu and Syverson, 2007). Similarly, mergers may 
create efficiencies by eliminating redundancies and accessing efficiencies of scale 
(Ashenfelter et al. 2015). However, both theoretical and empirical research suggests that 
cost reductions realized from these efficiencies must be measured against the effects of 
increased market concentration (Ashenfelter et al. 2015, Belleflame and Peitz 2010, 
                                                 8 It is unusual in the literature for consumers to advocate for a consolidation of suppliers 
in a market, as is the case where SFAs advocate for more opportunities to buy from 
intermediated sources instead of individually from farmers. The relevant theory comes 
from the perspective of suppliers that are interested in consolidation and the subsequent 
conversation about the potential welfare effects of consolidation. 
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Hortascu and Syverson 2007). Both vertical integration and mergers result in fewer firms 
in the market, which might provide remaining firms with the ability to exercise market 
power and charge the end consumer higher prices (Belleflame and Peitz 2010).  
Market concentration upstream of SFAs validates the possibility that market 
power may be a factor. School food authorities may contract with food service 
management companies, who hire management staff and arrange procurement, or they 
may be self-operated by the authority. School food service management companies 
comprise about 25% of the food service contracting industry, in which 66% of revenues 
are accrued by the top four companies in the industry nationwide, indicating the potential 
for upstream market power (Hyland 2018). While the national concentration of wholesale 
food distribution companies is lower in general, the broadline food distribution 
companies that often supply school food services are also concentrated, with the top three 
companies earning 60% of revenues, suggesting that even self-operated food service 
management may be subject to upstream market power (Technomics 2017). We do not 
have data that indicate whether SFAs in our sample are self-operated or are operated 
through contracted food service management companies. Regardless, upstream market 
concentration is a reasonable proposition in either case.  
4.3 Data and Methods 
4.3.1 Farm to School Census 
The USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) developed a national-level  FTS 
Census to comply with a directive in the Healthy Hunger Free Kids Act of 2010 to 
“disseminate research and data on existing farm to school programs”. The first  FTS 
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Census solicited data in 2013 about  FTS activities during the 2011-12 academic year 
from U.S. public school districts participating in the National School Lunch Program. 
USDA FNS revised questions in the 2015  FTS Census and administered it to private 
schools and charter schools as well. In the 2015  FTS Census, 12,585 SFAs completed 
the survey, a response rate of 70%. The  FTS Census did not impose a definition of 
“local” foods for SFAs. Instead, it instructed SFAs to self-define local from among 
several common options. Of SFAs that provided a definition in the 2015  FTS Census, 
45% considered local to be within the same city/county, within 50 miles, or within 100 
miles (O’Hara and Benson 2017).  
 Whereas previous studies using the  FTS Census only used variables from 
one of the surveys, we use variables from both datasets. To merge the 2013 and 2015  
FTS Census datasets, we first eliminate SFAs in the 2015 Census that did not have a 
Common Core of Data (CCD) identification number, since these numbers served as the 
basis for linking  FTS responses with school district data from other sources. Because in 
some instances the CCD number was not uniquely assigned in the 2015 Census, we 
merge respondents in the two datasets by matching on CCD number, SFA zip code, and 
the first eight letters of the school name9. The resulting dataset includes 2,373 observed 
SFAs that participated in both the 2013 and 2015 Census. Of these observations, 
however, 161 did not specify which market channel they used to source local food 
                                                 9 Before doing this, we deleted ten observations from the 2015 Census in which two 
schools had the same CCD number, zipcode, and first eight letters of the school name in 
common.  
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products. Our resulting dataset thus has 2,122 observations10. We merge these  FTS data 
with county-level rural-urban continuum codes in order to control for the metropolitan 
status of the county (USDA ERS 2013). We merge in county-level data from the Census 
of Agriculture (USDA 2017) and Food Environment Atlas (USDA ERS 2017).  
Twenty-two percent of SFAs reported lower school meal costs from participating 
in  FTS programs (Table 1). Ten percent of SFAs purchased local food exclusively from 
a producer, while 47% made such purchases both directly from producers and 
intermediaries. Fruits and vegetables were the most frequently purchased local food 
products. The average student size of an SFA was 5,600, and an average 48% of students 
were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. The corresponding median values for these 
two variables are 2,247 students and 47%, respectively. SFAs were distributed evenly 
among the six geographical regions established by FNS, and 86% of the SFAs were 
either located in a metropolitan county or adjacent to a metropolitan county. While the  
FTS Census was administered to all SFAs, it is possible that SFAs undertaking  FTS 
programming are more likely to respond to the survey than non- FTS SFAs. However, 
this is not a concern for our study since we are exclusively examining SFAs with  FTS 
programs, and of this subset it isn’t clear that there would be different response rates 
among SFAs conditional on the market channels that they use for local procurement
                                                 10 A select number observations had either negative or zero values recorded for the 
number of students in the school district and/or the number of schools in the school 
district. In such instances, we changed the value to missing.   
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Table 11 Descriptive Statistics for Market Channel and School Meal Costs 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.  
Lower Cost from  FTS Programming 2,212 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Purchased Direct Exclusive 2,212 0.10 0.31 0 1 
Purchased Intermediate Exclusive 2,212 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Purchased Both Direct and Intermediate 2,212 0.47 0.50 0 1 
County-level Farmers Markets Per 10,000 2,194 0.50 0.59 0 6.36 
County-level Direct Retail Producers Per 10,000 2,167 3.89 5.17 0 75.52 
Student size of SFA / 10,000 2,195 0.56 1.37 0.0007 32.0532 
% of Students Free/Reduced Price Lunch 2,187 0.48 0.22 0.00 1.00 
SFA in Metropolitan County 2,212 0.61 0.49 0 1 
SFA in Non-Metro Adjacent County 2,212 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Fruits / Veg. Local (2011-12) 2,212 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Fluid Milk Local (2011-12) 2,212 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Meat / Eggs Local (2011-12) 2,212 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Farm Visit / Trip (2011-12) 2,212 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Transaction Procurement Problem 2,212 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Product Procurement Problem 2,212 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Distribution Procurement Problem 2,212 0.29 0.45 0 1 
On-Site Procurement Problem 2,212 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Pricing Procurement Problem 2,212 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Northeast 2,212 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Midatlantic 2,212 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Southeast 2,212 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Midwest 2,212 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Mountain 2,212 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Southwest 2,212 0.08 0.27 0 1 
 
4.3.2 Empirical Model 
We estimate equation (1) using a probit model. 
𝑊(𝑦 = 0|𝒙) = 1 −Φ(𝒙𝛾)      (4.0) 
The independent variable, 𝑦, is a binary indicator that equals one if an SFA reported 
lower school meal costs from  FTS participation in 2013-14 and zero otherwise. In (1), Φ 
is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and 𝒙 is a matrix of explanatory 
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variables. Since the parameter estimates of probit regressions are challenging to interpret, 
we report the marginal effects of each coefficient in which the other covariates are 
evaluated at their sample means.  
The main independent variable of interest is the market channels that SFAs use to 
procure local products. We estimate three separate regressions in which the main 
independent variable is, respectively, whether the SFA procured local foods exclusively 
directly from producers; whether the SFA procured local foods exclusively from 
intermediaries; and whether the SFA procured local foods from both producers and 
intermediaries. We estimate the regressions including just one of these independent 
variables so that we can implement the endogeneity tests discussed below. In addition, 
we report regression results in which we include two binary variables indicating if the 
SFA purchased directly from producers exclusively and directly from intermediaries 
exclusively, which we report as specification “D” in the results. The results from 
specification D inform whether omitting one of the market channel classifications from 
the results would bias the results.  
We define SFAs that purchased directly from producers as those that answered 
affirmatively to any of the following four market channel classifications regarding where 
they obtained local foods: directly from an individual food producer 
(farmer/fisher/rancher), at a farmers market, via a community supported agriculture 
(CSA) program, or from a producer cooperative11. We define SFAs that purchased local 
foods from intermediaries as those making such purchases from food 
                                                 11 While purchases from a producer cooperative can be considered “direct” from a 
producer, they could exert market power. Nonetheless, our main results are robust to 
whether we classify producer cooperatives as “direct” purchases or purchases that occur 
from an “intermediary”.   
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processors/manufacturers, distributors, food buying cooperatives, food hubs, food service 
management companies, Department of Defense Fresh Program vendors, USDA Foods, 
or state  FTS program offices.  
To mitigate the possibility of omitted variable bias, we control for region-specific 
and SFA-specific characteristics. Regional variations influence the adoption of  FTS 
programs and the ways they are implemented (Lyson 2016, McCarthy, Steiner, and 
Houser 2017), so we include indicator variables to control for the region in which the 
SFA resides. We use rural-urban continuum codes to control for whether the SFA resides 
in a metropolitan county or non-metropolitan county that is adjacent to a metropolitan 
county (USDA ERS 2013). We control for the number of students in the SFA since there 
could be economies of scale that could influence the use of particular market channels. 
We control for the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price meals since 
the socioeconomic status of the school may influence which market channels they use. 
For instance, schools in less affluent districts may be more motivated to participate in  
FTS programs for cost saving purposes than wealthier schools.  
The type of local food products that SFAs purchase might influence the market 
channels that SFAs use to procure these products. To control for this variation, we use 
three food product classifications for whether the SFA purchased a) fruits or vegetables 
locally, b) fluid milk locally, and c) meat or eggs locally. For example, it may be easier to 
procure fruits and vegetables directly from a farmer than fluid milk. We control for 
educational motives that SFAs may have for purchasing directly from a producer by 
constructing a binary variable equal to one if the SFA conducted a student field trip to a 
farm or had a farmer visit a classroom. Including this control is important if such 
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educational activities result in reduced school meal costs. We use responses from the 
2013 Census to construct the food product and educational variables as otherwise these 
control variables could be endogenous due to simultaneity.  
We examine whether particular problems with procuring local food are correlated 
with market channel choice. To do so, we combine  FTS Census responses in which 
SFAs are asked to indicate procurement challenges because responses to these questions 
are highly correlated with each other. The five variables that we create are whether the 
SFA experienced local food procurement challenges pertaining to executing the 
transaction, the product, distribution, on-site preparation, or product prices (Appendix A). 
Even though our new categories reduce the redundancy of some of the problem 
categories, the new procurement variables that we create are nonetheless positively 
correlated with each other (Table 2). SFAs that experience challenges with procuring 
particular types of products are less likely to buy local foods exclusively from 
intermediaries, and more likely to make local purchases both directly and intermediaries. 
However, other types of procurement challenges are uncorrelated with whether a SFA 
purchased exclusively from an intermediary. Instead, SFAs with transaction, distribution, 
on-site, and pricing procurement problems are less likely to purchase local foods directly 
from producers exclusively, and have a greater probability of purchasing local foods from 
both producers and intermediaries. The procurement problem variables are negative 
correlated with SFAs that experienced lower school meal costs, as expected. Thus, the 
correlations between procurement challenges that SFAs confront and market channel 
choice provide justification in testing whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of 
the procurement problem variables in our regressions.
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Table 12 Market Channel Choice and Procurement Variables Correlations  
  
Lower 
Cost 
from  
FTS 
 Direct 
Excl. 
 Interm. 
Excl. 
 Both Direct 
& Interm. 
Trans. 
Prob. 
Product 
Prob. Distr. Prob. 
On-Site 
Prob. 
Pricing 
Prob. 
Lower Cost 
from  FTS  1.00 0.01 -0.05** 0.05** -0.05** -0.01 -0.07*** 
-
0.08*** 
-
0.19*** 
 Direct 
Excl. 
 
1.00 -0.29*** -0.32*** -0.04* 0.01 -0.04* 
-
0.08*** 
-
0.07*** 
 Interm. 
Excl. 
  
1.00 -0.81*** -0.02 
-
0.08*** -0.03 0.00 -0.04* 
 Both Direct 
& Interm. 
   
1.00 0.04* 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05** 0.08*** 
Transaction 
Prob. 
    
1.00 0.42*** 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 
Product 
Prob. 
     
1.00 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.37*** 
Distribution 
Prob. 
      
1.00 0.25*** 0.30*** 
On-Site 
Prob. 
       
1.00 0.27*** 
Pricing 
Prob.                 1.00 
*** -- Significant at 0.01 level. ** -- Significant at 0.05 level. * -- Significant at 0.1 level.  
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4.3.3 Instrumental Variable Regressions 
An SFA may make the decision of which market channels to use and school meal 
costs simultaneously. We use two instruments to test for the possibility that market 
channel choice is endogenous: the county-level number of farmers markets in 2016 per 
10,000 residents and the county-level number of farmers selling directly to retail outlets 
in 2012 per 10,000 residents (USDA ERS 2017, USDA 2017). Both measures are 
indicative of the opportunities available to SFA to procure foods directly from producers. 
We use two variables because while the number of producers selling directly to retailers 
in a county is a more accurate representation of producers within close proximity, some 
of those producers may not be marketing products within the county in which they reside. 
Alternatively, the number of farmers markets is more representative of the vibrancy of 
local food markets within closer proximity to the school, which could include the 
participation of producers from outside of the county. The county-level density of 
farmers markets is a variable that has been used in other  FTS studies, although in 
different contexts (Ralston et al. 2017, Botkins and Roe 2018).  
We hypothesize that both of these instruments are positively correlated with the 
probability that a SFA within that county has procured local foods directly from a 
producer. This is because a greater number of DTC markets and/or farmers selling to 
retail outlets within close proximity to the school could increase the probability that 
schools can identify producers from which to procure food products directly. We claim 
that these variables are exogenous with regard to whether a  FTS program reduced school 
meal costs at the school district level in 2013-14 outside of its influence on market 
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channel choice. This is because these variables represent average county-level conditions, 
which we claim are exogenous with regard to decisions made at the SFA-level.  
Since both the dependent variable and independent variable of interest are binary, 
we estimate a linear probability model (LPM) using instrumental variables following the 
rationale in Angrist and Pischke (2009). We estimate the coefficients from which derive 
the Hausman p-values that we present for the linear probability model according to the 
methodology in Wooldridge (2002). For robustness, we estimate instrumental variable 
probit regressions by maximizing the likelihood function of the joint density of lower 
school meal costs and market channel choice following Wooldridge (2002). We estimate 
both types of instrumental variable regressions to assess whether the distributional and 
functional forms associated with either of these regressions influences the results. 
However, for brevity, we only present the LPM instrumental variable regression results. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Probit Regressions 
We present the probit regression results in Table 312. In model A, there is no 
statistically significant association between SFAs that purchase local foods directly from 
producers exclusively and lower school meal costs. SFAs that purchase local foods 
exclusively from intermediaries (relative to those that do not) are less likely to have 
reduced school meal costs in model B (P<0.05). SFAs that purchase local foods from 
both producers and intermediaries have a greater probability of reducing school meal 
                                                 12 We find similar results when we estimate linear probability models or logit models 
instead of probit specifications.  
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costs in model C relative to those that do not (P<0.05). In model D, the coefficient on 
whether a SFA purchases exclusively from intermediaries is statistically significant with 
a similar coefficient magnitude as in model B. Thus, our results are robust to whether we 
include more than one market channel designation as an independent variable.  
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Table 13 Probit Regression Result 
 A B C D 
Intercept -0.44*** -0.38** -0.51*** -0.37** 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Purchased Direct Exclusive 0.02 
  
-0.05 
 
(0.10) 
  
(0.10) 
Purchased Intermediate Exclusive 
 
-0.16** 
 
-0.17** 
  
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
Purchased Both Direct and Intermediate 
  
0.14** 
 
   
(0.06) 
 Student size of SFA / 10,000 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
% of Students Free/Reduced Price Lunch -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Fruits / Veg. Local (2011-12) 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 
 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Fluid Milk Local (2011-12) 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Meat / Eggs Local (2011-12) -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Farm Visit / Trip (2011-12) 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
SFA in Metropolitan County -0.33*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.30*** 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
SFA in Non-Metro Adjacent County -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Northeast -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Midatlantic 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Southeast -0.15 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Midwest -0.22** -0.21** -0.21** -0.21** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Mountain -0.18 -0.19 -0.17 -0.18 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Southwest 0.34*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 
 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Observations 2,186 2,186 2,186 2,186 
-2 * Log Likelihood 2,276 2,270 2,271 2,269 
Percent Correctly Predicted 78% 78% 78% 78% 
Parameter estimate (standard error) 
    *** -- Significant at 0.01 level. ** -- Significant at 0.05 level. * -- Significant at 0.1 level.  
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In models A, B, C, and D, SFAs in metropolitan counties and in the Midwest have 
a lower probability of reduced school meal costs, while SFAs in the Southwest are more 
likely to have reduced them. None of the other control variables influence the probability 
of whether a SFA reduced school meal costs via  FTS program participation.  
In model B, the marginal effect of a coefficient magnitude of -0.16 implies that 
purchasing from intermediaries exclusively decreases the predicted probability that a 
SFA reduces school meal costs from  FTS participation by 0.05 (Table 4). The marginal 
effect for this coefficient in model D is similarly equal to -0.05. In model C, the marginal 
effect of a coefficient magnitude of 0.14 implies that purchasing local food from both 
producers and intermediaries increases the probability that the SFA reduces school meal 
costs by 0.04. The marginal effect of a SFA residing in a metropolitan county reduces the 
predicted probability of a SFA reducing school meal costs by 0.09. SFAs residing in the 
Midwest decrease the probability of reducing school meal costs by 0.06, while SFAs in 
the Southwest increase the probability by 0.1. 
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Table 14 Marginal Effects 
Specification A B C D 
Purchased Direct Exclusive 0.006 
  
-0.015 
 
(0.029) 
  
(0.030) 
Purchased Intermediate Exclusive 
 
-0.048** 
 
-0.050** 
  
(0.019) 
 
(0.020) 
Purchased Both Direct and Intermediate 
  
0.042** 
 
   
(0.018) 
 Student size of SFA / 10,000 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
% of Students Free/Reduced Price Lunch -0.026 -0.028 -0.027 -0.027 
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Fruits / Veg. Local (2011-12) 0.017 0.009 0.011 0.009 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Fluid Milk Local (2011-12) 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.010 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Meat / Eggs Local (2011-12) -0.019 -0.022 -0.021 -0.022 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Farm Visit / Trip (2011-12) 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
SFA in Metropolitan County -0.097*** -0.088*** -0.092*** -0.089*** 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
SFA in Non-Metro Adjacent County -0.045 -0.042 -0.043 -0.042 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Northeast -0.022 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Midatlantic 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.005 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Southeast -0.044 -0.038 -0.038 -0.038 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Midwest -0.064** -0.062** -0.062** -0.062** 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Mountain -0.054 -0.055 -0.050 -0.054 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Southwest 0.100*** 0.114*** 0.111*** 0.114*** 
 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Parameter estimate (standard error) 
    *** -- Significant at 0.01 level. ** -- Significant at 0.05 level. * -- Significant at 0.1 level.  
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  Our results are robust to the inclusion of control variables that represent 
challenges that schools experience with procuring local products (Table 5). The 
coefficient magnitudes on the independent variables that do not represent procurement 
problems are of a similar magnitude to the parameter estimates of the regressions in 
which the procurement problem variables are not included. SFAs that experience pricing 
challenges with procuring local foods are less likely to experience reduced school meal 
costs from implementing  FTS programs, while SFAs with product challenges are more 
likely to do so. The other procurement problem parameter estimates are statistically 
insignificant.  
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Table 15 Probit Regressions with Controls for Procurement Challenges 
Specification A B C D 
Purchased Direct Exclusive -0.05 
  
-0.13 
 
(0.10) 
  
(0.11) 
Purchased Intermediate Exclusive 
 
-0.17** 
 
-0.19*** 
  
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
Purchased Both Direct and Intermediate 
  
0.18*** 
 
   
(0.06) 
 Transaction Procurement Problem -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Product Procurement Problem 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Distribution Procurement Problem -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
On-Site Procurement Problem -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 
 
-0.08 -0.08 -0.08 (0.08) 
Pricing Procurement Problem -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.57*** -0.56*** 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
INCLUDED YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,186 2,186 2,186 2,186 
-2 * Log Likelihood 2,192 2,185 2,184 2,184 
Percent Correctly Predicted 78% 78% 78% 78% 
Parameter estimate (standard error).  
    *** -- Significant at 0.01 level. ** -- Significant at 0.05 level. * -- Significant at 0.1 level.  
Notes: We do not report the coefficients from the other independent variables for brevity.  
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4.4.2 Endogeneity Diagnostics 
We present endogeneity diagnostics in Table 6. For the linear probability model, 
both the county-level density of farmers markets and number of producers selling to retail 
institutions have positive and statistically significant coefficients on whether a SFA 
purchases local foods both directly from producers and intermediaries, and a negative and 
statistically coefficients on whether a SFA purchases local foods exclusively from 
intermediaries. These coefficients are statistically significant irrespective of whether we 
estimate the regressions with just one of the instruments or if both instruments are 
included. The F statistics from the first-stage regression are greater than ten in magnitude. 
The statistically insignificant F value from the over-identification test results provide 
evidence of the validity of using two instruments. Collectively, the first-stage regression 
results and over-identification test results imply that we do not have weak instruments.  
 The market channel choice variable has a statistically insignificant impact 
on reduced school meal costs in each of the second-stage regressions. However, we find 
in our Hausman tests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that market channel choice 
is exogenous. Thus, due the robustness of the finding across different instruments and 
market channel combinations, we believe it is reasonable to conclude that market channel 
choice is exogenous with regard to reducing school meal costs.  
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Table 16 Endogeneity Diagnostics 
Potentially Endogenous 
Market Channel Variable: 
Interm.  
Excl. 
Interm. 
Excl. 
Interm. 
Excl. 
Both Direct 
& Interm. 
Both Direct 
& Interm. 
Both Direct 
& Interm. 
First Stage Regression Results (Linear Probability Model) 
Density of Farmers Markets -0.04* -0.06*** - 0.05** 0.06*** - 
Density of Direct Retail 
Producers -0.01*** - -0.01*** 0.01** - 0.01*** 
Regression F Statistic 17.05*** 17.18*** 17.91*** 10.66*** 10.88*** 10.93*** 
Pertinent IV Statistics (Linear Probability Model) 
Hausman Exogeneity P-Value 0.19 0.49 0.25 0.22 0.50 0.29 
Overidentifying Restrictions 
F-Value 0.02 - - 0.01 - - 
Overidentifying Restrictions 
P-Value 0.88 - - 0.91 - - 
IV Regression Results (Linear Probability Model) 
2nd Stage Market Channel 
Coefficient 0.17 0.15 0.16 -0.22 -0.14 -0.23 
Regression F Statistic 2.31*** 2.63*** 2.30*** 2.25*** 2.63*** 2.20*** 
*** -- Significant at 0.01 level. ** -- Significant at 0.05 level. * -- Significant at 0.1 level.  
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 In the instrumental variable probit regressions (which we do not present in 
Table 6), the instruments are statistically significant when both instruments are used. 
However, the statistical significance is attenuated when only one instrument is used. 
While the market channel choice variable is statistically insignificant in the second-stage 
regressions when we use both instruments, it is statistically significant in three of the four 
second-stage regressions when we use one instrument. 
4.5 Discussion 
We find that exclusively purchasing local foods from intermediaries reduces the 
probability that an SFA perceives reduced school meal costs, and that purchasing from 
both intermediaries and producers increases the probability that an SFA perceives 
reduced school meal costs. While we are not able to identify the mechanism underlying 
these results with these data, there are a number of possible explanations for why this 
may be the case. One explanation for these results is that producers may have non-
pecuniary objectives for selling directly to schools, and they may be more willing to sell 
foods at affordable prices in order to facilitate the transaction (Conner et al. 2014). 
Intermediaries either may not achieve cost savings when aggregating from local 
producers, or if they do achieve cost savings, they do not pass those cost-savings along to 
SFAs.  
We do not find that purchasing local foods directly from producers exclusively 
has a statistically significant impact on reducing school meal costs. One reason why this 
effect is statistically insignificant is because a proportionally small number of SFAs 
procure local foods in this way, so we may not have a large enough sample to estimate an 
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effect. Another explanation is that SFAs that procure local foods from a variety of market 
channels may be able to negotiate or identify the most cost-effective locally priced foods. 
For example, a farmer may sell food at a lower price to a SFA that is also procuring local 
foods from intermediaries vis-a-vis those that are not.  
Our results are consistent with other case studies that found that non-pecuniary 
factors can be important in a farmer’s decision to sell to schools. While previous studies 
occurred with a small number of farmers within a narrow geographic region, we establish 
that this result holds at a national-level. Our results are also consistent with Christensen, 
Jablonski, and O’Hara (2017), who found that per-capita local expenditures were 
negatively correlated with SFAs that procured local foods directly from producers. The 
new insight that our model provides is establishing a causal relationship between market 
channel choice and school meal costs. We demonstrate that market channel choice by 
SFAs is highly influenced by characteristics of the surrounding food distribution system, 
and the results from our instrumental variable regressions indicate that market channel 
choice is exogenous. Nonetheless, we did not obtain consistent results on the second-
stage market channel choice coefficients, since they were statistically insignificant in the 
LPM IV regressions but significant in some of the IV probit regressions. So, our 
conclusions would be attenuated if market channel choice was endogenous.  
The negative coefficient on metropolitan counties in reducing school meal costs 
could arise if input costs for local farmers (irrespective of the market channels that they 
use) selling to SFAs in metropolitan counties is high, such as land prices or transaction 
costs. These higher input costs could raise their production costs, and reduce potential 
cost-savings to SFAs from local procurement. Or, these farmers may have greater 
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opportunity costs, such as other local marketing opportunities (like selling at farmers 
markets and/or to restaurants, for example) that may reduce their incentives to market 
products to schools (Fitzsimmons and Lass, 2015).  
The procurement problem variables were positively correlated with sourcing from 
both producers and intermediaries, which suggests SFAs may adapt to procurement 
challenges by sourcing from multiple types of suppliers. Of the five distinct procurement 
problems, lower school meal costs has highest negative correlation with pricing 
challenges (Table 2). This correlation may explain why pricing procurement challenges is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the probit regressions (Table 5). While product 
procurement challenges have a positive coefficient in the regressions, it is statistically 
insignificant when we estimate the regression without including pricing challenges as an 
independent variable. On-site procurement problems and distribution procurement 
problems are statistically insignificant in Table 4, but are both negative with statistical 
significance when pricing challenges is not included as an independent variable. We 
caution against drawing definitive conclusions about how particular procurement 
challenges impact school meal costs because the procurement challenges are highly 
correlated with each other (Table 2). Our principle purpose in including these controls is 
to test whether procurement challenges that could influence school meal costs were 
correlated with market channel choice, and we find that the statistical significance our 
market channel coefficients are robust to the inclusion of these variables.  
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4.6 Conclusion 
Whether and by what means SFAs may be reducing school meal costs via 
participation in  FTS programs has not received extensive attention. Transactions costs 
and impediments to local food procurement by SFAs is well-documented, and our results 
suggest that market channel portfolio choice can contribute to reduced school meal costs. 
These findings suggest the conditions under which  FTS program implementation may be 
more self-sustaining in the long-run, perhaps in the absence of policy support. Our results 
contradict the hypothesis that intermediated channels both realize cost reductions and 
pass those savings long the supply chain. However, since we do not observe actual costs, 
we are not able to determine the relevant mechanism. In particular, do intermediated 
channels not create significant efficiencies, or do they create efficiencies but do not pass 
them through the supply chain? 
One limitation of the dataset is that the question about school meal costs reflects 
the perception of SFAs regarding whether their school meal costs were reduced through 
participation in  FTS programs. They were not asked to undertake any calculations to 
arrive at their conclusion or to elaborate on how their school meal costs declined. The  
FTS Census does not ask  FTS SFAs if their school meal costs increased, and does not 
ask non- FTS SFAs questions about trends in school meal costs. More detailed data 
collection efforts into the components of school meal budgets would be valuable in being 
able to identify how school procurement strategies can be most effectively deployed 
given budgetary constraints. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 PRODUCER COSTS AND RETURNS FROM NEW ENGLAND FARM 
TO INSTITUTION SALES 
5.1 Introduction 
Diversified specialty crop producers take into consideration a number of factors 
when they choose how to market their products. In this chapter, I present the result of 
field research that informs the development of a theoretical model of utility maximizing 
producer choice of markets. We interviewed producers in six New England states who 
market at least some product to Farm to Institution markets. The field research results 
from a small scale study (N=11) of costs and returns to producer sales to local foods 
markets in New England, with particular focus on how sales to institutions fit into 
producers' overall marketing plans.  
We conducted in-depth interviews with eleven producers about their costs and 
returns in selling to farm to institution markets and two interviews with producers about 
their farm to institution markets more generally. Interviewees represented diversified fruit 
and vegetable growers in each of the six New England states, and a broad range of farm 
operations sizes and farm marketing strategies. Farm to Institution marketing ranged from 
less than 1% of total sales to about 11% of total sales of the farm operations interviewed. 
Notably, while very few farm operations specifically track costs and returns to farm to 
institution marketing, only two producers target this market for future growth. The 
barriers cited to increased participation include low prices, volume requirements, and 
logistical challenges. 
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We asked New England producers to identify the transaction characteristics 
associated with sales to the institutional market in direct and traditional-intermediated 
supply chain structures. Research results contribute to a growing body of literature on 
costs and returns to local foods markets and FTI specific transaction costs. This research 
further contributes to a new theoretical model of producer market channel choice that 
explicitly accounts for transaction characteristics that impact producers' decision to 
supply to FTI markets in the Chapter 6. 
In addition, we identify three important emerging topics that impact producers' 
profitability in the farm to institution market and conduct additional research to develop 
materials to inform producers about these topics. These topics include the emergence of 
online brokerage platforms to reduce transaction costs, the increased risk of violating 
Federal Department of Labor Wages and Hours violations as a result of engaging in some 
farm to institution activities, and the role of a value-added product in farm to institution 
sales. 
5.2 Background 
There are many ways for researchers to model producer marketing choices like 
what to produce and where to sell the products, but each model of producer choice comes 
with a trade-off. Extension economists, for example, might be interested in the practical 
choice that producers face on a regular basis: "This is what I can grow, where do I sell 
it?" To help producers answer this question, researchers can model costs and returns in 
different markets (Hardesty and Leff, 2010; LeRoux, 2010). It is often expensive and 
difficult to obtain this kind of information for diversified specialty crop producers. It is 
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not usually possible, for this population, to obtain cost and returns data in the volume that 
would allow statistical inference, so results are often of limited applicability. 
National data sets might allow researchers to observe which markets producers 
have sold to in the past, but do not usually provide both cost and returns information, 
such as sales prices, costs of production, marketing costs, transaction costs, and the costs 
and returns of the alternative markets to which the producers may have otherwise sold 
product. Producer choices are explained by producer demographic information, regional 
consumer demographic information, county, region, or state level market information that 
can be merged with other national level data (Park, Mishra, and Wozniak, 2011). While 
this research can provide a national view with broad applicability, it models producer 
choice as utility maximizing where equilibrium prices and quantities are exogenous, if 
they enter the model at all. This limitation prevents researchers from performing welfare 
analysis and inhibits the ability to model the potential effects of policy changes on market 
equilibria. 
Another approach is to model producer choice to differentiate product as local, 
instead of the choice of how to market the product. Producer product differentiation 
models are based on a well-developed literature (Muss and Rosen, 1978) with application 
across agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. This approach has the strength of 
allowing endogenously determined equilibria but does not account for the practical menu 
of choices that producers face regarding where to market their product. Two recent 
applications of this mode l use simulation methods (Winfree and Watson, 2017) and 
regional proprietary data from retailers (Richards et al., 20I 8) to identify equilibria and 
conduct welfare analysis. 
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As Farm to Institution (FTI) programs in New England expand, new supply 
chains are being developed to handle the increased flow of regionally-produced goods to 
regional institutions (Ralston, et al., 2017). While some supply chains deliver product 
directly to institutions, using no aggregators, distributors, or processors, other supply 
chains rely upon these additional supply chain actors. These are referred to as "direct" 
and "intermediated" supply chains, respectively. Each time an additional supply chain 
actor is added, the costs incurred to perform the supply chain task for which the actor is 
responsible must be covered. The actor may also charge an additional fee. On the other 
hand, in the absence of these additional supply chain actors, producers must absorb the 
costs associated with performing the supply chain tasks.  
It is not clear whether FTI markets are profitable to producers, and if not, what 
motivates producers to sell to FTI markets. Adams (2010) found evidence that 
institutional sales in New England may be profitable to producers. The Massachusetts 
Farm to School Project commissioned telephone surveys with producers to identify the 
impact of FTI sales on producers' profits. Results provide a description of Massachusetts 
producers' understanding of the profitability/ role of FTI sales. In written comments, 
producers noted trade-offs between costs associated with FTI sales and the profitability of 
these sales, non-economic benefits of FTI sales such as community "exposure", role of 
FTI sales in stabilizing seasonal income streams, personal value of helping feed 
schoolchildren, and the "premium" nature of the product sold. Sitaker et al. (2014) 
conducted a comprehensive literature review to determine whether different local food 
marketing options: 
• enable producers to make a living; 
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• improve local economies; 
• provide local residents with greater access to affordable, healthy food; and 
• contribute to greater consumption of healthy food among local residents. 
They found positive support to claim that producers marketing to farmers 
markets, retailers, CSAs, and food hubs may contribute to achieving these goals. In the 
case of FTI, however, the available research was insufficient to determine whether or not 
FTI is profitable, provides community economic benefit, or improves access and diet 
quality. 
Conner et al.'s (2012) work "Sustainable School Food Procurement in Large K-12 
Districts" offers a qualitative value-chain analysis of two pilot Farm to School projects. 
This study interviews producers, schools, and mid-chain vendors and uses Stevenson and 
Pirog (2008) definition of value-chains to further define the specific attributes of value 
chains as related to Farm to Institution programs. According to Stevenson and Pirog, 
value chains are characterized by: 
• product differentiation and value-added products 
• strategic partnerships across supply chain actors 
• information-sharing 
• trust 
• commitment to welfare of all participants through 
• fair pricing 
• fair governance. 
Conner et al. find that actors in the farm to school supply chain in their study 
display evidence of cultivating value-chains, particularly with regards to Business 
Relationships and Values, Information and Learning, and Equity and Pricing. Actors' 
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business interests and decisions are informed by the potential contribution they could 
make to the school districts' goals to improve local producer viability and child nutrition. 
Actors exchange information and develop opportunities to learn from one another to 
improve supply chain responsiveness. Finally, actors recognize that support for their 
shared goals of supporting local producers and child nutrition are constrained by tight 
price margins and economic bottom lines, and made efforts to offer products at 
"competitive prices," although the practice is dominated at times by the "desire to extract 
maximum economic surplus from upstream or downstream supply chain links" (2012). 
Low and Vogel (2012) use national data to determine how "local" foods are 
marketed, finding that "a large portion" of local foods move through intermediated 
markets, although small and medium sized farm sales in the northeast are dominated by 
direct markets. They also find that while there is evidence that producers participating in 
direct to consumer sales are able to capture a higher share of the food dollar, whether 
producers who participate in intermediated markets are able to capture a similarly high 
portion of the food dollar is in question. 
King et al. (2010) conducted case studies to compare "structure, size, and 
performance of local food supply chains with those of mainstream supply chains," 
including a FTI supply chain. The case studies focused on descriptions of structure, size, 
and performance of local food supply chains. Five key findings emerged from their 
research. First, they found that while local foods can move through different types of 
supply chains, intermediated supply chains make it difficult to establish and maintain 
consumers' connection to the "local" attributes of the product. Second, they found that 
local food supply chains account for a very small percentage of overall consumer demand 
 139 
 
for the five products and places studied. Third, they found that there is no single "cookie 
cutter" business model for a successful local food business enterprise. Fourth, they found 
that farmers that market directly generally count direct marketing as one component of a 
diversified marketing portfolio. Finally, they found that product aggregation to reduce per 
unit costs can be more important than how nearby the producer is to the consumer. 
Sexton (2012) suggests that “Market intermediaries, with even rather modest 
amounts of market power, can capture large shares of the benefits from policies intended 
to benefit producers." The exercise of market restraints, like liability insurance, sanitation 
guidelines, purchase minimums in FTI markets, and the capture of associated margins is 
common in intermediated agricultural markets where downstream firms typically set 
contracts to protect food quality and safety. 
5.3 Methods and Participants 
The goal of the research was to identify producers' costs and returns from broad 
range of FTI sales experiences. In coordination with Farm to Institution New England 
(FINE), we worked with farm to institution practitioners in New England to identify a 
judgement sample (Marshall 1996) of producers in six New England states who had 
experience selling to institutional buyers either directly or through intermediated 
channels. The criteria for inclusion on the list were broad: we requested that practitioners 
identify producers that were representative of their states' farm size, product offerings, 
access to marketing infrastructure, and marketing channels used. From this list, we 
prioritized interviewees that provided geographical, farm size, and market channel 
diversity. Fourteen producers agreed to be interviewed, although not all were willing to 
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provide the full range of data requested. The sample size is appropriate for in depth 
qualitative research on FTI market costs and returns (Sandelowksi, 1995) for the purpose 
of informing future research, but not large enough to be used to draw inferences. 
5.4 Survey Instrument 
We developed a survey tool and used the tool to conduct semi structured, in 
person interviews. We designed the survey to meet many goals. The survey instrument is 
intended to be compatible with existing USDA surveys and reports (King et a., 2012; 
USDA NASS 2012 Census of Agriculture; USDA ERS 2011 Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey), and IRS forms (1040 Schedule F), and additionally include 
questions that address costs and returns not currently gathered in these instruments (Lass, 
2012). There were multiple purposes for this intention. Primarily, we hoped to make 
straightforward comparisons to existing data for those fields that are included in both 
existing instruments and our instrument. Producers were able to refer to forms that they 
have already completed in order to answer many of our questions, which streamlined the 
process and helped the interviews go more quickly. Finally, the questions are designed to 
complement the existing instruments so that they may be easily inserted into future 
federal instruments and/ or may serve as a pilot for potential questions, should USDA 
decide to begin soliciting farm to institution data in future surveys. The list of documents 
prducers were requested to have on hand during interviews is provided in Figure 5.1, List 
of Farm Operation Documents.
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2014 IRS Schedule F 
2014 Harvest data 
Documentation of any grants received (contracts, etc.) 
Payroll 
Insurance paperwork  Federal Crop Insurance  Food Safety Liability Insurance  Farm Property Insurance  Employee Liability Insurance 
Mortgage statement/ Leases 
Town tax documents 
A copy of your 2012 USDA Farm Census form 
Figure 7 List of Farm Operation Documents 
 
The survey was also designed to be compatible with existing measures of social 
preferences. We designed the social preferences section with the intent of using the 
results to inform a future field experiment design. To achieve this, we reviewed the 
literature on field experiments, and developed a survey intended to identify a robust 
Dictator Game to identify producer social preferences for three social outcomes. As 
identified in the literature. In the process of making this design decision, we reviewed and 
rejected a number of other social preference frameworks. 
The final instrument design was built on the literature review and previous 
producer costs and returns surveys, including federal farm financial reporting and survey 
instruments, and questions intended to elicit producers' preferences for the social 
outcomes attributed to Farm to Institution programs (King et al., 2014; Lass, 2012). 
Section I, Social Preferences, included a section eliciting producers' agreement with 
common beliefs about the impact of FTI programs and the effectiveness of organizations 
with goals and principles that align with those impacts, using 5 point Likert scales 
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ranging from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree, with a "Can't Choose" option. Identify 
other causal factors that relate to supply chain transactions, including producer 
preferences, producer socio-demographic characteristics and farm characteristics. 
Sections 2 through 6 requested farm operation and financial information for the 
2014 growing year. Section 2 asked producers which market channels they sold to and 
whether and how they contracted with buyers in these market channels. In Section 3 we 
requested farm operation information regarding total acreage, production and marketing 
income from specific crops. In Section 4 we asked the producer about any other farm 
related income, and in Section 5 we asked detailed information about farm labor and 
wages. In Section 6 we solicited detailed information regarding farm operating expenses. 
Finally, Section 7 requested demographic information from the interviewee. A sample of 
interview questions is provided in Figure 5.2. The full instrument is attached in Appendix 
C. 
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Section 1. Social Preferences 
Beliefs 
Do you Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree or Disagree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree or Can’t Choose 
with the following statements: 
• Increasing the sales of New England food to New England consumers benefits the 
environment. 
• Increasing the sales of New England food to New England consumers helps preserve the 
region's working landscape. 
• Increasing the sales of New England food to New England consumers decreases the 
environmental impact of large-scale agriculture. 
• Increasing the sales of local and regional foods is a driver of local economic 
development. 
• Increasing the sales of local and regional foods is a driver of regional economic 
development. 
• Increasing the sales of local and regional foods to consumers in New England could 
improve health and nutrition outcomes. 
• Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could improve health and nutrition 
outcomes for students k-12.  
• Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could improve health and nutrition 
outcomes for the elderly. 
• Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could improve health and nutrition 
outcomes for incarcerated individuals. 
• Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could improve health and nutrition 
outcomes for hospital patients. 
• Small and medium sized farms are important drivers of rural economies. 
Section 2. Markets and Marketing Contracts 
Direct to consumer (fresh or processed) 
• Farm stand 
• CSA 
• Farmers' market 
• PYO 
 
Wholesaler  
End buyer known? Y N 
if "yes": 
• institution 
• retail 
• restaurant 
• buying club 
• processor 
• other  
 
Intermediated (fresh or processed) 
• Direct to restaurant 
• Direct to retail 
• Direct to buying club 
• Direct to aggregator 
 
Direct to processor 
 
Direct to institution 
• public k-12 
• pre-school private k-12 
• private college 
• public college/univ 
• hospital 
• other 
Figure 8 Selected Interview Questions
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5.5 Procedures 
We identified and interviewed 11 producers who shared extensive financial 
information about their farm operations, and two additional producers who were 
interested in discussing their experiences with costs and returns in farm to institution 
markets but were not willing to share financial information. The FINE practitioners 
identified potential producers to interview and the appropriate means of conducting those 
interviews. Several unanticipated questions came up during the process of identifying 
potential producer interviewees; particularly the issue of how FINE could be included in 
collecting producer information in a way that satisfies University Internal Review Board 
(IRB) requirements for confidentiality.  
The interviews were conducted on site, as producers were asked to share financial 
documents that would be difficult to transport. We requested in depth farm financial 
information, and a brief survey of producers pro-social motivations. We provided 
producers with hard copies of the interview instrument three weeks prior to the scheduled 
interview, along with a list of Farm Operation Documents that could furnish the 
information requested in the interview, provided in Table XX, and a guide to indicate 
which Farm Operation Documents were needed to respond to each interview question. 
Interviews times were targeted to be about two hours, and actual interview time 
ranged between two and four hours, with interviews taking over two hours being 
extended with the continuing consent of the respondent. Surveyed producers were 
compensated $100 each. 
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Respondents were informed that their responses were voluntary and that they 
could withdraw from the interview process at any time without forgoing compensation. 
Respondents were further informed that information received would only be reported in 
aggregate and that they would not be identifiable, and that they would remain 
anonymous. After each interview, the interview notes were typed and emailed to 
producers. Producers were given a (flexible) deadline, and asked to review the notes for 
accuracy, and to edit or redact any information that they consider to be identifying or 
proprietary. 
5.6 Results 
We use USDA's classification of farms according to gross income. 45.45% of 
interviewed farm operations were "small family farms" with less than $350,000 in gross 
cash farm income (GCFI) (USDA, 2013). Four of these farms are considered "low-sales 
small family farms" with GCFI of less than $150,000, and one is considered "moderate 
sales small family farms" with CGFI between $150,000 and $349,999. Interestingly, only 
one interviewed farm (9.09%) is classified as a "mid-sized farm," or a family farm with a 
gross income between $350,000 and $499,999 a year. The remaining 45.45% of farms all 
are considered "large-scale family farms" with CGFI of between $1,000,000 and 
$4,999,999. 
5.6.1 Social Preferences 
We asked eleven questions intended to elicit whether interviewed producers 
believed that farm to school programs contributed to the achievement of pro-social goals. 
 146 
 
Producers ranked their responses on a Likert scale from 1 to 5, where" 1" indicated strong 
agreement and "5" indicated strong disagreement. The producers were also allowed to opt 
out of stating a level of agreement, although none did for any question. In the case where 
a farm operation had more than one primary farm operator, we asked each farm operator 
with equal decision-making roles to fill out this portion of the survey; however, responses 
are not weighted to reflect the number of responses per farm operation. 
All producers interviewed "Strongly Agreed" or "Agreed" with the statements 
that: Small and medium sized farms are important drivers of rural economies; Increasing 
the sales of New England food to New England consumers helps preserve the region’s 
working landscape; Increasing the sales of local and regional foods is a driver of regional 
economic development. 
Almost 92% of producers "Strongly Agreed" or "Agreed" with the following 
statements: Increasing the sales of New England food to New England consumers 
benefits the environment; Increasing the sales of local and regional foods is a driver of 
local economic development; Increasing the sales of local and regional foods to 
consumers in New England could improve health and nutrition outcomes; Increasing the 
sales of local and regional foods could improve health and nutrition outcomes for hospital 
patients. 
Over 81% of producers "Strongly Agreed" or "Agreed" that: Increasing the sales 
of New England food to New England consumers decreases the environmental impact of 
large-scale agriculture; Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could improve 
health and nutrition outcomes for the elderly; Increasing the sales of local and regional 
foods could improve health and nutrition outcomes for incarcerated individuals. And 75% 
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of producers of producers "Strongly Agreed" or "Agreed" that increasing the sales of 
local and regional foods could improve health and nutrition outcomes for k-12 students. 
Table 17 Producer Social Preference 
    
Strongly 
Agree/ 
Agree 
Neither 
Strongly 
Disagree/ 
Disagree 
Can't 
Choose 
Increasing the sales of New England food to New 
England consumers …     
 benefits the environment 91.7% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
helps preserve the region's working 
landscape 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
decreases the environmental impact of 
large-scale agriculture 83.3% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods is a 
driver of …     
 local economic development 91.7% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 
  regional economic development 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods to 
consumers in New England could improve health 
and nutrition outcomes. 
91.7% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods 
could improve health and nutrition outcomes for 
…     
 for students k-12  75.0% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
 the elderly 83.3% 8.3% 8.3% 0.0% 
 incarcerated individuals 83.3% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
 hospital patients  91.7% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Small and medium sized farms are important 
drivers of rural economies. 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
N=12  
     
5.6.2 Supply Chain Structure 
We asked producers to identify how they marketed all products sold by the farm 
operation, and in particular, to identify the structure of the supply chains through which 
products flowed to end consumers in institutions. We provided producers with the 
following definition: 
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"Direct Marketing" is defined as sales from the producer directly to the 
end consumer of the product. 
"Intermediated Marketing” is defined as any sales where an additional 
business or organization owns the product before it reaches the end consumer. 
5.6.2.1 Direct Sales 
Seventy three percent of producers interviewed sold directly through a farm stand 
or farmers market, while 82% sold directly through a CSA, and 45% sold directly 
through pick-your-own. This suggests that our producer sample is not solely comprised 
of large producers that exclusively market to large wholesale buyers. 
5.6.2.2 Intermediated Sales 
We look at intermediated sales, in which producers sold product to outlets that 
prepared or sold product in turn to end consumers. Given our research goal to identify the 
costs and returns in the FTI market, we distinguish between intermediated sales to 
institutions versus those outlets that are not institutions. For Non-Institution 
Intermediated Sales, we find that 100% of producers interviewed sold product to a retail 
outlet, like a grocery store or co-op; 91% of producers interviewed sold to restaurants; 
55% sold to processors, 36% sold to aggregators, and 27% sold to buying clubs. This 
indicates that our sample was "wholesale ready", meaning that while producers in our 
sample may include sales directly to consumers in their portfolio of marketing options, 
they have the capacity to work with wholesale buyers. If our sample was comprised of 
producers that were not already "wholesale ready," we would be concerned that FTI 
specific costs could not be separated from the costs of learning or from up front fixed 
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costs associated with entering a new wholesale market, rather than the costs that are 
specific to the FTI market itself. 
Next we asked about FTI Intermediated Sales. Since our sample was selected 
from producers that were known to have sold to the FTI market in 2014, we asked 
producers to identify which FTI markets they sold to without using a wholesaler, such as 
an aggregator, processor, or distributor. Fifty four percent of producers interviewed sold 
to a public pre-k through 12th grade institution; 36% sold to private pre-k through 12th 
grade private schools or hospitals; 28% sold to a public college, or a private college, or a 
jail; and 9% sold to a pre-school. 
When producers sell products to a wholesaler, they do not always know who buys 
their product from the wholesaler. On the other hand, there are occasions where 
producers negotiate sales with a buyer and then contract a wholesaler to deliver the 
product. One important contribution of this study is that we ask producers who sell to 
wholesalers whether they have information about buyers further down the supply chain. 
This information is important because it provides insight into whether the intermediated 
supply chain is a "value-chain", in the sense that information flows "backwards" to the 
producer, whose marketing decision may be influenced by knowledge that the end 
consumer; are students, for example. To obtain this information, we asked producers 
about Intermediated Sales, when producers sell to wholesalers where the end buyer is 
known. Of the producers interviewed, 64% sold to a wholesaler. Of the producers 
interviewed, 27% (three total producers) sold to a wholesaler and know who buys their 
product from the wholesaler. All of these three producers know that the buyer who 
bought their product from the wholesaler was an institution. Of the producers 
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interviewed, 36% used a non-profit online broker as a wholesale distributor to 
institutions. Additional Market results are presented in Table Markets and Marketing 
Contracts. 
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Table 18 Producer Choice of Market Channel 
Markets                
      No Yes         No Yes 
Direct to consumer  
   
Intermediated  
  
 
Farm stand 27% 73% 
  
Direct to restaurant 9% 91% 
 
CSA 18% 82% 
  
Direct to retail 0% 100% 
 
Farmers' market 27% 73% 
  
Direct to buying club 73% 27% 
 
PYO 55% 45% 
  
Direct to aggregator 64% 36% 
Intermediated  
    
Direct to processor 45% 55% 
 
Wholesaler  36% 64% 
  
Direct to institution 
  
  
End buyer known? 73% 27% 
   
Public k-12 45% 55% 
  
Institution 73% 27% 
   
Pre-school 91% 9% 
  
Retail  82% 18% 
   
Private k-12 64% 36% 
  
Restaurant 82% 18% 
   
Private Higher 
Ed 73% 27% 
  
Buying club 91% 9% 
   
Public Higher 
Ed 73% 27% 
  
Processor 100% 0% 
   
Hospital 64% 36% 
  
Other 82% 18% 
   
Other 73% 27% 
  
If End Buyer Known 
       
  
Institution 0% 100% 
      
  
Retail  33% 67% 
      
  
Restaurant 33% 67% 
      
  
Buying club 67% 33% 
      
  
Processor 100% 0% 
          Other 33% 67%             
N=11 
          
5.6.3 Transaction Costs - the Costs of Gathering Information, Negotiation, and 
Monitoring.  
We asked a number of questions intended to uncover the transaction costs 
associated with farm to institution sales, but only one producer kept records that allowed 
us to calculate a dollar value of those costs as distinct from costs associated with other 
marketing. In this particular case, the dollar value is estimated as a portion of the salary 
of an employee whose job includes wholesale marketing, plus additional labor costs 
required for packing product for sales to these markets. This farm operation's business 
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planning is perhaps the most sophisticated of all farms interviewed, and may offer a 
window into how other farms will approach farm to institution marketing in the future, so 
we will share as much as we can about the costs without providing identifying 
information about the farm operation. 
This farm operation only used a non-profit online farm brokerage platform to 
coordinate and deliver farm to institution sales. Like many farms interviewed, the farm 
does not distribute to institutional buyers because the uncertainty associated with these 
deliveries is too high, and the revenue too low. The broker adds a 20% charge above what 
farm price. The 20% shi FTS the cost of the non-profits brokerage services and delivery 
to the buyer, so that the producer is not bearing these costs. In terms of transaction costs, 
the brokerage service is bearing the costs of gathering information about potential buyers 
and making a match among buyers and sellers; negotiating terms, including contracts, 
product quality and packaging, prices and quantities; and monitoring the value and 
quality of the sale. The farm does not process the product beyond what they would for 
any other wholesale buyer, but the FTI product needs to be packed differently than 
product for other wholesale buyers. The employee spends about 2% of their paid time on 
FTI sales, which constitute about 0.004% of the farm's total sales, and has volunteered 
about 200 hours of additional unpaid time to developing the farm to institution market for 
the farm. 
While other farm operations do not track information about transaction costs in a 
way that allows for this comparison, it is perhaps not difficult to see why 81% of the 
experienced farm business decision makers interviewed do not see Farm to Institution 
marketing as a growth area for the farm business operation. When we asked these 
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producers why they did not see this market as an area for growth, the answers all alluded 
to the transaction costs in the market. 
We provide a number of producer comments from our semi-structured interviews 
that indicate that transaction costs are a barrier to increased sales to institutions: 
-The wholesale learning curve is way more transparent than the FTI learning 
curve. Also, the rules for FTI are evolving more quickly, so it isn't like you invest 
in learning something and then you've invested that time and you move on - 
instead the needs and rules change as you go. Not sure if it will each some kind of 
stasis. 
 
-In wholesale marketing, the organizational relationship is much stronger than 
the institutional relationship, but in the institutional market, the relationship with 
the individual is paramount to getting anything done, even though it is dynamic - 
if a person [who you are working with at an institution] moves jobs, that may be 
the end. With institutions, you have to actually go and meet with them. 
 
-Won't do [delivery to institutions], or will avoid it if at all possible. Probably less 
than 1% was direct. For example, one local school wanted deliveries, but we said 
they need to go through the distributor because it just isn't worth all of the 
coordination for the volume that they want. 
 
-Quantities are too small to make it worth running a truck. Makes no economic 
sense. 
 
-Sold through [online broker to schools] for about 4-5 years, But 2014 was the 
last year - then they didn't want to work with us because we were too small. 
[online broker] has decided to focus on working with larger scale wholesale 
farms. 
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 -We could have sold through [national distributor who works with food service 
companies in institutions] but we would have had to increase our Food Safety 
Liability Insurance to $10 million umbrella. That would have cost $3000 a year, 
so we avoided it. 
 
-[To increase sales to institutions] you need to incentivize the people who buy. 
Buyers at schools need to get some kind of incentive - maybe 1% of local foods or 
something, as a bonus at the end of the year. 
 
-For us to move more of our sales from wholesale to institutions, they would need 
to increase their prices. 
 
-People who do food service are not accustomed to using whole vegetables, and 
they have to be willing to deal with the product we sell, to cook it, etc. We haven't 
made efforts to lightly process product in the way that institutions would need. At 
the moment we wouldn't take on that kind of processing. It is conceivable that we 
could sell to a middle man who would then process and move the product to 
schools. But they would have to make a commitment to organic, or the investment 
we've made in that wouldn't earn the returns to make it worthwhile. 
 
-What we need is a processor that can make the product into the kind of thing that 
cafeteria workers like. 
 
In addition, these farms may have better options for growth areas for their 
businesses. Farms that are near metropolitan areas are investing in farm stands and other 
direct marketing, like CSAs. Farms farther away from metropolitan areas are interested in 
moving into wholesale restaurant and retail markets, particularly those that have access to 
online brokerage platforms. These marketing options have much more clearly defined 
transaction costs. 
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With these comments however, it is important to distinguish the uncertainty about 
the transaction costs in the FTI market and the actual costs themselves. Perhaps with the 
emergence of online non-profit and for profit brokerages, the uncertainty will be 
gradually eliminated, and producers will sort themselves into markets with clearly 
defined costs, including farm to institution markets. 
Only two of the thirteen producers interviewed see farm to institution marketing 
as a growing market for their farm operation. These farm operations had a few 
characteristics in common - they did not perceive direct marketing as a growing market 
for their operations, either because they were geographically isolated from densely 
populated areas or because they felt that the direct to consumer market was saturated 
where they were located. Unlike most of the producers interviewed, who identified as 
diversified farm operations, each of these two operations focused on growing a smaller 
number of crops. Both operations had made large investments in on-farm processing 
facilities in the last two years, and both farms aggregate and process products from 
nearby growers to sell to institutions. While the other eleven interviewed producers 
engaged in on-farm processing, only these two farms served as aggregators, suggesting 
that the growth opportunity may be in aggregation, rather than a reallocation of product 
grown on-site from more general wholesale sales or direct sales to farm to institution 
sales. 
These producers, however, had far more differences than similarities. The 
operation sizes in terms of total dollars sales were on the opposite ends of the ranges of 
those interviewed. Farm labor expenditures were relatively low for one producer, and 
relatively high for the other. The farms' locations were very different in terms of access to 
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markets and infrastructure. One farm had significant on-farm infrastructure and the other 
did not. The producers had very different ratios of expenditures for distribution costs, 
utilities, insurance costs and other standard farm operation costs. 
5.7 Emerging Issues 
In addition to addressing social preferences and costs and returns in the FTI 
market, our semi-structured interviews uncovered some important emerging topics in FTI 
markets. The first topic is the development of a number of non-profit and for-profit 
organizations that have developed online ordering platforms that minimize many of the 
transaction costs associated with producers and buyers interacting in this market. The 
second topic is the increased chance that producers will be in violation of Federal 
Department of Labor Wages and Hours regulations as a direct result of new farm 
activities that producers may engage in to sell to institutional markets, including 
aggregating product from other producers and processing product. The final topic is the 
role of engaging in value-added processing for the farm to institution market. Appendices 
include extension and outreach materials developed as a result of this research to guide 
producers in their choices regarding two of these issues, and a Case Study to explore the 
third. To provide useful information to producers and practitioners about the emerging 
issues uncovered in the interviews with producers, we extended our research.  
5.7.1 Online Brokerages  
We determined the important characteristics of online brokerage platforms, 
identified the non-profits that offer these services to producers, constructed an online 
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survey using SurveyMonkey to elicit the relevant information and asked non-profits to 
fill out the survey. We identified five non -profits in New England that operate as 
brokers. The role that the brokers played varied. Most brokers required that producers 
deliver their product to a centralized location, although some would pick product up if the 
farm was on an established delivery route. Farmers usually set the price they charged 
brokers for each delivery of product, although it was often noted that the process was 
generally give and take, and at times prices were set for a portion of a season. The cost 
structure varied among brokers, with some brokers passing transaction, storage, and 
delivery costs directly on to buyers, and others charging a flat rate of 10-18%. Notably, 
most brokers paid producers in full within two weeks, which is an important 
improvement over the payment terms offered when by institutional purchasers, which can 
take months to fulfill payment. Finally, the brokers often provided a range of additional 
services, including: 
• Process raw product; 
• Refrigerated & Frozen storage; 
• Refrigerated trucks; 
• Legally own product once it is in possession; 
• Label, or require farmers to label, product origin; 
• Require farmers to participate in or carry any additional food safety 
certification s or processes 
• Online platform for sales. 
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5.7.2 Labor Laws and Farm to Institution Innovations 
In recent years, a number of producers in New England have been the subjects of 
Department of Labor Wages and Hours violation investigations for activities like 
aggregation and on farm processing that are encouraged by FTI advocates, but that result 
in farm workers’ exemption from Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). We interviewed 
three farmers who had been found in violation of labor law, reviewed FLSA and relevant 
case law, and interviewed a number of labor lawyers with expertise in agricultural labor 
law. We found that FTI sales may be different than other wholesale sales because 
institutions may want product that is lightly processed, they may need a volume delivered 
that is too large for any one farm to fill so that producers work together to aggregate 
deliveries, or they may be interested in buying from a farm in a neighboring state. 
Producers that are relatively large and are engaged in any of those activities to satisfy 
orders from institutional buyers may not be employing workers in "agricultural work" as 
defined by labor law. If workers are not engaged in agricultural work according to this 
definition in any given week, then they are not exempt from overtime pay for that week, 
and failure to pay overtime could result in expensive fines, in addition to providing the 
affected workers back pay.  
More research is needed to understand the scope of impact of labor regulations on 
the agricultural activities that producers engage in to meet the demands of institutional 
buyers, as well as on the activities that producers in New England engage in for other 
markets. A number of producers in New England have been found in violation of labor 
laws in the last few years, and engaging these producers to research this issue in depth 
and develop materials to prevent non-compliance is a growing need. Online brokerage 
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platforms, both those run by non-profits and those run by for- profit companies, are a 
growing trend across the country. In what circumstances might these platforms support 
producer profitability and in what circumstances they may contribute to a downward 
pressure on the prices charged by producers who use the platforms? More research is 
needed into the prices and quantities of products sold by producers and costs and returns 
to different farm to institution food processing options. Without this information, it will 
continue to be difficult to determine the profitability of this market for producers. 
5.7.3 Value-Added Product Line  
We conducted an in-depth interview with a farm that developed a value-added 
product line for institutional consumers. Reviewing internal production, processing, and 
sales documents detailing the costs and returns for that product and its role in the farm 
operation's long term viability, we investigated the convergence of stakeholders and 
resources that allowed the producer to explore a value-added soup product line. Despite 
significant community support for the value-added venture, the pilot value -added soup 
project was not cost-effective, and was not likely to be without significant changes in 
production costs.  
5.8 Conclusions 
The project identified a number of critical potential costs and returns for 
producers in farm to institution marketing in New England, and important new 
approaches to mitigate those costs. One approach is to leverage new technological 
resources like online brokerage systems to reduce transaction costs. 
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Results are also important for practitioners and researchers who have struggled to 
clearly understand the roll of farm to institution marketing in a sustainable farm business 
plan. In addition to the valuable responses to questions we asked about marketing, we 
have identified a number of questions that must be asked in the future, including the role 
of different market intermediaries and market structures, the role of labor and farm to 
institution activities, the role of processing, and the role of social preferences in 
producers choices to sell to these markets. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 EQUILIBRIA AND WELFARE IN MARKETS WITH SOCIAL 
PREFERENCES 
 
Authors: Jill Fitzsimmons, Dr. Nathalie Lavoie, Dr. Daniel Lass 
6.1 Introduction 
In this paper we introduce a theoretical model of markets for local foods that 
demonstrates how microeconomic theory can support sound policy decisions when both 
firm and consumer choices are determined by social preferences, and we apply the model 
to examine the effectiveness of different policy tools to enhance local food markets in 
which there may be a trade-off between achieving different local foods systems goals. 
Supply chains in markets for local foods are commonly referred to as “value chains” 
(Stevenson and Pirog, 2008). Value chains, in this definition, are supply chains in which 
both the product and information regarding the product’s pro-social attributes are 
communicated upstream and downstream along the supply chain, and supply chain 
actors’ choices in the market are influenced by preferences for pro-social attributes. 
There are three major challenges to modeling equilibria and welfare in markets 
comprised of value chains, like local foods: 1) The classical approach to modeling 
agricultural producer choice in markets for local foods is to treat the producer’s choice as 
a profit maximizing decision to differentiate product to meet consumer demand for local 
product attributes, but this objective function ignores the literature on producer profit 
maximizing market channel choice in local food markets, as well as the literature on 
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producer utility maximizing market channel choice; 2) Either firm or consumer choices 
can independently be explained by incorporating determinants of social preferences into 
the relevant objective functions, but prices and quantities are treated as exogenous, so 
that aggregate supply and demand cannot be derived and used to determine the market 
price and quantity; 3) Markets for local foods have, until recently, been characterized as 
“direct” markets in which there are no market intermediaries, but as the market matures, 
the effect of intermediary supply chain actors that may not be motivated by social 
preferences must be taken into account. 
This paper makes two types of contributions. First, we demonstrate the impact of 
modeling assumptions on welfare measures in markets that include value chains. To do 
this, we develop a partial equilibrium model that allows endogenous price and quantity in 
markets for local foods and that unifies the different perspectives of firms and consumers 
in markets for local foods. Our model allows identical producers to choose markets while 
heterogeneous consumers choose products. We then develop a model in which both firm 
and consumer are heterogeneous in their preferences for pro-social value chain outcomes, 
expanding the application of social preferences in decision making to firm decision 
making. Finally, we include the potential for intermediary market power to conduct 
welfare analysis. The second contribution is to apply this model to test the effectiveness 
of different policy measures in the specific case of farm to school markets, though the 
approaches we suggest can be used to model other agricultural markets, as well as non-
agricultural markets.  
Farm to School ( FTS) markets are particularly interesting because both case 
studies and empirical evidence raise questions regarding the long term viability of the 
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markets, but policy makers continue to support them to achieve childhood health and 
nutrition objectives. While demand in these markets is growing, it is price constrained 
(Ralston et al., 2017; Technomics, 2017), and supply to this market is relatively low 
compared to that of other markets for local food products (NASS, 2016). It is not clear 
that marketing to  FTS channels is a profitable strategy for producers who market local 
food (Boys and Fraser, 2018; Fitzsimmons and Lass, 2015; Sitaker, et al., 2011), yet 
empirical evidence suggests that physical proximity to producers who market directly is 
both statistically and economically important to  FTS program implementation (Botkins 
and Roe, 2018). Finally, while the local foods in general and the  FTS market in 
particular are moving toward more intermediated sales (Richards, et al., 2017; Bloom and 
Hinrichs, 2011) producer motivation to supply to the market may be driven by non-
pecuniary factors (Lehnerd, et al., 2018; Matts et al., 2011) that may not be discoverable 
or supported in intermediated markets where intermediaries do not transmit market 
information upstream.  
Policy makers have invested in creating demand for Farm to School Programs in 
which schools purchase “local” foods from producers, but have not made similar 
investments to ensure producer supply to these programs. This is understandable, 
considering that previous research does not provide a clear explanation for how producers 
choose marketing channels for locally differentiated products in intermediated markets. If 
policy makers want to support  FTS programs but do not understand how producers make 
the choice to sell to this market, it is difficult to design policy intended to encourage 
participation.  
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The  FTS market for locally differentiated products to schools highlights a 
number of potential trade-offs that often go unexplored in local foods research but that 
can be addressed through our approach. In  FTS markets, there may be economic trade-
offs between increasing the quantity of local foods supplied to schools and total welfare 
in the partial equilibrium model. As the quantity supplied to the  FTS market increases as 
a result of policy intervention, total economic welfare can decrease due to welfare 
decreases in the non  FTS market. As the  FTS market grows, producers and schools 
increasingly rely on market intermediaries to distribute product. The role of 
intermediaries in the market, however, is generally overlooked, resulting in the potential 
to under-estimate the price paid by schools for local product and over-estimate the 
equilibrium quantity allocated to the market. In addition, subsidies intended to increase 
the quantity of local foods in  FTS programs may improve success if used to support 
producer supply rather than school demand. The Farm to School case highlights that 
policy interventions to support social outcomes of local foods systems are sensitive to 
market factors that are not currently considered by policy makers and  FTS advocates, 
and highlights the need for more rigorous economic theories that can incorporate 
different dimensions of local foods systems.  
6.2 Economic Analysis of Local Food 
Economic analysis of “local” food systems has been challenging, in part, because 
the market definition differs between the demand side and the supply side. While 
consumers purchase “locally differentiated” products, producers sell “through direct 
markets”. To the extent that local foods markets have been defined by the direct 
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marketing channel through which they were bought and sold, and the product attributes 
have been considered verifiable as a result of “knowing” the producer, the modeling 
distinction has been insignificant. As markets for local food grow, however, and diversify 
beyond direct-to-consumer channels to include marketing locally differentiated foods 
through intermediated market channels, the distinction becomes relevant and necessary to 
effectively analyze market equilibria, policy impacts, and economic welfare. 
6.2.1 Consumer Demand for Local Food  
The idea that consumers can make purchasing choices to support social causes is 
not new, and has been applied to consumer choices for food and agricultural products for 
many decades. Examples include Victory Gardens, health foods, sustainable foods, 
organic foods, and most recently, local foods (Brown & Jameton, 2000; Pothukuchi & 
Kaufman, 1999). Economic analysis of consumer demand in markets for these foods 
generally focuses on understanding the specific food product attributes that consumers 
bundle into their definitions of these foods (Connolly & Klaiber, 2014; Darby et al., 
2008; Lusk and Briggeman, 2009). Economists ask what product attributes, such as food 
quality, environmental outcomes, health, et cetera, motivate consumers to choose and 
pay a premium for these products over otherwise indistinguishable commodity 
alternatives. Consumers consistently demonstrate an increased willingness-to-pay for 
products that are labeled as “local” or are labeled with a specific local or regional brand 
(“Colorado Grown”) and the attributes that are bundled into the implicit concept of local 
(Darby et al., 2008; Feldmann & Hamm 2015; Fitzsimmons and Cicia, 2018; Loureiro et 
al., 2002; Martinez, 2010). More recently, economic models of consumer demand have 
included other-regarding consumer preferences to support local producers (Toler et al., 
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2009) or to value local economic impacts and other potential externalities (Winfree and 
Watson, 2017). The presumption is that producers may then use this information to 
differentiate their product to meet consumer demand, and capture the relevant premium.  
The demand for local foods has extended beyond household consumption, and has 
a growing presence in public and private institutions like schools, colleges, hospitals and 
nursing homes (Ralston et al., 2017). We apply the model developed in this paper to the 
case of Farm to School ( FTS) programs, where public K-12 schools procure local foods 
for sales in cafeterias, so we will explore the demand in the K-12  FTS market in 
particular.  
Like consumers’ household demand for local in general,  FTS advocates argue 
that  FTS programs create new markets for producers that may bring better profit 
margins, improve nutrition and health for end consumers, improve connections between 
producers and community, generate local economic growth, and improve environmental 
sustainability of the food system (USDA, Food and Nutrition Service, 2016; National 
Farm to School Network 2016). Demand for local product by  FTS programs is intended 
to support systems change, incorporating different actors with different goals, which the 
National Farm to School Network summarizes:  
Farm to school enriches the connection communities have with fresh, healthy food 
and local food producers by changing food purchasing and education practices at 
schools and early care and education settings (2018). 
 
Programs incorporate education around nutrition, food preparation, and 
production with procurement to support this goal. Agencies, funders, and policies that 
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aim to support  FTS goals are generally oriented towards the institutional buyer, not the 
agricultural producer, and the resulting interventions tend to focus on education and 
procurement strategies. Nutrition and public health agencies tend to promote education 
interventions that benefit students’ health outcomes (Berezowitz et al., 2015; Lyson, 
2016), while producer-oriented organizations and agencies like USDA tend promote 
interventions that support schools procurement of local foods (Ralston et al., 2017). In 
general,  FTS programs are perceived to be mutually beneficial to both consumers and 
producers, and, like household consumers of local foods, the potential benefits to local 
producers, local economic development, and the environment are valued in addition to 
the perceived benefits from more healthful products and the opportunity to educate youth 
about food and health (Izumi et al., 2010). 
Unlike consumers’ household demand for local, however, there are a number of 
barriers that school food authorities (SFAs) face to procure local food products. SFAs 
struggle with local food availability, distribution logistics, operating costs, lack of staff 
training and kitchen equipment to prepare unprocessed products, and ordering and 
managing financial transactions (Bloom and Hinrichs, 2010; Boys and Fraser, 2017; 
Fitzsimmons, 2011; Vo and Holcomb, 2011). In the 2015 Farm to School Census, 
conducted by USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service, 75% of respondents that participated 
in  FTS programs reported problems with procurement. In Table 19. “Perceived Local 
Food Procurement Problems, 2013-2014”, we divide the twenty procurement problems 
identified by Census respondents into five problem categories: Transaction, On-Site, 
Delivery, Product Availability, and Price. SFAs that participated in  FTS were asked what 
problems they experienced with  FTS procurement. The most frequently noted problems 
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include Product Availability and Transaction costs. For example, 66% of respondents that 
participated in  FTS programming reported at least one problem with product availability, 
and 53% reported at least one transaction problem related to obtaining information, 
negotiating terms, and monitoring compliance. Of the SFAs that did procure product for  
FTS programs, 53% that reported at least on transaction problem, and 26% reported that 
it was “Hard to coordinate procurement of local with regular procurement.” 
 Policy makers and funders have long recognized that the problems SFAs face in 
procuring local product are barriers to program implementation, and have increased 
funding for  FTS programs and implemented policies to encourage schools to source 
regional farm products to help SFAs overcome the barriers (Lyson, 2016). For example, 
USDA began a $5 million annual  FTS grant program in 2012 “to increase local food 
procurement for school meal programs and expand educational agriculture and gardening 
activities.” The program was established by the 2010 Healthy, Hunger Free Kids Act 
(Lyson, 2016; Community Food Systems, 2017). The USDA’s  FTS programs are 
intended to increase procurement of local foods by local schools, primarily by addressing 
the barriers to participation faced by schools (Ralston, et al., 2017). The grants are limited 
to “training and technical assistance, planning, purchasing equipment, developing school 
gardens, developing partnerships, and implementing  FTS programs” (USDA, 2016). 
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Table 19 Perceived Local Food Procurement Problems for  FTS Participants 
 Specific Problem 
One or more 
problems 
On-Site   23% 
 
Lack of kitchen equipment to process/prepare 
local foods.  12%  
 
GAP/ other food safety requirements  12%  
 
Lack of compliance with your institution's 
purchasing policies  6%  
Delivery   24% 
 
Lack of reliability in delivering ordered items  19%  
 
Getting on time deliveries  8%  
 
Quantity delivered equals quantity ordered  8%  
Price   42% 
 
Higher prices  38%  
 
Unstable product prices  15%  
Product Availability  66% 
 
Hard to find year-round availability of key items  57%  
 
Local items not available from primary vendors  27%  
 
Vendors for local items don't offer a broad range 
of products  22%  
 
Lack of availability of processed/precut products  15%  
 
Getting product delivered that meets your quality 
requirements & other specs (i.e., size)  15%  
Transaction   53% 
 
Local producers aren't bidding  16%  
 
Hard to coordinate procurement of local with 
regular procurement 26%  
 
Hard to find new suppliers/growers or 
distributors  19%  
 
Hard to get information about product 
availability  16%  
 
Hard to place orders with vendors  6%  
 
Resolving problem deliveries  4%  
  
Inability to pay farmers according to farmers' 
needs due to school district payment procedures  8%  
Number of SFA Respondents that participated in  FTS programming, N=4718.  
75% of SFAs Reported One or More Problems. 
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While agricultural producers and producer groups are eligible for funding, less 
than $300,000 out of the $15 million has been awarded to producers to increase supply 
during the first three years of the grant’s existence (NSAC, 2016), and fewer than 9% of 
grant applicants and 1% of recipients between 2013 and 2017 were agricultural producers 
(Food and Nutrition Service, 2017). The USDA  FTS grant program is focused on 
procurement; between 2013 and 2017, 50% of funded projects were awarded directly to 
schools and school districts, 49% to non-profits, state and local agencies, Indian tribal 
organizations, and universities and colleges, while 0.008% has been awarded to 
producers. Thus, it is not surprising that funded proposals supported school food 
authorities in local food procurement, processing, and preparation activities, as well as 
agriculture, food, and nutrition-based education and school garden activities, and did not 
provide significant assistance to producer supply (Food and Nutrition Service, USDA, 
2017).  
The National Farm to School Network also tracks state-level  FTS policy 
proposals. Similar to the priorities of the USDA grant program, all of the three NFSN 
legislative categories support demand by increasing 1) education related to food, 
agriculture, health and nutrition; 2) school gardens; and 3) procurement, or school 
purchasing, serving and promoting of local foods. An analysis of laws that provided 
direct financial or program support to serve local foods found that such legislation was 
associated with higher rates of  FTS participation and frequency of serving local food at 
the state level (McCarthy et al., 2017).13 The category of procurement includes two 
                                                 13 Categories included: Project or pilot program implementation, budget appropriations, 
grant money allocation, local preference,  FTS coordinator, and database (McCarthy et 
al., 2017). 
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legislative topics that may indirectly increase market prices, benefiting producers, despite 
being aimed at schools: 1) increasing reimbursements for local food purchasing (19 
proposed bills); and 2) establishing preferential purchasing policies for local food (57 
proposed bills) (NFSN, 2016). To our knowledge, no legislation and no federal funding 
has been proposed to directly support producer participation in  FTS markets, although 
producers have access to many non- FTS specific funding and financing opportunities.  
In addition to funding SFAs to mitigate procurement costs at the school level, a 
proposed solution to reduce the barriers to local foods procurement for  FTS programs is 
to leverage economies of scale in existing “conventional” food distribution supply chains 
to improve efficiency and move larger volumes of product (Bloom and Hinrichs, 2010; 
Abatekessa and Peterson, 2011; Conner et al., 2012; Clark and Inwood, 2015; Givens and 
Dunning, 2018). The conventional wisdom is that distributors have access to more 
efficient infrastructure, like refrigerated trucks and cold storage, that can reduce 
marketing costs, and that they have ordering, billing and payment systems that are 
compatible with SFAs and can reduce transaction costs. Distribution sector cost 
information is generally proprietary, making it difficult to verify this claim. It is possible 
that the sector’s cost efficiencies are easily transferrable to the  FTS supply chain, but it is 
also possible that distributors face supply chain costs associated with the same challenges 
that SFAs and producers face. If using the distribution sector does achieve efficiencies 
that lead to overall cost savings in the supply chain, distributors with market power may 
retain some portion of the cost savings as rent, limiting the potential increase in quantity 
supplied. Without explicitly accounting for the role of an intermediary distributor sector 
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in the intermediated  FTS market channel, by treating it as “frictionless”, it is difficult to 
assess the net impact intermediaries may have on the quantity supplied.  
  
6.2.2 Producer Market Choice  
Three approaches dominate how producer choices in local foods markets are 
modeled: 1) profit maximizing sales of a locally-differentiated product, 2) producer profit 
maximizing choice of market channels, or 3) producer utility maximizing choice of 
market channels. Local food is modeled as a vertically differentiated good, i.e. we 
assume that at the same price, all consumers (schools) prefer the local product to the 
commodity product. Models of firms’ strategic choices to differentiate products as local 
allow producers or retailers a location-based comparative advantage in cost (Winfree and 
Watson, 2017) or the capacity to diversify its product bundles by including local products 
to exploit consumer demand for product bundles that include local foods (Richards, et al., 
2017). In these examples, firms offer different quality levels, where more efficient or 
proximate firms typically supply high-quality product or product bundles, and less-
efficient or distant firms supply low-quality product or product bundles. Firms make a 
choice regarding whether to differentiate products, and aggregate supply is a function of 
heterogeneity in producers’ efficiencies. Firms’ choices to differentiate products as local 
are profit maximizing choice. Modeling producers’ choices to differentiate products to 
meet consumer demand is the standard approach that has been used in the literature.  
Modeling producer choice of market channels is preferable to some authors 
because it is a more accurate reflection of the practical choice that small and medium-
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sized producers face (Hardesty and Leff, 2010;Kim, Curtis and Yeager, 2014; Leroux et 
al., 2010; Parks and Lohr, 2008). Models of profit and utility maximizing choice between 
markets or portfolios of markets implicitly embeds product differentiation within the 
market channel – products are differentiated as local because they are sold through a 
venue that is local. In these models, producers choose either to market the product as a 
commodity through a wholesaler, or directly to the consumer through a direct sub-
channel like a CSA, farmers market, or farm stand. The above local foods literature may 
favor this approach because of its practical application, but also the framing of the 
decision as market channel choice appears to be, in large part, a legacy of federal policy. 
The Farmer-To-Consumer Direct Marketing Act Of 1976 was enacted to  
“…promote…the development and expansion of direct marketing of agricultural commodities 
from farmers to consumers…” and it directed the USDA Secretary of Agriculture to “…initiate 
and coordinate a program designed to facilitate direct marketing from farmers to consumers for 
the mutual benefit of consumers and farmers…”  
While the Act expressly did not limit the definition of direct marketing, the 
definition that first appeared in the 1978 and 1982 Agricultural Censuses was based on 
language used in the act, and has, in practice, provided a benchmark for how researchers 
quantify direct marketing. Producers were asked: 
“During 1978 did you SELL any crops, livestock, or livestock products DIRECTLY to individuals 
FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION - roadside stands, farmers markets, pick your own, etc.?” 
(Bureau of the Census, 1978)14.  
                                                 14 USDA NASS took over administration of the Census of Agriculture in 1997, which 
had previously been administered by the Bureau of the Census. 
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The result has been that this Census category, with modest variation over subsequent 
censuses, has served as the sole national data source for agricultural products not 
marketed as commodities. More recently, the 2015 Local Food Marketing Practices 
(LFMP) Survey was conducted by USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS) to provide data about producers’ local food marketing practices. The survey 
identified four different “direct” marketing channels: “direct to consumer”; “direct to 
retail”; “direct to institution”; and “direct to intermediate”. The survey design is 
particularly interesting in that the definition of the “direct to intermediate” market 
channel explicitly identifies locally branded products, while the others do not. Table 20. 
“Local Food Marketing Practices Survey Channel and Sub-Channel Definitions” 
provides the market channel definitions used by USDA NASS in the 2015 LFMPS.
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Table 20 USDA 2015 Local Food Marketing Practices Survey Channel and Sub-
Channel Definitions 
Channel Sub-Channel 
CONSUMER 
Farmers markets, on-farm stores or farm stands, roadside stands or stores, 
CSA (Community Supported Agriculture), online marketplaces. 
RETAIL 
Supermarkets, supercenters, restaurants, caterers, independently owned 
grocery stores, food cooperatives. 
INSTITUTION 
K-12 schools, colleges or universities, hospitals, workplace cafeterias, 
prisons, foodbanks 
INTERMEDIATE 
Businesses or organizations in the middle of the supply chain marketing 
locally- and/or regionally-branded products, such as distributers, food hubs, 
brokers, auction houses, wholesale and terminal markets, and food 
processors. 
 
Producers may sell the product directly to a consumer, they may brand the 
product as “local” and sell it to a middle-man, or they may sell the product to a wholesale 
distributor as an unbranded commodity. In the case where the producer sells the product 
directly to a consumer, the product is presumed to be “local” by virtue of the lack of 
middle-men. In retail, institution, and intermediated markets, however, the process of 
branding the product as local and enforcing the branding through the supply chain so that 
the value of the local premium is realized at the point of purchase is costly (Hardesty and 
Leff, 2010; Leroux, et al., 2010). Further, intermediaries within the supply chain are 
concentrated and have the potential to act as oligopolists and/ or oligopsonists and 
capture a price premium and lower the price paid to farmers (Hardesty and Leff; 2010; 
Boys and Fraser, 2017). An additional consideration is that individual or family farm 
operators may be motivated to make marketing choices that are not solely profit 
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maximizing (Conner et al. 2012; Barrowclaw et al., 2015; Heiss et al, 2014; Lehnerd et 
al., 2018; Lyson, Gillespie and Hilchey, 1995; Hunt, 2007).  
Whether local food marketing is necessarily profitable to producers is 
inconclusive, particularly as the high cost of labor for direct marketing may offset the 
available premium for local (Hardesty and Leff, 2010; Lehnerd et l., 2018; Leroux, et al., 
2010; Sitaker, et al., 2014). Much of the research on producer profitability has been 
limited by the lack of available data, and instead relies on region-specific small-sample 
studies (Fitzsimmons and Lass, 2015; Hardesty and Leff, 2010; Leroux, et al., 2010). The 
national LFMPS asked producers to identify some channel-specific marketing practices 
costs and revenues. Unfortunately, the response rates for these questions were too low to 
provide reliable inference for any given marketing channel, though future research may 
supplement these data with USDA Economic Research Service Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey data to find some channel-specific profitability measures. There is 
limited available research, however, that demonstrates that producers’ costs to 
differentiate the product as local are less than the increased returns from the product 
differentiation (Fitzsimmons and Lass, 2015; Hardesty and Leff, 2010; Leroux; 2010). 
The costs of differentiation are inextricably tied to marketing channel choice. Implicitly 
differentiating products as local by selling at a farm stand, through Community 
Supported Agriculture (CSA), or at farmers’ markets, are costly labor-intensive activities 
(Boys and Fraser, 2018; Fitzsimmons and Lass, 2015; Hardesty and Leff, 2010; Leroux; 
2010). Explicitly differentiating products as local by labeling products, or otherwise 
transmitting information through an intermediated marketing channel increases variable 
costs, as well as enforcement costs. Importantly, explicitly differentiating products also 
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involves uncertain downstream negotiation, information, and monitoring costs, or 
transactions costs, particularly when supply chain intermediaries are not committed to 
preserving the value of a label along the supply chain (Hobbs, 1997). In the case of  FTS 
markets, SFAs who negotiate food service contracts and make procurement decisions 
have restricted budgets and may not have the ability to pay for locally differentiated 
products. Producers face increased transaction costs associated with explicitly 
differentiating their local product in the Farm to School marketing channel (Boys and 
Fraser, 2015; Vo and Holcombe; 2010). While other direct marketing practices have 
shown promise to be profitable in these small-scale studies, the potential profitability of  
FTS programs is less convincing (Sitaker et al., 2014). 
Producers’ ability to exercise market power derived from limited competition is 
another possible source of profitability in direct to consumer markets for locally 
differentiated food (Hardesty and Leff, 2010). A local product is defined by restricting 
the distance it has traveled from the producer to the end consumer. This restriction also 
limits the number of competitive producers that may sell “local” products to any group of 
consumers, effectively restricting market entry and potentially granting producers 
oligopoly power in the market for local foods. If direct-to-consumer marketing of locally 
differentiated food is, in fact, generally profitable for producers, the price-cost margin 
may be a result of both product differentiation and producers exercising oligopoly power.  
If the profitability of direct-to-consumer local foods is partially due to producers 
exercising oligopoly power, this market power may be countervailed in an intermediated 
market with a downstream intermediary exercising oligopsony power. In the  FTS market 
channel, producers increasingly sell product to intermediaries (Ralston, et al., 2017), 
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which then sell to schools where product is provided to end consumers. These 
intermediaries potentially limit producers’ abilities to reap benefits from oligopoly power 
and may subject them to oligopsony power. Market concentration upstream of SFAs 
validates the possibility that market power may be a factor. In  FTS markets, SFAs may 
contract with food service management companies, who hire management staff and 
arrange procurement, or they may be self-operated by the authority. School food service 
management companies comprise about 25% of the food service contracting industry, in 
which 66% of revenues are accrued by the top four companies in the industry nationwide, 
indicating the potential for upstream market power (IBISWorld, 2018). While the 
national concentration of wholesale food distribution companies is lower in general, the 
broad line food distribution companies that often supply school food services are also 
concentrated, with the top three companies earning 60% of revenues, suggesting that 
even self-operated food service management may be subject to market power 
(Technomics, 2017). Regardless of food service management, upstream market 
concentration is a reasonable expectation.  
Finally, agricultural producers’ decisions are not always modeled as profit 
maximizing decisions. Often, producers’ choices are modeled as utility maximizing 
choices. This modeling choice stems from Lin (1974) who demonstrated that commodity 
farm operators’ choices are best explained in some circumstance as utility-maximizing. 
Agricultural producers’ household income (off-farm employment) and farm operation 
income are combined in the household budget constraint, and off-farm economic factors 
influence on-farm economic decisions. The left-hand side of the producers’ objective 
function might be defined as “viability”, “survivability” and include off-farm income, for 
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example, or simply be a utility function (Brown and Weber, 2013; Byerlee and Anderson, 
1982; Parks and Lohr, 2008; Park, Mishra, Wozniak, 2011; Zuluaf, et al., 2014; UCSC, 
2018). In addition, unlike firm operators in general, farm business operations may operate 
past the point when other firms would exit the industry. Producers may be risk averse, 
may dislike expending effort to enter new marketing channels, may have off-farm 
income, and may make decisions based on other non-pecuniary benefits, like preferring 
self-employment, independence, and the agricultural life-style (Lin, 1974; Low, et al., 
2015; Hamilton, 2000; Key and Roberts, 2009). Producers may respond to 
encouragement or short-term incentives from entities that promote local foods, such as 
USDA’s “Know Your Farmer, Know Your Food” campaign.  
Low et al., (2015) suggest producers may enjoy the social aspects of direct-to-
consumer marketing, and in some qualitative studies, producers’ choices to sell to locally 
differentiated marketing channels are attributed to producers’ personal preferences for the 
social goals identified with local foods (Lehnerd et al., 2018). Research also suggests 
producers’ choices to sell to  FTS are influenced by the outcomes attributed to Farm to 
School in particular, like educating students about agricultural, supporting health and 
nutrition outcomes, supporting the regional economy, or contributing to improved 
environmental outcomes (Batemen, Engel, and Meinen 2014; Heiss et al., 2014; Lehnerd, 
et al, 2018; Matts, 2011; Matts et al., 2015). Each of these circumstances represent a 
motivation other than profit maximization that might lead a producer to choose a market 
for locally differentiated products – personal attributes, encouragement or incentivization 
by entities with pro-social goals, or the producer’s own pro-social goals. 
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A broad literature demonstrates that consumers regularly make decisions that are 
motivated by “pro-social behavior” rather than rational and self-regarding behavior 
(Camerer and Fehr, 2006). An emerging literature further identifies the potential for 
policy makers to employ non-price incentivization to encourage agricultural producer 
decision making intended to lead to socially optimal other-regarding outcomes. In these 
models, producers are utility maximizing, given exogenous cost and returns factors. The 
main thread of this literature uses insights from behavioral economics to suggest that, like 
consumer choices, producer choices to address environmental threats by adapting 
farming practices and/or adopting conservation technologies might be influenced by 
producers’ beliefs about environmental issues (Menapace, Colson, and Rafaelli, 2015) 
beliefs about social norms of adoption (Ferraro and Price, 2013; Ferraro, Messer and Wu, 
2017), and the influence of social networks (Khanna, Swinton and Messer, 2018).  
6.2.3 Producer Choice to Market to Schools 
Producers, of course, should sell products to institutional buyers in general, and 
more specifically,  FTS markets, if the markets contribute to farm profitability. 
Advocates for  FTS suggest various reasons that explain why the markets should 
contribute to farm profitability:  FTS markets might provide a premium price for the 
product, the costs associated with  FTS sales may be lower than the price they receive, or 
producers may be able to achieve efficiencies through sales volume (Painter, 2008; 
Hardesty and Leff, 2010; Heiss et. al, 2014 ).  FTS markets could reduce risk by 
diversifying the marketing portfolio or creating a stable future marketing relationship.  
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Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence to rely upon to test profitability in 
this market, as price and quantity data are generally not publicly available. It is unlikely 
that severely price constrained public schools will be able to pay premium prices for 
commodities (Technomics, 2017). It is not clear that marketing costs are lower than those 
in other wholesale markets; in fact, previous research would suggest the opposite ((Boys 
and Fraser, 2017; Sitaker, et al., 2014). If  FTS markets are chosen to primarily minimize 
risk, producers are unlikely to allocate the bulk of their product to this market.  
What is known is that there are very few producers who actually sell directly to 
any institutional buyer. The 2015 LFMPS results show that the number of respondents 
selling directly to institutional purchasers was so low that NASS is unable to publish 
results from this category of sales without risking loss of producer anonymity, and 
instead combines this category with another (Intermediated Sales) for publication 
(Barham, Fitzsimmons, & O’Hara, forthcoming). It is not known how many producers 
sell to schools through intermediated markets.  
6.3 Model of Producer Market Channel Choice 
The goal of this paper is twofold. We develop a theoretical model of markets for 
local foods that encompasses value chain characteristics, and we apply the model to 
examine the effectiveness of different policy tools to enhance local food markets, in 
which there may be a trade-off between achieving different local foods systems goals. 
We are particularly interested in policy applications to support markets that may not be 
profitable to producers, but in which policy makers, advocates, and perhaps some 
producers, would like to encourage to achieve health and education outcomes. We focus 
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on Farm to School ( FTS) markets to demonstrate how subsidies and labeling may impact 
market outcomes such as quantity supplied and welfare effects when we account for pro-
social behavior of both producers and consumers in a competitive market.  
Producers who “directly” market local foods choose a marketing portfolio that 
can consist of just one marketing channel, or many. It can include direct and 
intermediated marketing channels for local foods and wholesale commodity marketing 
channels. To simplify and move closer to economic theory that can assist in modeling 
markets for local foods, we move away from the LFMPS definitions presented above and 
define two categories of marketing channels, Direct Marketing and Intermediated 
Marketing, each with a number of sub-channels. The Direct Marketing category includes 
marketing where the product is sold directly from the producer to an end consumer. 
Direct marketing sub-channels include farm stands, Community Supported Agriculture 
(CSAs), and farmers markets. The Intermediated Marketing category includes marketing 
where the product is sold to one or more “middle-men” between the producer and the end 
consumer. There can be just one middleman, or multiple middle-men. Intermediated 
marketing channels with one middleman can include farm sales to restaurants or 
institutional food service, and farm sales to retailers or grocers. Intermediated marketing 
sub-channels with multiple middlemen can include farm sales to producer aggregators, 
regional or broad line distributors, and food processors. These middlemen may then sell 
to restaurants and institutional food service providers, retailers, and grocers. The 
distinction between our definition and that of the LFMPS is the relationship between the 
local product and the direct market. In our definition of direct marketing, locally 
differentiated products do not need explicit labeling or coding, as the nature of the 
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transaction verifies the product differentiation. Unlike the LFMPS definition, however, 
we specify that any product that passes through an intermediary requires some kind of 
labeling or coding to identify the “local” attribute of the product. The two categories that 
LFMPS categorizes as “direct” but we categorize as “intermediated” are retail and 
institutional markets in which “Businesses or organizations in the middle of the supply 
chain (are) marketing locally- and/or regionally-branded products” (NASS, 2015). 
We first disentangle the quality of the local food product from the quality of the 
producer’s marketing practice. Next, we explore the impact of producers’ objective 
functions, i.e., profit maximization vs. utility maximization (Lin, 1974), on the resulting 
quantity marketed to  FTS. The utility-maximizing framework includes a behavioral 
model of choice for producers’ marketing decisions applying Mussa and Rosen’s model 
(1978) of vertically differentiated product quality to the quality of markets. The model 
allows both consumers and producers to derive utility from perceived benefits of direct 
markets for local foods, and can be used to evaluate the welfare effects of various 
policies.  
This section is organized in the following way: We begin with a standard model 
of consumer demand for a product that is viewed by SFAs (consumers) as vertically 
differentiated given its “local” origin. Then we introduce a simplified model in which 
producers maximize profit in an intermediated  FTS market channel with a frictionless 
intermediary distributor. The first contribution we make is to modify the producer’s 
objective function to allow producers to maximize utility in their choice of market 
channel. We use this utility-maximizing producer model as our “base case” in which the 
distributor is assumed to be “frictionless”. We then add a distributor and analyze the 
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effect of a distributor with market power and/ or economies of scale. Next we allow the 
distributor to reduce transaction costs in the market by labeling the product as “local” to 
consumers and label the market channel as “Farm to School” to producers. We then 
determine the effects of different “quality” information mechanisms, and the potential for 
such a distributor to exert market power, which may counteract the intended policy 
effect. Finally, we explore the effect of subsidies to support school food authority (SFA) 
procurement and producer marketing in the above cases. 
6.3.1 Consumer Demand for Differentiated Local Product  
We model consumer demand for locally differentiated food in the  FTS market 
within the structure of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Pietz (1995). We assume that 
consumers perceive that the locally differentiated product L  is the “high-quality” ( Lκ  ) 
product, and the wholesale product W is the “low-quality” ( Wκ  ) product so that L Wκ κ> , 
according to the literature demonstrating consumers’ increased willingness to pay for the 
credence attribute of locally differentiated products (Darby et al., 2008; Feldmann and 
Hamm 2015; Fitzsimmons and Cicia, 2018; Loureiro et al., 2002; Martinez, 2010). While 
consumers perceive a quality difference between locally differentiated products and non-
local products, the product’s physical attributes are unlikely to be distinguishable from a 
similar product sourced elsewhere, such as a pepper from Chile. The difference is the 
information available to the consumer from interactions with producers or labeling 
regarding the products’ origins and consumers’ valuation of that origin information 
(Motta and Sharma, 2016). To simplify, we assume that end-consumer demand (students 
in schools) are perfectly represented by the SFA’s purchasing. That is, we assume that 
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SFAs have perfect knowledge of the end-consumers’ demands for local food in schools, 
and incur no additional costs to realize that demand.  
SFAs have a constant base level of utility ω 15, heterogeneous preferences ψ  for 
product quality ,L Wκ κ , and the population of SFAs is characterized by a uniform 
distribution of the preference parameter with [0,1]ψ ∈ . SFAs expend effort to procure 
product, where effort to procure locally differentiated foods ( Lν  ) is greater than that 
required to procure wholesale products ( Wν ). Effort can be considered as the monetary 
value of the representative SFA’s activities to procure product, including increased 
operating costs, distribution logistics, and ordering and managing financial transactions 
(Bloom and Hinrichs, 2010; Boys and Fraser, 2017; Fitzsimmons, 2011; Vo and 
Holcombe, 2011). In what follows, we assume that Lν  is the additional effort required to 
procure the local relative to the wholesale product, and thus 0Wν =  with no loss of 
generality.  
Following Pietz (1995), we identify a numeraire good, 0 1q ≥  with a normalized 
price 0 1p ≡ , so that the price for product quality and an SFA’s operating budget are 
measured in units of the numeraire. We use an indicator function for product quality,
[ ],i L W∈ , to capture the SFA’s discrete choice with unit demand 
( )
1 if 1,  for W<L,  and  for W>L
0 otherwise
L L W L W
i
q q q q q
Q q
≥ ≥ >
= 

 , so that the function gives a value of 
1 to the product quality of the chosen product, ( ) 1LQ q = , and 0 otherwise. The typical 
                                                 15 This base level of utility can also be interpreted as the consumer’s reservation price for 
a good with quality equal to zero (Pietz, 1995).  
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SFA’s direct utility is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0
,
, ; i i i L
i L W
U q Q q qψ ω ψκ ν ω ψκ
=
= + − + − +∑q . The SFA with a 
strength of preference ψ has an operating budget, Ω  , which can be expressed as 
Lω ψκΩ = +  , the base level of utility for one unit of the high-quality local product. This 
suggests that the higher the operating budget, the more strongly an SFA prefers product 
quality. The operating budget constraint is 0pq q+ ≤ Ω , where the two qualities are 
available at prices Lp  and Wp . We replace the operating budget Ω  in the operating 
budget constraint with the base level of utility for one unit of the high-quality local 
product, so that 0 Lpq p ω ψκ+ = +  . The indirect utility function is 
( ) ( ){ }
0
0 0
,
, ; , ; |max L
q q
V p u q q pq qψ ψ ω ψκΩ = + ≤ + . The consumer decision is then to select the 
product that provides the highest indirect utility ( )V  among the three possible options:  
 
if the local product is bought
if the wholesale product is bought
otherwise.
L L L
W W
p
pV
ω ψκ ν
ω ψκ
ω
+ − −
= + −




  (12.0) 
This set-up implies that the market is uncovered, that is, some SFAs with a low enough 
ψ  will not purchase a product. This might be the case where SFAs access free USDA 
Foods or Department of Defense Fresh foods which can comprise between 15-20% of 
food served on any given day (USDA FNS, 2016). The consumer indifferent between 
purchasing the local versus the wholesale product is expressed as  
 ˆ .L W L
L W
p p ν
ψ
κ κ
− +
=
−
 (12.1):  
For an indifferent consumer to exist, it must be the case that ˆ 0ψ > , which implies that the 
additional cost of acquiring local product versus wholesale product must be greater than 
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zero, that is that L L Wp pν+ > . The consumer indifferent between purchasing the wholesale 
product and nothing can be expressed as: 
 .W
W
p
ψ
κ
=   (12.2) 
As the wholesale price Wp  increases relative to the quality of the wholesale product Wκ , 
(6.2) increases, and fewer consumers purchase the wholesale product while more 
consumers buy nothing. As the wholesale price decreases relative to quality, more 
consumers purchase the wholesale product and fewer consumers buy nothing. Figure 10 
depicts the consumer demand for products of different qualities as a function of 
consumers’ indirect utility curves for each of the two product qualities, and the opt-out. 
The vertical axis measures consumers’ indirect utility, while the horizontal axis allots a 
uniform distribution of consumers according to their strength of preference for product 
quality. 
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Figure 9 Consumer Indirect Utility from Product Quality
We consider the representative case where ˆ0 1ψ ψ< ≤ ≤ . Consumers with ˆ[ ,1]ψ ψ∈  
buy the high-quality product, ˆ[ , ]ψ ψ ψ∈   buy the low-quality product, and consumers with 
[0, ]ψ ψ∈   buy nothing. To ensure that consumers buy a non-negative quantity of the local 
product, i.e., ˆ 1ψ ≤ , the following condition must hold:  
 ( ) .L L W L Wp pν κ κ+ − ≤ −   (12.3) 
 
The value of the difference in quality for the consumer with the highest willingness to 
pay must be greater than the additional cost of acquiring the local relative to the 
wholesale product. Severely price constrained SFAs may not have the ability to pay a 
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premium price per unit, but may have the ability to absorb effort costs from procuring 
local. Equation (6.4) also implies that the sum of effort and price for the local product is 
indexed to the wholesale price. 
A non-negative quantity of the wholesale product will be purchased if ˆψ ψ≤ , thus 
 
( )
,W W
L L L
p
p
κ
κ ν
>
+
  (12.4) 
so that the quality ratio of the wholesale relative to the local product should be greater 
than the cost of using the wholesale relative to the local product. Finally, the condition 
for some consumers to choose to buy neither the local nor the wholesale product, that is, 
0 ψ<  , necessarily holds given that Wp  and Wκ  \ are assumed to be positive.  
For a population of M  consumers, the aggregate demand functions in the  FTS 
market are: 
 [ ]ˆ1 1 ,D L W LL
L W
p pX M M νψ
κ κ
 − +
= − = − − 
  (12.5) 
 [ ]ˆ ,D L W L WW
L W W
p p pX M M νψ ψ
κ κ κ
 − +
= − = − − 
   (12.6) 
for the local product and the wholesale product respectively. The inverse demand 
functions are  
 ( ),
D D
D D W W L L
L L W L L
X Xp X X
M M
κ κ
κ ν= − − − ,  (12.7) 
and 
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 ( ), 1
D D
D D W L
W L W W
X Xp X X
M M
κ
 
= − − 
 
 , (12.8) 
in the wholesale market. 
Finally, we provide expressions to show the relationship between the fixed 
wholesale price, Wp and the local product price Lp . We first solve (6.7)  for ( )DL Lp X  to 
obtain    
 ( ) ( ) 1 ,
D
D L
L L W L L W
Xp X p
M
ν κ κ
 
= − + − − 
 
   (12.9) 
and (6.8) for ( )DW Wp X  to obtain 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) .
D
W W L W W L WD
W W
L L
p X
p X
M
κ ν κ κ κ
κ κ
+ −
= −
   (12.10) 
6.3.2 Producer Supply 
The producer supply model builds upon the profit-maximizing market channel 
choice literature, as in Leroux (2010) and Kim, Curtis and Yeager (2014), but diverges 
from the profit-maximizing producer choice to differentiate local product (Winfree and 
Watson, 2017). The typical producer’s objective function is to maximize net income (NI) 
over the life of the farm operation for years 1,...,h H= , by choosing a portfolio of market 
channels that may include up to five mutually exclusive channels l  in a given year. The 
five channel categories are chosen based on the market channel costs and returns, with 
the intention of grouping channels with similar costs structures together. Four channels 
, , ,l d s h r= represent categories similar to those in the Local Food Marketing Practices 
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Survey (LFMPS). The four categories represent locally branded products sold; direct to 
consumer, 1 d= ; through intermediated channels such as schools and institutions  2=s ; 
through distributors or food hubs, 3 h= ; or through retailers 4 r= . The final market 
channel 5 u=  represents the traditional intermediated wholesale market channel for 
products not branded as local, in which the end buyer is not known to be a school food 
authority. 
 
5
1 1
.max 
H
hl
h l
hlNI π
= =
= ∑∑   (12.11) 
As in the LFMPS, each market channel may include several sub-channels, so that market 
channel, d , for example, may represent any combination of farm stands, farmers markets, 
or CSAs.  
Note that (6.11) allows flexibility in the definition of both net income from any 
particular marketing channel and the relationships across marketing channels. It would be 
straightforward to introduce any number of modifications to this model to account for the 
many factors that influence an agricultural producers’ net income. For example, expected 
profits or expected net present value of profits (Byerlee and Anderson, 1982; Kim, Curtis, 
and Yeager, 2014; Marra, 2002) off-farm income, crop insurance, risk aversion, portfolio 
diversification (Izumi, Wright and Hamm, 2010; Park and Lohr, 2008; Park, Mishra, 
Wozniak, 2011), cross-market branding effects16 (Izumi, Wright and Hamm, 2010) 
would all be simple modifications to the LHS of (6.11). The model presented ignores 
those modeling possibilities in favor of modeling the parameter of interest, producers’ 
                                                 16 Some  FTS advocates suggest that selling to schools is a branding tool to market the 
local farm to parents. 
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strength of preference for social outcomes from local food marketing channels. In 
addition, a key feature of (6.11) is the ability for producers to earn negative net income in 
any given year through any given marketing channel, but to remain viable they must earn 
non-negative profits over the life of the farm operation. 
6.3.2.1 Producer Supply: Profit Maximizing Producer 
In applications of the canonical Mussa and Rosen (1978) model to markets with 
differentiated products, producer supply results from competition among heterogeneous 
firms that vary in production efficiency (Plastina, Giannakas, and Pick 2011; Joseph, 
Lavoie, and Caswell, 2014). Recall that models of firms’ strategic choices in markets for 
local foods allow firms to choose to differentiate product or product bundle as “local” 
Winfree and Watson, 2017; Richards, et al., 2017). These models stand in contrast to 
literature that examines producer’s choice of market channel, in which producers choose 
a market channel or portfolio of market channels to maximizing profit or utility and 
prices are exogenous (Hardesty and Leff, 2010;Kim, Curtis and Yeager, 2014; Leroux et 
al., 2010; Parks and Lohr, 2008; Brown and Weber, 2013; Byerlee and Anderson, 1982; 
Parks and Lohr, 2008; Park, Mishra, Wozniak, 2011; Zuluaf, et al., 2014).  
To demonstrate the contrast between the profit-maximizing and utility-
maximizing producer choice to sell to a local foods market channel that we present in this 
paper, we first frame the producer’s objective function as a profit-maximizing choice. We 
simplify the objective function (6.11) above by limiting the typical producers’ profit 
maximizing choice between selling to one of two intermediated marketing channels, 
,l s u= , in a given year, where s is  FTS sales and u is sales to an NS (Not School) buyer. 
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One channel delivers the product to students through school meals; the other to the NS 
consumer. A strictly profit maximizing producer will choose to sell the unit of product to 
the most profitable channel, so that (6.11) becomes 
 .max  
if 
 
ifs s u
u s
l
u
NI
π π π
π π π
>
=  >
  (12.12) 
To begin, under assumptions of profit maximization in perfect competition, the 
producer sells the product to a frictionless distributor which then sells the product to an 
end buyer in either the  FTS or NS market channel. A typical producer’s profit in market 
l  is revenues from sales minus variable and fixed costs. Both variable and fixed costs 
have three components: production, marketing, and transaction costs (Hardesty and Leff, 
2010; Hobbs, 1997). We assume producers are homogenous in production (that is, all 
producers face the same production costs and do not vary in expertise or efficiency). The 
profit lπ  of a typical producer in market channel l  is given by:  
 ( ) ( )l l l l l l l lp q c q FC m tπ γ t= − + + − + + ,  (12.13) 
where lp and lq  are the market price and quantity sold in market l , c , and FC  are the 
constant marginal and fixed costs of production, which do not vary across market 
channels chosen; lγ and lm  are the constant marginal and fixed marketing costs, which 
may vary across marketing channels; and lt and lt are the constant marginal and fixed 
transaction costs to ensure delivery to each end buyer, which may also vary across 
marketing channels. In the  FTS market, producers incur additional variable and fixed 
transaction costs ,s stt  to obtain information regarding distribution and terms of sales to 
SFAs as end buyers, negotiate ordering and payment terms and conditions, and monitor 
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contracts (Boys and Fraser, 2017; Fitzsimmons and Lass, 2015; Matts et al., 2015). 
Without loss of generality, we assume that variable and fixed transaction costs in the 
“Not  FTS” (NS) marketing channel are equal to zero, , 0u utt =  while transaction costs in 
the  FTS market are greater than zero, , 0s stt > . Marketing costs include packaging, 
storing, and transporting products to the wholesaler. Without loss of generality, we also 
assume that fixed marketing costs in the NS marketing channel and fixed marketing costs 
in the  FTS marketing channel are equal to zero , 0u sm m = , while variable marketing costs 
in the  FTS marketing channel are greater than in the NS market s uγ γ> . Note that only 
the producers’ cost of marketing product to a distributor enters the producer’s profit 
function. In practice, a distributor will incur additional marketing costs, which are not 
accounted for when the distributor is “frictionless”.    
We normalize quantity to 1 and find a typical producer’s profit in the  FTS market 
s 
  ( ) ,s s s sp c FC tπ t γ= − + + − −   (12.14) 
while a typical producer’s profit in the NS market u is  
 .u up c FCπ γ= − − −   (12.15) 
Price in the  FTS and Not  FTS market, p , are the same. While consumers have an 
increased willingness to pay a premium for locally versus non-locally differentiated 
products, producers supply a homogeneous product sold through the distributor, which 
does not label the products as local versus non-local. Instead, producers must incur 
transaction costs to guarantee that supply is delivered to the  FTS market, as in (6.14), 
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and SFAs incur effort costs to obtain the high-quality local product (12.0) . Given that a 
producer selling to  FTS will incur additional variable transaction costs and will gain no 
monetary benefit from sales to schools, a profit-maximizing producer will choose to sell 
to the NS marketing channel, all else equal, and no product will be sold to the  FTS 
marketing channel. 
Alternatively, we may allow price to be endogenously determined as a function of 
consumer demand and producer supply, while the price of the good received from the 
Not  FTS is a constant determined in a separate perfectly competitive market. Because 
producers are homogeneous, a typical producer’s profit function in a given market will 
mirror those equations (6.14) and (6.15), so that  FTS market profit is 
 ( )s s s s sp c FC tπ t γ= − + + − −  ,  (12.16) 
And NS profit is 
 u u up c FCπ γ= − − −  , (12.17) 
so that a producer will be indifferent between selling to the  FTS market channel and the 
NS channel when s uπ π= , or when the premium from the  FTS channel exactly covers the 
additional costs of selling through that channel, i.e., s u s s s up p tt γ γ− = + + − . When 
s u s s s up p tt γ γ− ≥ + + −  , the difference between the SFA price and the NS market price is 
greater than the additional costs of selling to the  FTS market, and all producers will 
supply to the  FTS market. Assuming a population of N  producers, SsX N= . When 
s u s s s up p tt γ γ− < + + − , the premium is less than the additional cost of selling to the  FTS 
market, and no producers will supply to the  FTS market, so that 0SsX = , which is a 
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plausible outcome given that SFAs are significantly price constrained (Izumi, Wright and 
Hamm, 2010; Motta and Sharma, 2016: IBISWorld, 2018).  
6.3.2.2 Producer Supply: Utility-Maximizing Producer 
While producer choice in markets for local foods is typically modeled as a profit 
maximizing choice to differentiate products or product bundles, the literature on how 
producers choose market channels when selling locally differentiated products does not 
model supply decisions in this way. Instead, producer choice of market channel is 
modeled as either a profit-maximizing (Park and Lohr, 2006; LeRoux, et al., 2010) or a 
utility-maximizing (Park, 2009) choice of market channel portfolios. In these models, the 
dependent variable is the choice of market channel portfolio, where market channel 
prices are exogenous. Aggregate supply functions are not obtained from these models, 
thus welfare effects of policy interventions are also not obtained. 
Neither cost efficiencies nor portfolio choice models allow observed 
heterogeneity in producer motivations to supply to high-quality markets for local food for 
the purpose of contributing to social goals. Like incentivizing producer choice to 
implement on-farm environmental conservation techniques to achieve environmental 
goals (Khanna, Swinton, and Messer, 2018), a key insight to increasing supply of local 
foods to  FTS markets may be to incentivize producer choice to market to SFAs, 
particularly given the evidence that such sales may satisfy producers’ preferences for 
social goals to support the health and education of children in the producers’ community 
(Izumi, Wright and Hamm, 2010; Lehnerd, et al., 2018).  
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To address this gap, we model the typical producer’s choice between two 
vertically differentiated marketing channels, where, from the producers’ point of view, 
the quality of the  FTS marketing channel is assumed to be higher than that of the non-
school marketing channel in which the end buyer is unknown, all else equal. This utility-
maximizing model follows from both the literature reviewed above suggesting that 
agricultural producers are unique firms that consider non-pecuniary factors in their firm 
decision making, as well as from the growing literature suggesting that producers in  FTS 
markets in particular are motivated by social considerations to supply to the  FTS market. 
A typical producer’s utility from choice of marketing channel is a function of profits 
earned in the marketing channels plus the strength of preference producers have for the 
“quality” of the marketing channel, as has been suggested by Barrowclough and Boys, 
(2017); Boys and Fraser (2017); Heiss et al., 2013; Matts et al. (2015), Lehnerd et 
al.(2018), Fitzsimmons and Lass (2015).  
We model producer supply to a farm-to-school market channel within the 
consumer demand structure of Mussa and Rosen (1978)17. Market channels are vertically 
differentiated, and producers sell to one market channel, where the  FTS market channel s 
is assumed to be the “high-quality” channel (ks) in which food is delivered to school 
cafeterias, and the Not  FTS market channel u is the “low-quality” market channel (ku) in 
which the end-buyer is unknown, where ks > ku.  
Producers have heterogeneous preferences (θ) for market channel quality, and the 
population of producers is characterized by a uniform distribution function of this 
                                                 17 In the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model, consumers are assumed to be heterogeneous on 
their willingness to pay for quality. We adapt this model to heterogeneous producers with 
respect to preferences for market channels with different perceived qualities. 
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preference parameter with [0,1]θ ∈ . A typical producer’s indirect utility is equal to the 
profit from the chosen market channel plus the strength of preference for quality θ  for 
the market channel quality lk .  
 FTS market channel is chosen
NS market channel is chosen.
s s
u u
k
W
k
π θ
π θ
+
=  +
,  (12.18) 
where sπ  and uπ  are the profit from selling to the  FTS and NS markets respectively and 
are given in equations (6.14) and (6.15) respectively. Because we assume a covered 
market, profit for the NS market channel is implied to be positive. 
If s uπ π> , or the price premium ( )s up p−  more than covers the additional cost of 
selling to the  FTS market ( )s s stt γ+ +  ,all producers will choose to sell to this market, 
and the outcome of the utility-maximizing model is the same as that of profit 
maximization. However, if 0u sπ π> > , due to higher transaction costs in the  FTS market, 
then the producer’s decision is to select the market channel that provides the highest 
indirect utility ( )W  among the possible options. The producer indifferent between selling 
to the  FTS market channel and the market channel with the not  FTS buyers is expressed 
as 
 ˆ .u s
s uk k
π π
θ
−
=
−
  (12.19) 
Substituting (6.14) and (6.15) into (6.19), the indifferent producer can be expressed as: 
 ˆ .
( )
u s s s s u
s u
p p t
k k
t γ γ
θ
− + + + −
=
−
  (12.20) 
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The indifferent producer must satisfy ˆ0 1θ≤ ≤ . In the profit maximizing models 
presented above where s uπ π>  , all product will be supplied to the  FTS market, but when 
s uπ π<  , all product will be supplied to the NS. In contrast, (6.20), implies that 
ˆ,  0u s s s s up p tt γ γ θ> − − − − >  must hold for both the  FTS and NS markets to be served
18. 
When ˆ 0θ ≤ , only the  FTS market is served because the profit from that market to the 
producer that does not value market quality (maximizes profit rather than utility) is 
positive. Unlike the profit maximization model where the aggregate supply to the  FTS 
market is zero unless the price premium covers the cost of marketing, the utility 
maximization model allows a positive aggregate quantity to the  FTS market when the 
premium does not cover costs. Since net income is realized over the life of the farm 
operation, producers absorb economic loss to sell to the high-quality market in any given 
year.  
Producers with ˆ( ,1]θ θ∈  will sell to the high-quality channel ( FTS), producers 
with ˆ[0, ]θ θ∈  will sell to the low-quality channel. For, ˆ 1θ ≤  , the following condition must 
hold: u s s s s u s up p t k kt γ γ− + + + − ≤ − , that is, the difference in profit between the two market 
channels must be smaller or equal to the value of the quality difference between the two 
marketing channels according to the producer with the highest preference for quality. 
When ˆ 1θ > , the additional profit from the NS market is greater than the additional value 
of the  FTS market quality, and only the NS market is served. To ensure that the market is 
covered, utility must be greater than zero 0u ukπ θ+ ≥ , when 0θ = , so that 0uπ ≥ . Figure 
11 depicts the producer supply to markets with different qualities as a function of 
                                                 18 We ignore the extreme cases where ˆ ˆ1, 0θ θ> < .  
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producers’ indirect utility curves for each of the two market qualities. The vertical axis 
measures producers’ indirect utility, while the horizontal axis allots a uniform distribution 
of producers according to their strength of preference for market quality. 
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Figure 10 Producer Indirect Utility from Markets Quality
Given a population of N  producers, market channel supply is obtained by 
integrating the unit supply of each producer given the distribution of producer types. 
Given the uniform distribution assumption, the aggregate market supply function for the  
FTS market channel is ˆ[1 ]SsX N θ= −  so that  
 ˆ[1 ] 1
( )
S u s s s s u
s
s u
p p tX N N
k k
t γ γ
θ
 − + + + −
= − = − − 
.  (12.21) 
We further assume that the quality of the NS marketing channel is u sk kϑ=  where 
1ϑ ≤ . We name the difference between variable marketing costs in the  FTS and NS 
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markets as s uγ γ γ− = ∆ . In a covered market, we are unable to find the inverse supply 
functions, however, with a fixed price in the NS market, up , we can express the price for 
product sold in the  FTS market as a function of aggregate supply, 
 ˆ
(1 )
S u s s s
u
s
p p tX N N
k
t γ
θ
ϑ
 − + + + ∆
= =  − 
 . (12.22) 
Note that as the difference in market quality increases, the quantity supplied to the  FTS 
market increases and the quantity supplied to the NS market decreases.  
The utility maximizing choice between the high and low quality market provides 
a model of producer choice of marketing channel in local foods markets that is consistent 
with the literature on producer choice in local foods and  FTS markets, and that allows 
price to be endogenous.  
6.3.3 Market Equilibrium  
To find the market equilibrium we equate food service consumers’ demand for 
locally differentiated products (6.5) and producers’ supply to  FTS market channels 
(6.21) 
 1 1 ,D SL W L u s s sL s
L W s u
p p p p tX M N X
k k
ν t γ
κ κ
   − + − + + + ∆
= − = − =   − −   
    (12.23) 
Recall that we assume that SFAs perfectly represent end consumer demand. We assume 
that the market price paid by food service consumers is equal to that received by 
producers, 
Ls
p p= . Note that we do not assume that the product supplied to the NS 
market is the wholesale product purchased by the SFA. Instead we assume that the 
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wholesale market for commodity products and the NS market are unrelated and are much 
larger than the market for local products, so that producers and SFA cannot affect the 
price in these markets. Thus, up  and Wp  are constant and are not provided any a priori 
relationship. We further simplify by expressing difference in market qualities as
( )L Wκ κ κ∆ = − and product qualities as s uk k k∆ = − . The equilibrium price is 
 ( ) ( )* * ,W L u s sL s
M k p N p t k
p p
N M k
κ ν κ t γ
κ
∆ ∆ + − + ∆ + + + ∆ − ∆
= =
∆ + ∆
    (12.24) 
The equilibrium market quantity is  
 ( ) ( ) [ ]* * W L u s sD SL s s s
MN k p p t
X p X p
N M k
κ ν t γ
κ
∆ + ∆ + − − − − − ∆
= =
∆ + ∆
   . (12.25) 
If the equilibrium price increases to a point where ˆψ ψ> , then there are no consumer 
willing to buy local product. Note that the equilibrium quantity of local increases as 
market quality difference ( )1sk k ϑ∆ = −  , and/ or product quality difference ( )L Wκ κ κ∆ = −  
increase. To ensure a positive quantity of product to  FTS programs ( )* 0LX p > , it must be 
the case that  
 ( ) ( )( )1 .L W L s s s u Wk t p pκ κ ν ϑ t γ− − + − − − − ∆ > −    (12.26) 
That is, the net value of the local product to the buyer and the  FTS market to the seller is 
higher than the alternative. We can rearrange (6.26) to offer an additional interpretation 
comparing consumer valuation of the product versus producer valuation of the market. 
The difference between the total value of the local product to the consumer (that value of 
the product less the cost of effort to procure the product) and the total value of the 
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wholesale product, ( )1L L W W u s s sp p t kκ ν κ t γ ϑ− + − > + + + ∆ − −  , must exceed the difference 
between the total value of the  FTS and NS market to the producer. In the utility 
maximizing model, market specific fixed costs st  continue to influence the producer’s 
market channel choice. 
As long as condition (6.26) holds, the model of utility maximizing producers 
allows the market to allocate a positive quantity of product to the  FTS market for local 
product in equilibrium. Note that this is a different result from the profit maximizing 
model, in which either all product was allocated to this market, or none of the product 
was allocated to this market. Our results reflect the findings of the social sciences 
literature and empirical observations that some proportion of producer will supply to this 
market, though it is unlikely to be profitable to be the profit maximizing choice of 
market.  
Substituting the equilibrium price *Lp  into equation 0.17, we find the equilibrium 
aggregate quantity of wholesale product demanded by SFAs 
 ( ) ( )( )
[ ]
W W
W
W L u s s W LD
W
M k p N p t k p
X M
N M k
κ
κ
κ ν t γ κ
κ
∆ − + + + + + ∆ − ∆ −
=  
∆ + ∆  
  
.  (12.27) 
For the equilibrium quantity of wholesale product bought by SFAs to be greater than or 
equal to zero, it must be the case that  
 ( ) ( )( ) 0W W W L u s s W LM k p N p t k pκ κ ν t γ κ∆ − + + + + + ∆ − ∆ − ≥    . (12.28) 
The first term of (6.29) can be interpreted as the consumer residual value of the wholesale 
product ( )W Wpκ −   weighted by the total number of SFAs and market quality that 
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producers face. Recall that from (6.02) that the SFA that is indifferent between buying 
the wholesale product or not buying any product is W
W
p
ψ
κ
=

 . For any product (local or 
wholesale) to be demanded, the value of 1ψ <  , so that W Wpκ > , indicating that the 
residual value of the wholesale product must be greater than one. Wholesale quantity 
increases as the costs specific to the  FTS market for local foods and the price paid to 
producers in the NS market increase, and decreases as wholesale price increases.  
Substituting the equilibrium price *Lp  into (6.23), we find the equilibrium 
aggregate quantity of product supply by producers to the NS market 
 ( )L u s s Wsu
N M p t p
N M k
X N
κ ν t γ κ
κ
∆ + ∆ − ∆ −
∆ + ∆
+ + + + 
=  
 
  .  (12.29) 
The equilibrium quantity to the NS market decreases as product quality difference and 
market quality difference increases. Quantity supplied to the NS market increases as the 
costs in the alternative market increase, and decreases as the price paid for the wholesale 
product increases. Rewriting the numerator inside the brackets of (6.29) as 
( ) ( )L u s s WN M M p t pκ ν t γ∆ − + ∆ −+ + + +  , we can see that quantity supplied to the NS market 
is sensitive to the relative number of producers and SFAs in the market.  
When the number of producers is equal to or greater than the number of SFAs 
N M≥ , increases in product quality difference increase producer surplus from sales to the 
NS market. When the number of SFAs is greater than the number of producers M N> , 
the product quality difference decreases producer surplus from the NS market. This is 
expected, as fewer producers would indicate a restricted supply to the  FTS market, so 
that as the quality of the local product increases relative to the commodity product, more 
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SFAs buy local from producers, so that producers sell fewer units to the NS market. For 
the quantity supplied to the NS market to be greater than or equal to zero, it must be the 
case that  
 ( ) 0L s s u WN M t p pκ ν t γ κ∆ + ∆ − ∆ −+ + + + ≥  .  (12.30) 
The common denominator N M kκ∆ + ∆  is the sum of product quality difference weighted 
by the number of producers and market quality difference weighted by the number of 
SFAs.  
Subtracting the quantity purchased in the wholesale market (6.27) from the 
quantity sold to the NS market (6.29) , we find that  
 ( ) ( )
( )
W W W L WS D
u W
W
M p N M k N p
X X N
N M k
κ κ κ
κ κ
− − ∆ −  − = +
∆ + ∆
 
.  (12.31) 
We call ( )W WM pκ −   the aggregate residual value of wholesale, which is weighted by 
( )WN M kκ − ∆ . If the difference between this term and L WMN pκ   is positive, then the 
quantity that producers supply to the NS market is greater than the quantity of wholesale 
product purchased by SFAs. If this term is negative and greater than the number of 
producers in the market, N  , then it will be the reverse. This might be the case, for 
example, if the number of SFAs is larger than the ratio of quality of the wholesale 
product to the difference in the market qualities weighted by the number of producers, 
WNM
k
κ
>
∆
, given that 0W Wpκ − > . If N M= , for example, then the quantity of wholesale 
product demanded would exceed that of quantity supplied to the NS market if the quality 
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of the wholesale product is less than the quality difference between the  FTS and NS 
markets.  
The residual value to the buyer from purchasing the wholesale product is W Wpκ −  ; 
L Lκ ν− is the residual value to the buyer from buying the locally differentiated product; 
s s sk tt γ− − − ∆  is the residual value to the producer from selling the product to the 
differentiated  FTS market; and u sp kϑ+  is the residual value to the producer from selling 
the product to the NS market. Restating  
 ,L L s s s u s W Wk t p k pκ ν t γ ϑ κ− + − − − ∆ > + + −    (12.32) 
we see that the total residual value for the  FTS market is the sum of producer and 
consumer residual values from selling and buying in the market, which must be greater 
than the difference between the producers’ residual value of selling to an Not  FTS and 
the buyers’ residual value of buying undifferentiated local products. 
Next we take equation (6.24) and ensure that the equilibrium market price is 
positive, * 0sp > , providing ( ) ( ).W L u s sM k p N p t kκ ν κ t γ∆ ∆ + − > − ∆ + + + ∆ − ∆   Rearranging, we 
find .W L
u s s
p N
k p t M k
κ ν κ
t γ
∆ + − ∆
>
∆ + − − − ∆ ∆


 The RHS numerator is the product quality difference 
weighted by the number of producers, and the denominator is the market quality 
difference weighted by the number of SFAs. For the equilibrium price to be positive, the 
ratio of weighted product and market quality difference must be less than the ratio of the 
residual value of the local product to the consumer to the residual value of the  FTS 
market to the seller, relative to the alternative.  
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6.3.4 Welfare 
To capture Total Welfare, we add the sum of Consumer and Producer Surplus in 
the  FTS market for local foods to the sum of Consumer and Producer Surplus in the 
wholesale market for SFAs and the NS market for producers, calculated from supply and 
demand curves in each market 0 0 0 0L u WTW TS PS CS= + + . Total surplus from local is the sum 
of consumer and producer surplus in the  FTS market, 0 0 0L L LTS CS PS= + , where consumer 
surplus from local food is [ ]
( )
2
0 ,
2
L s s W u
L
N k t p pMCS
N M k
κ ν t γκ
κ
 ∆ + ∆ − − − − ∆ + −∆
=  ∆ + ∆ 
   and 
producer surplus in the  FTS market is [ ]
2
0 .
2
L s s W u
LPS
M k t p pN k
N M k
κ ν t γ
κ
=
 ∆ + ∆ − − − − ∆ + −∆
 ∆ + ∆ 
   
Total Surplus from the  FTS market for local foods is obtained by taking the sum of the 
producer and consumer surplus and corresponds to
[ ]
( )
2
0 .
2
L s s W u
LTS
MN k t p p
N M k
κ ν t γ
κ
=
∆ + ∆ − − − − ∆ + −
∆ + ∆
   Surpluses from the  FTS market for local 
food decreases as the residual values of either the wholesale product ( )W Wpκ −   or the NS 
market ( )u sp kϑ+  increase, and increases as the residual value of either the local product 
( )L Lκ ν− or the  FTS market ( )s s sk tt γ− − − ∆  increase. Surpluses from the  FTS market for 
local decrease as SFA effort, transaction, and marketing costs increase.  
Similarly, total surplus from the wholesale product and NS market is the sum of 
surpluses  
 0 0 0W u W uTS CS PS+ = +  . (12.33) 
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Consumer surplus in the wholesale market is
( ) ( )( )
[ ]
2
0
2
W W W L s s u L W
W
W
M k NM
CS
p k t p p
N M k
κ κ ν t γ κ
κ κ
∆ +
=
 − − ∆ + + + ∆ + −
 
∆ + ∆  
  
. The equilibrium 
condition to ensure that the quantity of wholesale product (6.27) is at least zero also 
guarantees that consumer surplus from wholesale product is positive. 
Producer surplus in the NS market is 
( ) ( ) 20
2
u s s W L
u
M p t p N MNPS
N M k
t γ ν κκ
κ
 + + + ∆ − + + ∆ − ∆   =
∆ + ∆  
 
. Producer surplus in the NS 
market increases as the costs in the alternative market increase, and decreases as the price 
paid for the wholesale product increases.  
Total Surplus from the Wholesale product and NS market is 
 
( ) ( )( )
[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]
[ ]
2
2
0
2
2
2
2
u s s W L
W W W L s s u L W
W u
W
W
W
M p t p N
M k p N k t p pMTS
N M k
N N M k
N M k
t γ ν κ κ
κ κ ν t γ κ
κ κ
κ κ κ
κ κ
+ =
+ + + ∆ − + ∆ + ∆
  ∆ − + − ∆ + + + ∆ + −  
 ∆ + ∆
 
 ∆ ∆ + ∆ −
+  
∆ + ∆  
 
  
 .(12.34) 
Total surplus from wholesale product and NS market is decreasing in wholesale product 
price and increasing in effort costs, transaction and marketing costs, and NS price. 
Following our conditions to ensure that the equilibria in the alternative markets are 
positive, (6.27) and (6.29), we can see that total surplus from the alternative product/ 
market is positive. 
We are interested in how changes in costs in the  FTS market for local product 
impact total welfare. Recall that market-specific costs include SFA’s effort to procure 
product and the producer’s transaction and marketing costs. While the quantity supplied 
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to the  FTS market DLX  and total surplus in the  FTS market for local products 0LTS  are 
decreasing in market-specific costs, surplus in the alternative product/ market 0W uTS + is 
increasing in  FTS market-specific costs. Policy makers wishing to increase the quantity 
of product supplied to the market by reducing market –specific costs may be interested in 
the trade-off between increasing product supplied and total welfare. To understand the 
potential trade-offs, we simplify the costs in the  FTS market for local product
s s LF tt γ ν= + + ∆ + and compare the magnitude of the decrease in surplus from local  FTS 
to the magnitude of the increase from wholesale NS. We find that 
( )
( )
0
W uLTS MN F k p p
F N M k
κ
κ
∂
= −
− ∆ − ∆ − +
∂ ∆ + ∆
   , where the expression inside the parenthesis is positive 
per our equilibrium condition (6.28) and 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
[ ]
0
2
W W L W W uW uW u
M k p p F k pMN M F p p N M N NTS
F N M k
κ κ κ κκ
κ
+
∆ ∆ − − ∆
=
 − + + ∆ − + − + +∂  
∂ ∆ + ∆
   
 , 
where the expressions inside the brackets are positive as a result of conditions (6.27) and 
(6.29).  
We equate the change in Total Surplus from local in the  FTS market to the 
change in Total Surplus from NS markets and wholesale products, obtaining 
 ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) 2u W W u WN M k k F p N M k p F p N M k Nκ κ κ κ∆ + ∆ ∆ − − − + ∆ − − > + ∆ + ∆     . (12.35) 
When the LHS of (6.35) is greater than the RHS, the increase in total welfare from an 
increase in  FTS market-specific costs will be increasing. Recall that we have assumed 
that L Wκ κ>  , so that WN M k N M kκ κ∆ + ∆ > + ∆ and therefore 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] 0u W uN M k F p N M k F pκ κ∆ + ∆ − − − + ∆ − − >  . When market quality difference times 
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the sum of product quality difference weighted by the number of producers and market 
quality difference weighted by the number of SFAs is greater than the wholesale price 
times the sum of wholesale product quality weighted by the number of producers and 
market quality difference weighted by the number of SFAs,
( ) ( )W Wk N M k p N M kκ κ∆ ∆ + ∆ > + ∆ , the LHS of (6.35) will be positive. The RHS is positive 
as a result of our assumptions. Another way to consider this relationship is to assume that 
Wk p∆ =  , and simplify so that 0uF p+ = . The inequality (6.35) now reduces to 
2 L W
W
Nk
N M
κ κ
κ κ
∆ >
∆ −
 so that the welfare trade-offs depend on the relative qualities of the two 
markets. Further analysis of this trade-off can best be determined through simulation.  
6.4 Quality Information Costs and Distributor Market Power 
The base case model above treats the distributor as “frictionless” and so does not 
explicitly include the role of market intermediaries. Market intermediaries with the ability 
to exert market power may reduce quantity supplied in the  FTS market which is not 
accounted for when the distributor is “frictionless”. In the following sections, we add a 
distribution sector that distributes product to markets and may provide information, 
negotiation, and monitoring services more efficiently than SFAs and producers by 
labeling product and market quality, but that may also exert market power.19 We 
subsume the possible market structures that may exist between upstream producers and 
downstream SFAs into a single distribution sector. For example, some SFAs are self-
operated, while others are managed by a contracted food service management company. 
                                                 19 Quality information services differ from distribution services performed by the 
distributor, which include the costs of storing and transporting products. 
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Self-operated SFAs procure inputs from the wholesale distribution sector, which is a 
highly concentrated industry with potential upstream and downstream market power 
(Technomics, 2017). Food service management companies are themselves a highly 
concentrated sector, and may exert market power in setting contract terms that include 
food procurement price schedules (Hyland, 2018). In both cases, mid-market 
concentration is indicated, though the actor exercising market power may vary.  
6.4.1 Quality Information Costs/ Labeling 
Farm to School and local foods literature suggests that quality information in 
direct markets for local food is communicated via point-of-sale interaction and producer-
consumer relationships (Colasanti, Matts, and Hamm, 2012). One byproduct of an SFA’s 
cost of procurement efforts and producers’ transaction costs is to communicate the value 
of the product and market quality along the supply chain. Another option to communicate 
the value of the product to consumers and/ or the market to producers is for the 
distributor to provide quality information through labeling or coding. Typically, 
information is provided to the downstream actor, but in the case that producers value the 
quality of the  FTS market, we must also consider the transfer of information back to the 
upstream actor. To simplify, we will refer to the distributor provision of product and 
market quality information as “labeling”.20  
We present and discuss model results with policy applications that demonstrate 
the unique contribution of the model. The “base case” equilibrium price (6.24) and 
quantity (6.25) depict a frictionless model that omits the potential role of distributors. We 
                                                 20 Quality information for product may also be provided by coding, for example in the 
case of bulk delivery to processors, restaurants, and cafeterias.  
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choose the frictionless model as our base case because it reflects the current assumptions 
of  FTS advocates and policy makers. In the following Scenarios, we include the 
distributor, change its role in providing quality information, and allow it to exercise 
market power. Since  FTS procurement is only valuable to SFAs when product quality Lκ  
is known, either as a result of effort Lν or as a result of the distributor labeling product as 
local, we restrict the models presented to those where product quality is known to the 
buyer. On the other hand, producer’s access to market quality information sk  is generally 
only known when producers are actively involved in coordinating supply to SFAs as a 
result of transaction and marketing costs , ,s s stt γ , or when market quality information is 
provided upstream to producers by downstream distributors via labeling.  
In Scenario A, we depart from the base case utility-maximizing producer 
presented above in that a distributor is included, incurring distribution costs. Both 
upstream and downstream actors continue to have preferences for product and market 
quality and the quality is communicated as a byproduct of interactions, incurring 
transaction and effort costs. Utility-maximizing producers prefer the  FTS market, but in 
the absence of labeling, only know whether sales to a distributor will be sold downstream 
to a  FTS market if they incur transaction costs to coordinate sales with an SFA. In 
Scenario B, we allow the distributor to label both downstream product quality and 
upstream market quality to producers in lieu of SFA effort and producer transaction costs.  
6.4.2 Distributor with Market Power 
Following Alston, Sexton and Zhang (1997), we include a distribution sector with 
Z distributors with market power, and in some cases, the ability to label quality, so that 
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the costs of distribution and quality information vary. All intermediary distribution 
functions are subsumed within a single sector called “distribution,” with multiple 
homogenous distributors nesting the possibility of a single distributor. We assume 
constant returns to scale in the distribution sector.21 We present two Scenarios, one in 
which a distribution sector with the ability to exert market power is included, and another 
in which the added distribution has the ability to label products 
For each Scenario, we first present equilibria and welfare effects, and then 
compare the Scenario results with the base case presented above.  
6.4.2.1 Scenario A: Known Qualities, No Labeling  
To determine the equilibrium quantities and prices with a distribution sector, we 
solve a representative distributor’s profit-maximization problem where utility-
maximizing producers incur transaction costs and SFAs incur effort costs. Like the base 
case, market and product qualities are known in the  FTS market as a result of 
interactions between SFAs and producers, where procurement effort costs, Lν are incurred 
by SFAs and  FTS market transaction costs, ,s stt , are incurred by producers. We now 
further assume that product sold to the NS market may be sold by a distributor as a 
wholesale, commodity product to SFAs, where the input and market prices of the good 
are constants determined in separate perfectly competitive markets. Recall that base case 
inverse demand for local product is 
                                                 21 This simplification suggests that the management and contracting structure of any 
given SFA’s food service operation does not affect the oligopsony power of the 
intermediary. Both self-operated and contracted food services face upstream market 
power.  
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  , (12.36) 
while the base case inverse demand for wholesale product is  
 ( ) ( ), 1
D D
W LD D
W L W W
X X
p X X
M
κ
 +
 = −
  
 . (12.37) 
The typical distributor maximizes profit from both sales of local product to the  
FTS market and wholesale product sourced from local producers to the NS market. The 
quantity of product purchased by distributor i  from producers marketing to the  FTS 
channel is denoted as isq , the quantity of locally differentiated product distributed to 
SFAs is iDq , and we assume fixed proportions in the  FTS market for local foods so that 
all product marketed by producers to  FTS is distributed to SFAs, such that is iD iLq q q= = . 
The quantity of product purchased by a distributor from producers marketing to the NS 
channel is denoted by iuq , and iWq  is the quantity of product distributed as a wholesale 
commodity product. We use superscript A to denote results from Scenario A, to write 
distributor 1’s profit function as  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 1
max ,
1
, ,
L W
D D D s S S
L L W s s u L W W u u
q q
A p X X p X X y q p q p g qπ  = − + + − +    ,  (12.38) 
where y represents variable distribution and transaction costs for the local product, such 
as segregated docking and traceability protocols per unit distributed in the  FTS market, 
and g  represents the variable costs of distribution for the commodity product. Consistent 
with Motta and Sharma (2016) which found increased transaction costs associated with 
the purchase of locally grown products, and Izumi Wright and Hamm (2010) which 
( , )
D D
D D W W L L
L L W L L
X X
p X X
M
κ κ
κ ν
 +
= − −  
 
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found that increased information, negotiation and payment costs for SFAs and increased 
delivery and storage costs for producers, we restrict variable costs for the undifferentiated 
product  to be less than in the  FTS market, g y<  . 
The inverse demand for local is 
 ( ), 1
DD
D D WL
L L W L W L
XXp X X
M M
κ κ ν
 
= − − − 
 
 . (12.39) 
Because the price of the wholesale product is constant and given from the wholesale 
market, the SFAs’ aggregate quantity demanded for wholesale product can be expressed 
as a function of aggregate quantity of local and the fixed price for wholesale product by 
inverting (6.39), so that ( ), 1 WW L W L
W
pX X p M X
κ
 
= − − 
 

 . Substituting this expression into the 
SFAs’ inverse aggregate demand for local product is a function of aggregate quantity of 
local and the fixed price for wholesale product, ( ), 1 LL L W W L
Xp X p p
M
κ ν = ∆ − + −  
  .  
On the supply side, the market is covered (producers sell an aggregate quantity N  
to either the  FTS or the NS market channel). Thus, the quantity sold to the NS market is 
 S Su sX N X= −  . (12.40) 
Aggregate input supply from producers to the NS market can be expressed as the sum of 
the NS product from distributor 1 and the product of the other distributors 1
2
Z
u u iu
i
X q q
=
= +∑ . 
Aggregate quantity of wholesale product demanded can be expressed similarly, 
2
Z
W iW iW
i
X q q
=
= +∑ . Producers’ inverse input supply of product to the  FTS market, 
g
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expressed as a function of fixed input price up , is ( ) 1
S
S s
s s u s s
XP X k p t
N
t γ
 
= ∆ − + + + + ∆ 
 
 , 
where S Ds L LX X X= =  so that the expression becomes
( ), 1A Ls L u u s s
Xp X p k p t
N
t γ = ∆ − + + + + ∆  
  . Substituting these expression into distributor 1’s 
profit function yields
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1
2 2max ,
1
, , ,
L W
Z Z
s
L L W s L u L W W L W iW u L iL
i iq q
A p X p p X p y q p X X p q p g N X qπ
= =
    = − + + − − + − −        
∑ ∑     . 
 (12.41) 
The first-order necessary condition for maximizing equation (6.41) is 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
, , 0
sA s
s sW sL L L L L
L L W L W s L u L u
L L L L i L L L L
X pp X X X Xp X p q p p X p y q p g
q X q X q X q q
π ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + + − − − + + =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
   
.  (12.42) 
We manipulate this expression as follows to introduce conjectural variation 
elasticities
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1
1 1 1 1
, , 0
ss
sW sL L L L L L L
L L W L W s L u L us
L L L L L L L L L
X pX q p X X q Xp X p X p p X p y X p g
q X X X q q X X q
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ + − − − + + =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
    . 
 (12.43) 
Recall that the distribution sector’s aggregate demand for wholesale 
( ), 1D D DWW W L L
W
pX p X M X
κ
 
= − − 
 

 , so that a one unit change in the aggregate quantity in the  
FTS market results in a one unit decrease in aggregate quantity in the wholesale market, 
1W
L
X
X
∂
= −
∂
. The aggregate quantity supplied to the  FTS market is the sum of individual 
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distributor’s supply
1
N
L iL
i
X q
=
= ∑ , so that 1L
iL
X
q
∂
=
∂
. For any distributor i , the conjectural 
elasticity of demand is 
D
iLL
i D
iL L
qX
q X
ξ
  ∂
=   ∂   
, and conjectural elasticity of supply is 
S
iLL
i S
iL L
qX
q X
ς
  ∂
=   ∂   
. As with Alston, Sexton and Zhang (1997), conjectural elasticities 
represent indices of market power, rather than conjectures regarding competitive 
behavior, so that  
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , 0sLL L W i L W s L u i L u
L L
ppp X p X p p X p y X p g
X X
ξ ς
∂∂
+ − − − − + + =
∂ ∂
     . (12.44) 
Homogenous distributors have identical conjectural variations in equilibrium, i.e., 
iξ ξ=  and iς ς= , where [ ], 0,1ξ ς ∈  indicates perfect competition when equal to 0, and 
monopoly/ monopsony when equal to 1. Intermediate forms of market power, such as 
oligopoly or oligopsony competition, are represented by ,ς ξ  values between 0 and 1, 
with higher values representing less competitive markets. Since distributors are 
homogenous and have identical conjectural variations, distributor 1’s objective function 
can be treated as the representative objective function for each distributor in the sector, as 
well as the industry equilibrium condition, and is represented by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , 0sLL L W L W s L u L u
L L
ppp X p X p p X p y X p g
X X
ξ ς
∂∂
+ − − − − + + =
∂ ∂
     . (12.45) 
We denote results from Scenario A with a superscript A , so that the aggregate 
quantity supplied to the  FTS market is 
 ( )* L s sAL
MN k t y g
X
N M k
κ ν t γ
κλ µ
∆ + ∆ − − − − ∆ − −  =
∆ + ∆
 , (12.46) 
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where 1λ ξ= +  and 1µ ς= + . Note that for the equilibrium quantity *ALX to be positive, 
 ( )( ) 0L s sk t y gκ ν t γ∆ + ∆ − − − − ∆ − − >   (12.47) 
The equilibrium quantity of local product supplied to  FTS markets when a distributor is 
included is increasing in wholesale NS distribution costs and market and product quality 
differences, and is decreasing in effort, transaction, marketing, and local  FTS distribution 
costs. The equilibrium quantity is decreasing in distributor market power.  
We use the *ALX  to find the equilibrium quantity in the wholesale market  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )* *, .W W W L s sA AW L W
W
p N M k N k t y gMX X p
N M k
κ κλ µ κ κ ν t γ
κ κλ µ
 − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − − − − ∆ − − =
∆ + ∆


  (12.48) 
The equilibrium quantity in the wholesale market increases as residual value in 
the wholesale market ( )W Wpκ −   and  FTS market-specific costs increase, and decreases as 
the differences in market and product qualities increase and the wholesale distribution 
costs increase. Given condition (6.47) holds, the wholesale quantity supplied increases as 
distributor market power increases. As distributor market power increases, the 
distribution sector restricts quantity supplied to the  FTS market to increase market price 
and maximize profit from the market. Distributors shift product to the wholesale market.  
Recall that all producers supply to either the  FTS or NS market so that the sum of 
supply is equal to the number of producers in the market. The equilibrium quantity of 
product supplied by producers to the NS market is therefore the difference between the 
number of producers and the quantity supplied to the  FTS market, * *A Au LX N X= −  , 
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 ( )
( )
* 1 .L s sAu
M k t y g
X N
N M k
κ ν t γ
κλ µ
 ∆ + ∆ − − − − ∆ − +
= − ∆ + ∆ 
  (12.49) 
We compare the quantity sold as a wholesale product (6.48) *AWX to the quantity 
supplied to the NS market (6.49), *AuX . Recall that W
W
p
ψ
κ
=

 , is the equilibrium value of the 
indifferent consumer between those who buy the wholesale product and those who opt 
out and buy nothing, so that 1 W
W
pM
κ
 
− 
 
  represents the quantity of total products (local or 
wholesale) bought by SFAs. Given, by assumption in our consumer model, that each SFA 
buys one unit of product, this expression also represents the number of SFAs that choose 
to buy either local or wholesale product. We find that when the number of producers is 
greater than the number of SFAs that purchase either the local or wholesale product,
1 W
W
pN M
κ
 
> − 
 
  , the quantity supplied to the NS market will be greater than that bought as 
a wholesale product then * *A Au WX X> , and when 1 W
W
pN M
κ
 
< − 
 
  it is the reverse.  
The downstream price to the SFA is 
( ) [ ]* L s sAL L W
N k t y g
p p
N M k
κ κ ν t γ
κ ν
κλ µ
∆ ∆ + ∆ − − − − ∆ − +
= ∆ − + −
∆ + ∆
  , (12.50) 
The equilibrium price paid by SFAs for local product supplied to  FTS markets when a 
distributor is included is increasing in transaction costs, marketing costs, wholesale price, 
and local  FTS distribution costs, and is decreasing in wholesale NS distribution costs and 
effort costs. An increase in wholesale product quality will increase the equilibrium price 
of local product in the  FTS market. Since from (6.47), ( ) 0L s sk t y gκ ν t γ∆ + ∆ − − − − ∆ − + >
 221 
 
, equilibrium price paid by SFAs increases as distributor market power increases, 
* *
0, 0
A A
L Lp p
λ µ
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
> >  . 
Upstream input price paid to the producer is  
 ( ) [ ]* L s sAs u s s
M k k t y g
p
N M k
p t k κ ν t γ
κλ µ
t γ
∆ ∆ + ∆ − − − ∆ − +
=
∆ + ∆
− + + + ∆ − ∆ +   
 .  (12.51) 
The upstream input price paid to the producer is increasing in the price received in the NS 
market, wholesale distribution costs, transaction and marketing costs, and decreasing in  
FTS distribution costs, and  FTS market quality. Because from (6.47)
( ) 0L s sk t y gκ ν t γ∆ + ∆ − − − − ∆ − + > , the input price paid to the supplier decreases as the 
distributor market power increases, 
* *
0, 0
A A
s sp p
λ µ
∂ ∂
< <
∂ ∂
.  
We compare the downstream price paid by the SFA, *ALp , to the upstream price 
that the distributor pays to the producer, *Asp . The upstream price is greater than the price 
paid to producers * *A AL sp p>  in perfect competition , 1λ µ = , when
L s s W u L s sk t p p k t y gκ ν t γ κ ν t γ∆ + ∆ − − − − ∆ + − > ∆ + ∆ − − − − ∆ − +  , so that  
 ( ) ( ) 0W up p y g− + − >   , (12.52) 
Setting L s sE k tκ ν t γ= ∆ + ∆ − − − − ∆ , we can see that since (6.47) says that ( ) 0E y g− − > , it 
must also be the case that ( ) 0E y g+ − > . Recall that we have assumed that ( )y g− is 
positive, since distribution costs in the  FTS market are greater than those in the NS 
market. If we further assume that the price paid by the SFA for the wholesale product is 
greater than the input supply price paid to the farmer in the NS market W up p>   , which is 
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plausible since distributors will incur some positive operating costs to distribute the 
product.  
When the distributor is a monopolist/ monopsonist such that , 2λ µ = , the price 
difference grows so that the when ( ) ( )2 0W uE p p y g+ − + − >  , price paid by SFAs is greater 
than that received by producers, as the distributor is able to extract the value of product 
and market qualities and excess market costs.  
6.4.2.2 Base Case versus Scenario A Equilibria 
Comparing the  FTS market equilibria results in Scenario A to the base case 
aggregate equilibrium quantity (6.24) we find that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0* *
1 1
A
L L
W u W u
X X
MN N k F p p y g M k k F p p y g
N M k N M k
κ λ κ λ µ κ µ
κλ µ κ
− =
 ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − + − + − + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − + − + −       
∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆
   
  (12.53) 
where we simplify the additional costs specific to the  FTS market as L s sF tν t γ= + + + ∆ . 
Under perfect competition this reduces to  
 ( ) ( )0* * W uAL L
p p y g
X X MN
N M kκ
− + − 
− =  ∆ + ∆ 
   . (12.54) 
The difference in equilibrium quantity between the base case and Scenario A will 
therefore be positive * * 0AL LX X− >  if ( ) ( ) 0W up p y g− + − >  . Recall that we have assumed 
that ( )y g− is positive. Thus, under the reasonable assumption that the price paid by the 
SFA for the wholesale product is greater than the input supply price paid to the farmer in 
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the NS market W up p>  , the quantity marketed to SFAs under perfect competition and a 
frictionless distributor is greater than that under a distributor that incurs positive 
distribution costs. In the base case model where the distributor is “frictionless”, producers 
and SFAs do not account for downstream distribution costs, but in Scenario A these costs 
have the effect of reducing the equilibrium quantity of local product supplied to  FTS 
markets. Similarly, the quantity supplied is affected by the alternative prices received by 
distributors for wholesale product and that is paid to producers who supply to the NS 
market. As the difference between these prices increases, the difference between the 
equilibrium quantities with and without the distributor increases.  
 Distributors, even when acting as perfect competitors, have an advantage that 
individual producers do not have. Distributors can allocate the entire quantity produced 
between two markets in a profit-maximizing way, whereas individual producers, in this 
model, are restricted to a choice between two markets. 
With an increase in distributor market power, the aggregate quantity supplied to 
the  FTS market decreases, 
* *
0, 0
A A
L LX X
λ µ
∂ ∂
< <
∂ ∂
, and the difference between the base case 
quantity and the quantity in Scenario A increases. The difference is largest when the 
distributor is a monopolist/ monopsonist, and corresponds to    
 ( ) ( )
( )
0* * ( ) 2
2
W uA Mon
L L
k F y g p p
X X MN
N M k
κ
κ
 ∆ + ∆ − + − + −
− =  ∆ + ∆ 
   . (12.55) 
The difference between the perfect competitive quantity and quantity in a 
monopsony/ monopoly increases with  FTS market-specific costs and product and market 
qualities.  
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Including a distributor in the model of this market, in contrast to the base-case 
model in which a distributor is assumed to be “frictionless,” raises the price paid by 
SFAs, even under perfect competition. There are two reasons why this is the case. First, 
profit maximizing distributors have the ability to allocate product between markets, and 
second, including a distributor more accurately reflects distribution-specific costs. When 
the distributor has market power, the quantity allocated to SFAs decreases, relative to a 
frictionless distributor. Policy makers and  FTS advocates that do not account for the role 
of market intermediaries run the risk of over-estimating the quantity of product that is 
allocated to the  FTS market for local foods.  
We compare the equilibrium quantity supplied to the wholesale market in the base 
case to that in Scenario A, so that when 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
.WW W W u L W W W
N k F y gM k p N F p k N p
p
N M k N M k
κ κκ κ κ
κ
κ κλ µ
∆ + ∆ − − + ∆ − + + − ∆ −  > − −
∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆
  
 , the 
equilibrium quantity of wholesale is greater in the base case 0 *AW WX X> . When this 
condition does not hold, the reverse is true. In perfect competition, we find that the base 
case will be larger than Scenario A when 
2
u W
L W W
p y g p
κ κ κ
− +
>
−
  . When the distributor is a 
monopolist/ monopsonist , the base case will be larger when 2 u W
L W W
F p k y g p
κ κ κ
+ − ∆ − +
>
+
   .  
Comparing the  FTS market price for local in the base case to that in Scenario A,  
 ( )
( )
[ ]
( )
* 0* W uA
L L
k F y gk F p p
p p N
N M k N M k
κκ
κ
κ κλ µ
 ∆ + ∆ − − +∆ + ∆ − + −
− = ∆ − ∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆ 
  .  (12.56) 
When the distributor has no market power 1, 1λ µ= =  , the difference will be  
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( )
* 0*A W u
L L
p p y gp p N
N M k
κ
κ
 − + −
− = ∆  ∆ + ∆ 
 
 . (12.57) 
 Following the treatment above (6.56), this is a positive difference so that the downstream 
price paid by the SFA is higher under Scenario A than in the base case. When the 
distributor is a monopolist/ monopsonist,  
 ( )
( )
* 0* 2 2
2
W uA Mono
L L
k p p F y g
p p N
N M k
κ
κ
κ
 ∆ + ∆ + − − + −
− = ∆  ∆ + ∆ 
 
 . (12.58) 
 The difference is decreasing in SFA effort, market quality, transaction, marketing, and 
wholesale distribution costs, and increasing in product quality difference and  FTS 
distribution costs. The comparison is similar to the above comparison of quantity 
differences between the frictionless base case and Scenario A in which there is an explicit 
distribution sector. With the addition of the distributor, the price paid by SFAs increases 
and the price difference increases when the distributor has market power, so that 
subtracting (6.58) from (6.59) we have a difference of ( )( )
( )2
k F y g
N
N M k
κ
κ
κ
 ∆ + ∆ − − −
∆  
∆ + ∆  
. Policy 
makers and  FTS advocates that do not account for the role of market intermediaries run 
the risk of under-estimating the price of product that is allocated to the  FTS market for 
local foods. 
6.4.2.3 Scenario A: Welfare 
Total welfare is now the sum of distributor profit, consumer and producer 
surpluses in two markets, the  FTS market for local product and the NS market for 
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undifferentiated wholesale product, A A AL W uTW TS TS += + , calculated from supply and 
demand curves in each market. Consumer surplus in the  FTS market for local food is 
 ( )
2
,
2
A
L
N k F y gMCS
N M k
κκ
κλ µ
 ∆ + ∆ − − + ∆  =  
∆ + ∆  
  (12.59) 
Similarly, total producer surplus is the sum of producer surplus in the  FTS 
market and the NS market where  FTS producer surplus is 
 ( )
2
2
A
LPS
M k F y gN k
N M k
κ
κλ µ
 ∆ + ∆ − − + ∆  =  
∆ + ∆  
.  (12.60) 
Both consumer and producer surpluses from local product sold in the  FTS market are 
decreasing in  FTS market effort, transaction marketing, and  FTS distribution costs, and 
increasing in wholesale distribution costs, and market and product qualities. 
We find profit in the distribution sector from the  FTS market by solving the 
distribution sector profit from sales of local product purchased from producers supply to 
the  FTS market in equation (6.41) ( ) ( )( )* * * * * *, ,A A A A A AL L L W s L u Lp X p p X p y Xπ  = − +    with the 
equilibria to obtain 
 [ ]
( ) [ ]
( )[ ]
( )
*A
L W u
MN k F y g N M k k F y g
k F y p p
N M k N M k
κ κ κ
π κ
κλ µ κλ µ
=
 ∆ + ∆ − − + ∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆ − − +
∆ + ∆ − − + − − ∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆ 
  . 
 (12.61) 
When the distribution sector has no market power , 1λ µ =  , profit in the 
distribution sector from sales of local product to  FTS markets is 
[ ]
( ) ( )
, *PC A
L W u
MN k F y g
p p g
N M k
κ
π
κ
=
∆ + ∆ − − +
− −
∆ + ∆
  . As we would expect, distribution sector profit 
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in the  FTS market for local food is decreasing in  FTS market distribution costs, 
transaction effort and marketing costs, and increasing in product and market quality. 
Distributor profit is increasing in the wholesale price paid by consumers, and decreasing 
in the input price paid to producers for the NS market, and positive distribution costs in 
the wholesale market. Following the analysis above, we would expect that the wholesale 
price paid by SFAs is greater than the input price paid to producers for the NS market, 
W up p>  and that 0k F y gκ∆ + ∆ − − + > . When W up p g− >   , the distribution sector will earn 
positive profits from the  FTS market.  
When the distributor is a monopolist/ monopsonist, profit becomes 
[ ]
( ) ( )
, * 2
4
M A
L W u
MN k F y g
k F y p p g
N M k
κ
π κ
κλ µ
=
∆ + ∆ − − +
 ∆ + ∆ − − + − −   ∆ + ∆
  . Distributor profit is 
positive when ( )2 W uk p p F y gκ∆ + ∆ + − > + +  , and increases as product and market quality 
increase, and decreases as marketing, transaction and distribution costs increase. Recall 
that the oligopolist/ oligopsonist distributors restrict quantity supplied to the  FTS market. 
Note that in both the perfectly competitive and the monopolist/ monopsonist environment 
additional efficiencies in the distribution sector that decrease distribution costs ,y g  will 
increase profits in the distribution sector. 
Consumer surplus in the wholesale market is
( )
( )
2
,
2
WA
W u W W
W
CS
N k F y gM p
N M k
κ κ
κ
κ κλ µ+
=
 ∆ + ∆ − − +  − − 
∆ + ∆  
  and producer surplus in the market 
with NS buyers ( )
2
1
2
A
W u
M k F y gNPS
N M k
κκ
κλ µ+
 ∆ + ∆ − − + ∆  = − 
∆ + ∆  
 . Both Producer and Consumer 
Surpluses in the NS market for wholesale product increase in wholesale product quality, 
 228 
 
SFA effort and producer  FTS market costs, and decrease in wholesale market costs. 
Consumer Surplus from wholesale also decreases in wholesale price. More efficient 
distribution decreases consumer surplus from wholesale product, and increases in market 
power decrease it. Note that in the base case * *Su LX N X= −  , but that is not the case in 
Scenario A. 
In the NS market with wholesale product, the distribution sector profit is found by 
solving (6.41) for the sales of wholesale product purchased from producers supply to the 
NS market, ( ) ( )* * *,A A AW u W W u L W u Lp X X p p g N Xπ + +   = − + −      yielding 
 ( ) ( )[ ]( )
2
, * u WDist A W
W u W u
W
MN p g p k F y gMp Mp N p g
N M k
κ
π
κ κλ µ+
=
+ − ∆ + ∆ − − +
+ − + +   ∆ + ∆
 

  . (12.62) 
Distribution profit in the NS market with wholesale product is increasing in input 
price paid to the producer, NS market distribution costs, transaction effort and marketing 
costs, and decreasing in  FTS distribution costs. Distribution profit is decreasing in 
wholesale product quality, and increasing in local product quality and  FTS market 
quality. The decrease in profit due to wholesale product quality results from an increase 
in sales from a product/ market combination in which consumers have no increased 
willingness to pay. When the distribution sector has no market power , 1λ µ =  , profit in 
the distribution sector from sales of wholesale product to NS markets is
( ) ( )[ ]( )
2
, * u WDist A W
W u W u
W
MN p g p k F y gMp Mp N p g
N M k
κ
π
κ κ+
=
+ − ∆ + ∆ − − +
+ − + +   ∆ + ∆
 

   . Total distributor 
profit is the sum of profits in the  FTS market for local food and profit in the alternative 
market, , * , * , *Dist A Dist A Dist AW u Lπ π π+= + . Under perfect competition, when , 1λ µ =  we find that total 
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distributor sector profit is the difference between wholesale revenues and input costs 
from the NS market [ ], * 1Dist A WW u
W
Mp N p g
p
κ
π
 
= − − + 
 
 

 where prices are exogenous.  
Total surplus from local in Scenario A is A A A AL L L LTS CS PS π= + + . Summing profit 
with producer and consumer surpluses in the  FTS market for local product, we find  
( )[ ]
( )
[ ] ( )[ ] [ ]( )
*
22
A
L
W u
MN N M k k F y g
TS
N M k
N M k k F y p p k F y g
MN k F y g
N M k
κ κ
κλ µ
κλ µ κ κ
κ
κλ µ
=
∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆ − − +
+
∆ + ∆
 ∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆ − − + − − ∆ + ∆ − − +
∆ + ∆ − − +  ∆ + ∆ 
 
.  (12.63) 
Note that as the costs of effort, transactions, and local  FTS distribution increase, Total 
Surplus from local decreases, but increases in the quality difference of products and 
markets, as well as distribution costs from wholesale product to the NS market. In perfect 
competition, this simplifies to 
[ ] [ ]( ) [ ]
* 1 2
2
A
L W u
k F y g
TS MN k F y g k F y p p
N M k
κ
κ κ
κ
=
 − ∆ + ∆ − − +
∆ + ∆ − − + − ∆ + ∆ − − + − ∆ + ∆ 
  .  
We denote the base case welfare with the superscript 0, and show welfare in the  FTS 
market for local product as [ ]
( )
2
0 0
2
W u
L LPS
MN k F p p
CS
N M k
κ
κ
=
∆ + ∆ − + −
+
∆ + ∆
  . We subtract Total 
Surplus in Scenario A from the base case 0 00,PC A A AA L L L L L LPS PSTS CS CS π   ∆ = + − + +     and find 
that is less than that in the base case under perfect competition when 
[ ] [ ]
( )[ ][ ]
22
2 1W u
k F y g k F y g
N M k k F y g k F y p p
κ κ
κ κ κ
∆ + ∆ − − + − ∆ + ∆ − − +
− ∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆ − − + ∆ + ∆ − − + − < 
 . By inspection, the LHS is 
likely to be less than one. Compared to the base case, welfare in the  FTS market 
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decreases with the addition of the distribution sector. When the distributor has monopoly/ 
monopsony power, Total Surplus decreases  
 
[ ] [ ]( ) [ ]
,
1 2
4
A Mono A A A
L L L L
W u
TS PS CS
k F y g
MN k F y g k F y p p
N M k
π
κ
κ κ
κ
== + +
 − ∆ + ∆ − − +
∆ + ∆ − − + − ∆ + ∆ − − + − ∆ + ∆ 
 
. (12.64) 
Welfare from the wholesale product sold to the NS market is 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
22
22
A A
W W W W u W W uA
W u
W
M p N M k N G N N M k MG
TS
N M k
κ κλ µ κ κκ κλ µ
κ κλ µ
+ +
+
    − ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ ∆ + ∆ −    =
∆ + ∆

 , (12.65) 
where we simplify so that AL s s s W uk t y g Gκ ν t γ +∆ + ∆ − − − − − + = . Here, wholesale quantity 
supplied and Total Surplus from wholesale product to the NS market increases as the 
costs of effort, transactions, and local  FTS distribution increase, but decreases in the 
quality difference of products and markets, as well as distribution costs from wholesale 
product to the NS market.  
Summing total surplus from the  FTS market for local products with total surplus 
from the wholesale product from the non  FTS market, we find that, like in the base case, 
total welfare increases as the costs of effort, transactions, and local  FTS distribution 
increase, but decreases in distribution costs from wholesale product to the NS market. 
Recall that the quantity supplied to the  FTS market decreases in these costs, suggesting 
that there is a trade-off between total economic welfare and the quantity supplied to the  
FTS market. This trade-off becomes more striking as intermediary market power 
increases.  
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6.4.2.4 Efficient Distribution Sector 
The addition of an explicit distribution sector has two potentially conflicting 
effects on equilibria. On one hand, adding a distribution sector with market power may 
restrict the aggregate quantity and increase the price of local product in the  FTS market, 
as seen above. On the other hand, there is the possibility that the distribution sector is 
more efficient and therefore reduces the overall costs in the supply chain, increasing the 
aggregate quantity and reducing the price of local product in the  FTS market.  
While we have not restricted the distributor costs, ,y g to be positive, we have 
proceeded with our interpretation of results as if they are. However, policy makers and 
advocates argue that existing food distribution systems are specialized businesses with 
expertise in procurement, shipping, storage, traceability, ordering, and billing and 
payment systems. This expertise may make distributors more efficient at procuring and 
distributing product, and thereby may reduce total supply chain distribution costs. 
Distributors’ expertise, however, may be less applicable in  FTS markets. For example, 
efficiencies established when distributors procure product from large wholesalers may 
not apply when procuring product from individual producers, and traceability information 
such as local or regional origin may not be compatible with existing information tracking 
systems. If distributors are in fact more efficient, they may pass some cost savings on to 
SFAs in the perfectly competitive case, however, a distributor with monopoly/ 
monopsony power may instead extract some portion of the savings. The frictionless base 
case model presented above may be unrealistic in that it assumes the potential benefits 
from efficiencies that might accrue from the use of a distribution sector in  FTS markets, 
but ignores the potential negative effects from distribution sector that exercises market 
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power. The addition of the distribution sector in Scenario A allows us to explore the 
possible conflicting effects of that sector on equilibria. 
First we consider how our model allows efficient distributors to reduce costs in 
the supply chain. Recall that in both the base case and Scenario A we have expressed the 
difference in producers’ marketing costs between  FTS and NS markets as s uγ γ γ∆ = −  and 
transaction costs ,s st t  , and SFA effort Lν , as components of the total  FTS market-
specific costs, L s sF tν t γ= + + + ∆ . Previously we interpreted the distribution costs as being 
positive , 0y g > , and assumed distributors’ costs to supply the  FTS market would be 
higher than costs to supply the NS market ( y g> ) so that the effect of adding a 
distribution sector  resulted in increased costs, ( ) 0y g− > . We now allow distributors’ 
costs to be less than zero , 0y g < , so that they reduce the overall marketing and 
distribution costs in each market. We look at two possible relationships between 
distribution efficiencies in the  FTS and NS markets. First, distributors could reduce costs 
through efficiencies, , 0y g < , but the cost reductions in the NS market exceed those in the  
FTS market, y g< . This might be the case if the  FTS market is still relatively more 
costly to supply, even if distributors realize relative efficiencies and reduce overall 
distribution costs, F . The outcomes for equilibria are qualitatively equivalent to those in 
Scenario A, since ( ) 0y g− > . Alternatively, cost reductions in the NS market could be 
less than or equal to those in the  FTS market, y g≥ . This might be the case if 
distributors reduce  FTS market costs more than NS market costs, or if the costs to 
distribute are equal in both markets. All else equal, equilibrium quantities of local 
product supplied to the market increases relative to Scenario A as a result of decreased 
 233 
 
overall supply chains costs, equilibrium price paid by SFAs for local product decreases, 
and the equilibrium price paid to producers increases, since ( ) 0y g− ≤ . 
When ( ) 0y g− ≤ , price decreases and quantity increases in the  FTS market 
whether the distribution sector is concentrated or is perfectly competitive. Recall 
Equation (6.54), the difference between the base-case versus the Scenario A equilibrium 
quantity of local product supplied under perfect competition
( ) ( )0* * W uA
L L
p p y g
X X MN
N M kκ
− + − 
− =  ∆ + ∆ 
  . Clearly, distribution costs savings could reduce the 
discrepancy between these models, and might erase them if ( ) ( )W up p y g− < −  .  The net 
effect on equilibria, however, may vary, depending on the relationship between cost 
savings and market power. To demonstrate, we compare the effect of a change in the net 
distributor costs 
( )
*
0
A
LX
y g
∂
>
∂ −
 when ( ) 0y g− ≤ , on equilibrium aggregate quantity (6.47) to 
the effect of a change in market power parameters 
*
0
A
LX
λ
∂
<
∂
, where we simplify by 
assuming that the distributors’ upstream and downstream market power are equal, µ λ= . 
When ( ) ( )( )F y g kλ κ> − − − ∆ + ∆ , the increase in aggregate quantity of local product that 
results from cost efficiencies dominates the decrease that results from market power. The 
term ( )( )F y g− −  can be interpreted as the extent to which distribution sector cost 
efficiencies mitigate  FTS market-specific costs. In perfect competition, 1λ = , the cost 
efficiency effect dominates when this mitigation effect does not exceed the qualities of 
the local product and  FTS market by more than a value of 1, ( ) ( )( )1 F y g k κ> − − − ∆ + ∆ .  
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As market power increases, the distribution sector must become increasingly 
efficient for the cost savings effect to dominate the market power effect. For example, in 
monopoly / monopsony, 2λ = , the difference in the mitigation effect and qualities must be 
twice that in the perfectly competitive case, ( ) ( )( )2 F y g k κ> − − − ∆ + ∆ for the cost 
efficiency effect to dominate. When this mitigation effect does exceed product and 
market qualities by more than 2, the decrease in aggregate quantity of local product 
supplied resulting from distribution sector market power dominates, and aggregate 
quantity supplied decreases. As market power increases in the distribution sector, the 
more efficient the sector is, the more the sector can reduce quantity of local product and 
extract rents.  
Ultimately, policy makers should note that assuming a frictionless distribution 
sector can suggest that a greater quantity is supplied to the  FTS market than that if the 
distributor is taken into account, depending on whether or not distributors introduce 
efficiencies that reduce overall supply chain costs, and do or do not exert market power. 
When distributors do have market power, the difference between the presumed quantity 
supplied due to efficiency and the actual quantity supplied increase. Taken together with 
evidence that intermediaries in between producers and consumers in the  FTS supply 
chain are highly concentrated, these results suggest that policy makers would be well 
advised to consider the potential for market intermediaries to exercise market power to 
reduce equilibrium quantities relative to the frictionless base case and counter to the goal 
of increasing local foods supplied to  FTS programs. It is possible that distributors enjoy 
higher efficiency, perhaps as a result of economies of scale, which can increase the 
quantity supplied to the market.  
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6.4.2.5 Scenario B: Known Qualities, Labeling  
In Scenario B, a typical distributor labels both the product as local, incurring 
product labeling cost d , and the market as  FTS, incurring market labeling cost b . Product 
and market quality labeling allows SFAs to avoid the effort Lν  associated with procuring 
local product, and producers to avoid the transaction costs ,s stt  associated with selling to  
FTS markets, but still allows producers and consumers to know product and market 
qualities. We assume that distributor labeling is more efficient and less costly than SFA 
effort or producers transaction costs, so that Ld ν<  and s sb tt< + , set , , 0L s stν t =  equal to 
zero to find inverse demand for local product  
 ( , )
D D
D D W W L L
L L W L
X Xp X X
M
κ κ
κ
 +
= −  
 
 . (12.66) 
SFAs’ aggregate demand for wholesale product is again expressed as a function 
of aggregate quantity of local and the fixed price for wholesale product, so that 
( ), 1 WW L W L
W
pX X p M X
κ
 
= − − 
 

  , SFAs’ inverse aggregate demand for local product is a 
function of aggregate quantity of local and the fixed price for wholesale product,   
( ), 1 LL L W WXp X p pMκ
 
= ∆ − + 
 
  , and input supply with a not  FTS buyer is 
( ), 1Ls L u u
Xp X p k p
N
γ = ∆ − + + ∆  
  , which again follows S Su sX N X= −  . Labeling costs now 
enter the Distributor’s profit function, so that the typical distributor’s profit function, 
denoted with the superscript B , is 
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
2 2max ,
, , , .
iL iW
Z Z
L L W s L u iL W L W iW W u iW u
i iq q
B
i
p X p p X p y d b q X X p q p X q p gπ
= =
    = − + + + + − − − +        
∑ ∑    
  (12.67) 
Using the FOC we find the equilibria quantities sold to  FTS and wholesale 
markets. With perfectly competitive upstream and downstream markets, the aggregate 
supply or local food to the  FTS market is  
 [ ]*BL
MN k y d b g
X
N M k
κ γ
κλ µ
∆ + ∆ − ∆ − − − +
=
∆ + ∆
,  (12.68) 
which decreases as the conjectural variation of supply and/ or demand elasticity 
increases, 
* *
0, 0
B B
L LX X
λ µ
∂ ∂
< <
∂ ∂
 . The equilibrium price of local food in the  FTS market is
( ) ( ) [ ]* WB
L
N M k p N k y d b g
p
N M k
κλ µ κ κ κ γ
κλ µ
∆ + ∆ ∆ + − ∆ ∆ + ∆ − ∆ − − − +
=
∆ + ∆
 , which increases as the 
conjectural variation of demand increases, 
*
0
B
LP
λ
∂
>
∂
, while the upstream price paid to the 
producer is ( ) ( ) [ ]* s suBs
p k M k k y d b g
p
N M k
M k N γ κ γ
κλ µ
µ κλ ∆ ∆ ∆ + ∆ − − − − +
=
∆ + ∆
∆ + ∆ + − + 
 
 
  ,which decreases 
as the conjectural variation of supply elasticity increases 
*
0
B
sP
µ
∂
<
∂
 . The wholesale 
aggregate supply of wholesale product to the NS market is  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *, .W W W sB BW L W
W
p N M k N k y d b gMX X p
N M k
κ κλ µ κ κ γ
κ κλ µ
− ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − − − − +  =
∆ + ∆

   
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6.4.2.6 Scenario B: Welfare 
Consumer surplus in the local market is
[ ] 2 ,
2
B L
L
L
MN k y d b g
CS
M M k N
κ γκ
λ κ µ
 ∆ + ∆ − ∆ − − − +∆
=  ∆ + 
 and consumer surplus in the wholesale 
market ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
W W WB
W
W
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p N M k N k y d b gM
N M k
κ κλ µ κ κ γ
κ κλ µ
=
 − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ − − − +   
∆ + ∆  

. Similarly, 
total producer surplus is the sum of producer surplus in the  FTS market and the NS 
market  where  FTS producer surplus is [ ]
2
2
B
L
L
PS
MN k y d b gk
N M k N
κ γ
λ κ µ
=
 ∆ + ∆ − ∆ − − − +∆
=  ∆ + 
 
 and producer surplus in the market with not  FTS buyers  
( ) ( ) ( )
2
.
2
W W WB
W
W
p N M k N k y d b gN k MPS
N M k
κ κλ µ κ κ γ
κ κλ µ
  − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ − − − + ∆    =
∆ + ∆  

 
6.4.2.7 Scenario A versus B 
The perfectly competitive comparative welfare outcomes of the Scenarios 
presented above depend primarily on the relationship between the labeling costs and the 
effort and transaction costs. A primary motivation that advocates cite for “scaling up”  
FTS procurement by using established market intermediaries like distributors and foods 
service management companies is the assumption that intermediaries have economies of 
scale and technological expertise, and are therefore able to provide services that reduce or 
eliminate transaction and effort costs, like the provision of quality information, more 
cost-effectively than SFAs and producers.  
s uTPS PS PS= +
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If we assume that the distribution sector is more efficient than producers and 
SFAs in the provision of quality information, so that product labeling costs are less than 
SFA effort to procure local, Ld ν<  and distributors market labeling costs are more 
efficient than producers’ transaction costs incurred in selling to SFAs, s sb tt< + , we find 
that Scenario B provides a larger aggregate quantity of product and increased total 
welfare compared to Scenario A, no matter the level of market power exerted by 
distributors.  
6.4.3 The Effect of Subsidies on Effort and Transaction Costs 
How can policy makers increase the quantity of local foods that are served in 
schools? Current policy focuses on subsidizing the effort that SFAs must expend to 
procure local foods. We introduce subsidies into the consumers’ and producers’ indirect 
utility functions to demonstrate the possibilities and challenges associated with policy 
interventions like subsidies on SFA effort or producer transaction costs to support these 
markets. 
6.4.3.1 Subsidy on Consumers’ Effort Cost and on Producers’ Transaction Costs 
First we introduce a subsidy, ρ , to Scenario A to supplement some portion of the 
SFA’s effort in the  FTS market channel such that [ ]0,1ρ ∈ . This subsidy is in effect the 
current strategy to increase the quantity of local product in schools. 
 
( )1 if the local product is bought
if the wholesale product is bought
otherwise.
 
g L L L
g W W
p
pV
ρω ψ κ ν
ω ψ κ
ω
−+ − −
= + −





.  (12.69) 
 239 
 
The indifferent consumer is now ( )1ˆ L W Lp p ρνψ
κ
−− +
≡
∆
 , and aggregate market 
demand is [ ] ( )1ˆ1 1D L W LL
p p
X M M
ρν
ψ
κ
−− + 
= − = − ∆ 
. Next we consider the producers’ 
profit function, and add a subsidy δ  , to supplement some portion of the transaction costs 
in the  FTS market channel, where [ ]0,1δ ∈ , so that ( (1 ) )s s s s sp c FC tπ γ t δ γ= − + + − + − − . 
We update the indifferent producer so that ( )1ˆ u s s si
p p t
k
δt γ
θ
−− + + + ∆
=
∆
, and aggregate 
market supply, ( )1ˆ[1 ] 1S u s s ss
p p t
X N N
k
δt γ
θ
−− + + + ∆ 
= − = − ∆ 
 . 
6.4.3.2 Equilibrium with Subsidies 
We refer back to Scenario A to provide context for an analysis of subsides, as 
Scenario B has eliminated the  FTS market specific costs that could be minimized 
through subsidy policy. The aggregate quantity supplied to the  FTS market is 
( ) ( )* 11L s sA
L
MN k t y g
X
N M k
δκ ν ρ t γ
κλ µ
−∆ + ∆ − − − − − ∆ − +  =
∆ + ∆
. Equilibrium quantity is increasing 
in both a subsidy on effort 
( )
*
s LdX MN
d N M k
ν
ρ κλ µ
=
∆ + ∆
 , and in a subsidy on transaction costs,  
( )
*
s sdX MN
d N M k
t
δ κλ µ
=
∆ + ∆
, suggesting that policy makers wishing to increase the 
quantity supplied to the  FTS market could consider policies to supplement either supply 
or demand.  
The resulting downstream price to the SFA is 
( )( ) ( ) ( )*
11
1 L s sAL L W
N k t y g
p p
N M k
δκ κ ν ρ t γ
κ ν ρ
κλ µ
−∆ ∆ + ∆ − − − − − ∆ − +  = ∆ − − − −
∆ + ∆
 . Equilibrium 
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market price, however, is increasing in a subsidy on schools’ efforts, but decreasing in a 
subsidy on transaction costs, 
( )
*
1s L
dp N
d N M k
κν
ρ κλ µ
 ∆
= − ∆ + ∆ 
 and 
( )
*A
sL Ndp
d N M k
κt
δ κλ µ
∆
= −
∆ + ∆
. To 
the extent that the increase in equilibrium price is reflective of the value of the subsidy on 
effort, the effect should be the same as any other subsidy – namely that demand increases 
according to the value of the subsidy. Policy makers, however, must take into account the 
effect of a subsidy on market price into account. A subsidy on SFA effort does increase 
demand, but since price is endogenous this increase in demand results in an increase in 
price. An increase in price past an SFA’s ability to pay due to budget restrictions will 
result in a shift in a consumer’s indirect utility such that no consumer will demand the 
local product. 
Alternatively, policy makers could consider a subsidy on producers’ transaction 
costs. In this case the equilibrium market quantity increases, but price decreases, 
( )
*
s L sdp N
d N M k
κ t
δ κλ µ
= −
∆ + ∆
. A subsidy on transaction costs could counteract the increased 
challenges that producers must meet to supply to the  FTS market, and, in theory, could 
fully offset these costs so that the indifferent producer would find  FTS to be as profitable 
as sales to an not  FTS buyer. 
Additional policy considerations could be to directly subsidize price to the SFA or 
to the producer, or to increase marketing a market promotion to increase the perceived 
quality of the market or the product. While some states have introduced legislation to 
allow some portion of SFAs food budget to be purchased at market price without a bid, or 
at a percentage above the market bid price, it is not likely to be politically feasible to for 
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these policies to pass in any way that would have a significant ability to raise market 
prices for local foods in  FTS markets.  
 FTS market promotion has already been a significant focus of resources, with 
federal, state, municipal and private funders investing the promotion of  FTS markets, 
primarily to schools. The quality of the market could be increased by this kind of 
promotion, or by an increase in evidence that procurement of local foods does in fact 
significantly and positively impact the short- or long-term goals of  FTS, namely to 
increase student learning about health and nutrition and to reduce health and diet related 
disease and illnesses.  
While upstream input price paid to the producer is 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]* 1 1 1s s L s suA
s
p t k M k k t y g
p
N M k
M k N t δ γ κ ν ρ t δ γ
κλ µ
µ κλ − + ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ + ∆ − − − − − ∆ − +
=
∆ + ∆
∆ + ∆ + + − + − 
 
 
  . 
We use the *ALX  to find the equilibrium quantity in the wholesale market  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )* * 11, .W W L s sA AW L W
W
N M k N k t y gMX X p
N M k
δκλ µ κ κ ν ρ t γ
κ κλ µ
− Γ ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − − − − − ∆ − + =
∆ + ∆

  
6.4.3.3 Subsidies: Welfare 
Total welfare is now the sum of consumer and producer welfare in two markets, 
the  FTS market for local product and the NS market for undifferentiated wholesale 
product. Total welfare is the sum of Local and Wholesale Surplus, calculated from supply 
and demand curves in each market, so that for Scenario A, A A AL WTW TS TS= + . Consumer 
surplus in the  FTS market for local food is 
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surplus in the wholesale market is
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. 
Similarly, total producer surplus is the sum of producer surplus in the  FTS market and 
the NS market where  FTS producer surplus is
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N M k
δκ ν ρ tκ
κλ µ
−  ∆ + ∆ − − − − − +∆   = −
∆ + ∆  
. 
Welfare in the  FTS market in Scenario A in the absence of market power is  
( ) ( )
( )
2
, 11
2
L s sA PC A A
L L LTS PS
MN k t y g
CS
N M k
δκ ν ρ t
κ
=
−∆ + ∆ − − − − − +  = +
∆ + ∆
.   
Note that as the costs of effort, transactions, and local  FTS distribution increase, 
Total Surplus from local decreases, but increases in the quality difference of products and 
markets, as well as distribution costs from wholesale product to the NS market. When the 
distributor has monopoly/ monopsony power, Total Surplus decreases further to  
( ) ( )
( )
2
, 11
4
L s sA Mono A A
L L LTS PS
MN k t y g
CS
N M k
δκ ν ρ t
κ
=
−∆ + ∆ − − − − − +  = +
∆ + ∆
. Welfare from the 
wholesale product sold to the NS market is 
( ) ( )
( )
22
22
A A
W W W u W W uA
W u
W
M N M k N G N N M k MG
TS
N M k
κλ µ κ κκ κλ µ
κ κλ µ
+ +
+
    Γ ∆ + ∆ − + ∆ ∆ + ∆ −    =
∆ + ∆
 , where  
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( ) ( )1 1 AL s s W uk t y g Gκ ν ρ t δ +∆ + ∆ − − − − − − + = . Equilibrium price, however, is 
increasing in a subsidy on schools’ efforts, but decreasing in a subsidy on transaction 
costs, 
( )
*
s s Ldp Mk
d N M k
ν
ρ κλ µ
=
∆ + ∆
. To the extent that the increase in equilibrium price is 
reflective of the value of the subsidy on effort, the effect should be the same as any other 
subsidy – namely that demand increases according to the value of the subsidy. Policy 
makers, however, must take into account the effect of a subsidy on market price into 
account. A subsidy on SFA effort does increase demand, but since price is endogenous 
this increase in demand results in an increase in price. An increase in price past an SFA’s 
ability to pay due to budget restrictions will result in a shift in a consumer’s indirect 
utility such that no consumer will demand the local product. 
Alternatively, policy makers could consider a subsidy on producers’ transaction 
costs. In this case the equilibrium market quantity increases, but price decreases, 
( )
*
s L sdp N
d N M k
κ t
δ κλ µ
= −
∆ + ∆
 . A subsidy on transaction costs could counteract the increased 
challenges that producers must meet to supply to the  FTS market, and, in theory, could 
fully offset these costs so that the indifferent producer would find  FTS to be as profitable 
as sales to an not  FTS buyer. 
Additional policy considerations could be to directly subsidize price to the SFA or 
to the producer, or to increase marketing a market promotion to increase the perceived 
quality of the market or the product. While some states have introduced legislation to 
allow some portion of SFAs food budget to be purchased at market price without a bid, or 
at a percentage above the market bid price, it is not likely to be politically feasible to for 
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these policies to pass in any way that would have a significant ability to raise market 
prices for local foods in  FTS markets.  
 FTS market promotion has already been a significant focus of resources, with 
federal, state, municipal and private funders investing the promotion of  FTS markets, 
primarily to schools. The quality of the market could be increased by this kind of 
promotion, or by an increase in evidence that procurement of local foods does in fact 
significantly and positively impact the short- or long-term goals of  FTS, namely to 
increase student learning about health and nutrition and to reduce health and diet related 
disease and illnesses.  
6.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
We develop a theoretical model of producer utility maximizing choice of market 
channel with endogenous equilibria and welfare analysis markets for local food, and 
apply the model to the case of  FTS markets. A positive quantity of product can be 
supplied by producers even when the market is not the most profitable market choice. 
Producers who supply to the market even when it is not the most profitable choice are 
those producers with strength of preference for a high quality market that may contribute 
to other pro-social goals, like improved child health and nutrition or improved local 
economic development. We find that increasing the quantity of local food to SFAs 
increases the welfare in the  FTS market for local food, but may decrease total welfare 
due to welfare losses in the alternative markets.  
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We then add a distribution sector and allow it to exert both upstream and 
downstream market power, leverage efficiencies of scale to reduce overall supply chain 
costs, and label product and market quality. We find that adding a distribution sector does 
introduce the possibility of reduced supply chain costs under certain assumptions, but that 
the upstream and downstream actors may not benefit fully from these efficiencies when 
market power is present. We note that even in the case where efficiencies are passed 
through, policy makers and advocates may over-estimate the quantity of local food that is 
supplied and under-estimate the market price paid by omitting the role of market power 
in the distribution sector from policy considerations. We explore the effect of the most 
prevalent market support, subsidies on SFA procurement effort, and find that while the 
subsidy does increase quantity supplied, it also increases the equilibrium price, which 
may limit the effectiveness of the subsidy. Alternatively, policy makers could subsidize 
producers’ transaction costs, which would both increase the quantity supplied and 
decrease the market price to SFAs. Policy makers may also wish to encourage 
distributors to adapt to the role of providing upstream information to producers regarding 
the end consumer and more traditional downstream information regarding product 
attributes, including product origin, but note that in the presence of market power and 
with the limited opportunity for oversight this could result in mislabeling. 
Future work will include modeling producers’ choice to sell to an unlabeled 
market under the expectation that some portion of product supplied will go to an SFA, 
even in the absence of transaction costs and labeling. This additional scenario and the 
effect of subsidies will be compared to the results in which a distribution sector is 
included to provide a comparison that is relevant for policy makers going forward. We 
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will conduct simulations that allow for different parameter values. While there is 
substantial evidence in social sciences literature that producers make utility maximizing 
choices in markets for local food, additional work is needed to demonstrate the external 
validity of this model. We intend to test the assumption that producers have strength of 
preference for market quality, as developed in this paper, via choice experiments with a 
convenience sample of agriculture producers with existing sales of locally branded 
products, and to test the market equilibria in an experimental lab with undergraduate 
students. Finally, will we consider the possibility that policy makers may be able to 
increase the quantity of product in the market by decreasing the value at which producers 
are indifferent between the two market channels, , through the use of nudges.  
The case of producer choice to sell locally differentiated products to schools 
highlights a number of potential trade-offs that often go unexplored in local foods 
research but that can be addressed through our approach. In particular, in the case of 
Farm to School markets, there are trade-offs between increasing the quantity of local 
foods supplied to schools and total welfare. In addition, policy subsidies for  FTS 
implementation at SFAs intended to increase the quantity of local foods in Farm to 
School programs might have improved success if they were used to support producer 
supply. The Farm to School case highlights that policy interventions like subsidies to 
reduce  FTS market costs to support social outcomes of local foods systems might be 
most effective if applied to producers instead of SFAs, and highlights the need for more 
rigorous economic theories that can incorporate different dimensions of local foods 
systems.  
  
θˆ
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I combine field research, econometric methods, and economic 
theory to analyze a market in which both firms’ and consumers’ choices are motivated by 
social preferences. This work contributes to the fields of behavioral economics, industrial 
organization, and local food systems economics. The dissertation expands the growing 
literature on social preferences to incorporate firms’ choices that are motivated by utility 
maximizing objectives in an environment that allows endogenous equilibrium prices and 
quantities.  
This dissertation attempts to develop a framework for understanding the 
relationships among market forces that operate to improve economic efficiency and those 
that operate to achieve pro-social values in a way that allows prices and quantities to be 
endogenous. In addition to contributing to theory that advances the application of 
behavioral economics to firms in a competitive market environment, I seek to provide 
policy makers with a framework through which the effect of policies to promote local 
foods can be evaluated. To provide a concrete application, most of this dissertation 
focuses on understanding the key components of a specific value chain – the Farm to 
School market for local foods. The second chapter veers from the Farm to School 
application to provide empirical evidence of how human values can influence consumer 
decision making in markets for local foods. 
In the second chapter this dissertation, “Consumers’ Human Values and 
Preferences for Social Outcomes of Regional Food Attributes,” written with Gianni 
Cicia, (2018) we investigate heterogeneity in consumers’ human values and willingness 
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to pay (WTP) for social outcomes of credence process attributes that might have some 
positive social impact on purchases of early potatoes in Italy and Germany.  
In the third chapter, “Food Service Authorities’ Motivations to Buy Regional 
Food,” and fourth chapter, “Market Channel and School Meal Costs in Farm to School 
Programs” written with Jeffrey O’Hara, I analyze school food authorities’ local food 
procurement choices. The third chapter uses primary historical data from the 
Massachusetts Farm to School program to analyze how different social forces converge 
to promote a common goal of increasing the volume of local food in Massachusetts’ 
schools. The fourth chapter analyzes perceptions of costs of procuring local foods in 
regards to school food authorities’ choice of procurement channel. We combine two 
years’ of USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service national Farm to School Census data with 
USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service Census of Agriculture to test, among 
schools participating in farm to school programs, whether procuring directly from 
producers is more likely to lower costs than procuring through a distributor.  
In the fifth chapter, “Producer Costs and Returns from New England Farm to 
Institution Sales,” I present the results of field research from interviews with producers in 
six New England states who market at least some product to Farm to Institution markets. 
I gather information about producers’ costs and returns in selling to farm to institution 
markets. Notably, while very few farm operations specifically track costs and returns to 
farm to institution marketing, only two producers target this market for future growth. 
The barriers cited to increased participation include low prices, volume requirements, and 
logistical challenges. 
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The sixth chapter, “Equilibria and Welfare in Markets With Social Preferences,” 
written with Nathalie Lavoie and Dan Lass, develops a behavioral model of producer 
choice for high-quality local food markets in which marketing choices may be influenced 
by social preferences, while allowing price and quantity to be determined in the market. 
We draw upon theory from behavioral economics and industrial organization, as well as 
field research results, to develop a theoretical model that advances the existing literature 
on producer choice of market channels, in which price is treated as exogenous. Non-
pecuniary motivations in marketing choices are increasingly identified in the literature as 
relevant to producer decision making. The paper provides a theoretical framework to 
model the potential effects of policy interventions when producers may be motivated by 
non-pecuniary factors and downstream intermediaries may exercise oligopsony power. 
We apply the model to producer marketing choices in farm to school markets, which 
policy makers currently provide demand-side support by subsidizing school food 
purchasers’ procurement of local foods. We find that if policy makers wish to increase 
the quantity of local product supplied to schools, supply-side interventions are likely to 
more effective. Effective interventions could include mitigating producers’ transaction 
costs. We also find that market power in the distribution sector may, in certain cases, 
serve to counteract policy-makers’ goals to increase quantity of local foods supplied to 
schools. It is also possible that distributors enjoy higher efficiency, perhaps as a result of 
economies of scale, which can increase the quantity supplied to the market. Future work 
using this framework will include evaluating interventions like promoting farm to school 
markets to producers, or providing technical assistance to producers, to establish 
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contracts with intermediaries that support price pass-through and communicate 
information about downstream market activity.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
LOCAL FOOD PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS (2013-2014) 
 
 Number Percent 
On-Site      
Lack of kitchen equipment to process/prepare 
local foods.  553 12% 
GAP or other food safety requirements  552 12% 
Lack of compliance with your institution's 
purchasing regulations and policies  275 6% 
Delivery   
Lack of reliability in delivering ordered items  874 19% 
Getting on time deliveries  393 8% 
Having quantity delivered equal to quantity 
ordered  381 8% 
Price   
Higher prices  1,810 38% 
Unstable product prices  729 15% 
Product   
Hard to find year-round availability of key items  2,674 57% 
Local items not available from primary vendors  1,268 27% 
Vendors for local items don't offer a broad range 
of products  1,033 22% 
Lack of availability of processed/precut products  709 15% 
Getting product delivered that meets your quality 
requirements & other specs (i.e., size)  718 15% 
Transaction   
Local producers aren't bidding  774 16% 
Hard to coordinate procurement of local with 
regular procurement 1,208 26% 
Hard to find new suppliers/growers or distributors  909 19% 
Hard to get information about product availability  736 16% 
Hard to place orders with vendors  298 6% 
Resolving problem deliveries  171 4% 
Inability to pay farmers according to farmers' 
needs due to school district payment procedures  363 8% 
No Reported Problems 1,203 25% 
Total 4,718   
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APPENDIX B 
LOCAL FOOD PROCUREMENT CHANNELS (2013-2014) 
Direct      
At least one direct channel 2,832 60% 
 Individual producers ( Farmers, fishers, ranchers) 1,886 40% 
 Farmer, rancher, or fisher cooperatives 798 17% 
 Farmers markets 373 8% 
 Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) model 157 3% 
 
  
Intermediated   
At least one intermediated channel 2,995 63% 
 Food processors and manufacturers 1,772 38% 
 Distributors 2,995 63% 
 Food buying cooperative 647 14% 
 Food hub 403 9% 
 Food service management companies 101 2% 
 Dept. of Defense Fresh Program vendors 1,379 29% 
 USDA foods 1,440 31% 
 State Farm to School program office 142 3% 
   
Total 4,718   
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APPENDIX C 
2015 NEW ENGLAND FARM TO INSTITUTION COST & RETURNS 
INTERVIEW 
 
Section 
1
Social Preferences
A. Beliefs
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could 
improve health and nutrition outcomes for the elderly
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could 
improve health and nutrition outcomes for incarcerated 
individuals
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could 
improve health and nutrition outcomes for hospital 
patients. 
Increasing the sales of New England food to New England 
consumers benefits the environment.
Increasing the sales of New England food to New England 
consumers helps preserve the region's working landscape.
Increasing the sales of New England food to New England 
consumers decreases the environmental impact of large-
scale agriculture.
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods is a driver of 
local economic development
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods is a driver of 
regional economic development.
Small and medium sized farms are important drivers of rural 
economies.
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods to consumers 
in New England could improve health and nutrition 
outcomes.
Increasing the sales of local and regional foods could 
improve health and nutrition outcomes for students k-12. 
Agree 
Strongly
Can't Choose
Disagree 
Strongly
Disagree
Neither agree 
nor disagree
Agree
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Section 
1
Social Preferences
B. Rating of Organizations
1. How effective are the following organizations?
a. Sierra Club
b. Appalachian Mountain Club
c. National Audubon society
d. State Natural Resources Council
e. Local Fire Department
f. Local Hardware store franchise
g. Local or regional economic development organization
h. Feed the Children
i. Children's Hospitals Associations
j. Feeding America
k. American farmland Trust
l. Farm Aid
2. How familiar are you with the following organizations?
a. Sierra Club
b. Appalachian Mountain Club
c. National Audubon society
d. State Natural Resources Council
e. Local Fire Department
f. Local Hardware store franchise
g. Local or regional economic development organization
h. Feed the Children
i. Children's Hospitals Associations
j. Feeding America
k. American farmland Trust
l. Farm Aid
Extremely 
Familiar
Moderately 
familiar
Slightly 
familiar
Not at all 
familiar
Somewhat 
familiar
Ineffective
Unsure/ Not 
familiar with 
organization
Very 
Ineffective
Very 
Effective
Effective
Neither 
Effective nor 
Ineffective
  
 
 
A. What was your gross farm income for 2014? (Schedule F, line 9 or 50)?
B. What was the net income or loss from the sale of business assets for 2014?
C. In 2014, what was your principle crop or activity?
D. How/ to whom did you sell your products in 2014?
"0" if did NOT sell to this market, "1" if DID sell to this market.
1 Direct to consumer (fresh or processed)
a. Farmstand
b. CSA
c. Farmers' market
d. PYO
2 Intermediated (fresh or processed)
a. Direct to restaurant
b. Direct to retail
c. Direct to buying club
d. Direct to aggregator
e. Direct to processor
i. public k-12 ii. pre-school iii. private k-12 iv. private college v. public college/univ vi. hospital vii. other
f. Direct to institution
g. Wholesaler 
h. End buyer known?
if "yes" to g. : i. institution ii. retail iii. restaurant iv. buying club v. processor vi. other
i.
Section 2
"Direct" marketing  is defined as sales from the 
producer directly to the end consumer of the product.  
"Intermediated" marketing  is defined as any sales 
where an additional business or organization owns 
the product before it reaches the end consumer. 
2. Code from Part IV (Schedule F, Line B)1. Principal Crop or Activity (Schedule F, Line A)
$
$
Markets & Marketing Contracts
  
 
 
Code
Total 
production
/ Quantity 
Harvested?
Unit Code 
(C&R 
Section D)
 MARKETING 
Contract = 
"1", 
PRODUCTION 
contract= 
"2", Cash or 
Open Market 
sales = "3", 
Other ="4" 
What 
Quantity 
of this 
product 
was 
delivered 
through 
this 
contract?
FINAL 
PRICE /FEE 
RECEIVED  
per Unit 
by this 
operation 
for this 
product 
marketed 
under this 
contract?
Total 
dollar 
amount 
received 
in 2014 
from this 
contract?
 MARKETING 
Contract = 
"1", 
PRODUCTION 
contract= "2", 
Cash or Open 
Market sales 
= "3", Other 
="4" 
What 
Quantity 
of this 
product 
was 
delivered 
through 
this 
contract?
FINAL 
PRICE/ FEE 
RECEIVED  
per Unit 
by this 
operation 
for this 
product 
marketed 
under this 
contract?
Total 
dollar 
amount 
received 
in 2014 
from this 
contract?
Code Acres Tenths Quantity Code Value 
[1,2,3,4]
Quantity Dollars & 
cents
Total 
Dollars
Value 
[1,2,3,4]
Quantity Dollars & 
cents
Total 
Dollars
0397 10 3 2000 1 3 400 0.4 160 2 600 0.37 222
How many 
acres were 
harvested? 
(acres and 
tenths)
Section 3
Crop
Acreage, Production, Marketing and Income
DIRECT to Institution
Vegetables, Potatoes and 
Melons
Carrots
Fruit and Nuts
Berries
WHOLESALE to Institution
  
 
 
Acreage, Production, Marketing and Income
Code
Total 
production
/ Quantity 
Harvested?
Unit Code 
(C&R 
Section D)
 MARKETING 
Contract = 
"1", 
PRODUCTION 
contract= 
"2", Cash or 
Open Market 
sales = "3", 
Other ="4" 
What 
Quantity 
of this 
product 
was 
delivered 
through 
this 
contract?
FINAL 
PRICE /FEE 
RECEIVED  
per Unit 
by this 
operation 
for this 
product 
marketed 
under this 
contract?
Total 
dollar 
amount 
received 
in 2014 
from this 
contract?
 MARKETING 
Contract = 
"1", 
PRODUCTION 
contract= "2", 
Cash or Open 
Market sales 
= "3", Other 
="4" 
What 
Quantity 
of this 
product 
was 
delivered 
through 
this 
contract?
FINAL 
PRICE/ FEE 
RECEIVED  
per Unit 
by this 
operation 
for this 
product 
marketed 
under this 
contract?
Total 
dollar 
amount 
received 
in 2014 
from this 
contract?
Code Acres Tenths Quantity Code Value 
[1,2,3,4]
Quantity Dollars & 
cents
Total 
Dollars
Value 
[1,2,3,4]
Quantity Dollars & 
cents
Total 
Dollars
* public k-12, pre-school, private k-12, private college, public college/univ, hospital, other
Hogs and Pigs
Poultry
Equine, Sheep & goats, 
Aquaculture, Bees, other 
livestock & livestock 
products
Section 3, 
cont.
DIRECT to Institution WHOLESALE to Institution
Crop
How many 
acres were 
harvested? 
(acres and 
tenths)
Other field crops, hay, trees 
& maple syrup, nursery
Cattle and Calves
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Section 4 Other Farm-Related Income
1 In 2014, what was the total income received by you and all partners for the following:
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
(ii)  Were the sales of any farmland or other farm real estate made to :
1   a non-relative
2   a relative
3   both non-relatives and relatives 
$
$
$
$
$
$
2
i. How many hours of assistance did you receive?
"0" if NO, "1" if 
YES.
(i)   recognized gain/loss on sales of farmland and other farm real 
a.   custom work, machine hire, and other agricultural services provided by this operation
b.   grazing of livestock? (Exclude contract arrangements previously reported.) 
c.   recreational and agri-tourism activities such as hunting, fishing, farm tours, hospitality 
services, petting zoos, etc.
d.   sales of all forest products? (Include firewood, timber, etc.  Exclude maple syrup and 
Christmas trees.)
e.   sales of farm machinery and vehicles? (farm share only) 
f.    proceeds from sales of farmland and other farm real estate owned by this operation 
only
i. Grant titles
ii. Granting Organizations
iii. Total Dollar amount of Grants
iv. % total Dollar amount 
Received for Direct to 
Institution Marketing 
$
$
iii . % total $ Received for 
Direct to Institution 
Marketing 
ii. Estimated Dollar value of services 
received
v. % total Dollar Amount 
Received for Wholesale to 
Institution marketing
iv. % total $ Received for 
Wholesale to Institution 
marketing
a.  apply for any grants that were received all or in part for expenses incurred in 2014? (Include 
operating, capital, technical assistance and training, workshop waivers etc.)
c. request and receive any in-kind services from public, private sector for and non-profit sources in 
2014? (Include marketing, professional or public sector services)
b.  receive any grants all or in part for expenses incurred in 2014?
k.   income from royalties or leases associated with energy production (e.g. natural gas, oil 
and wind turbines)?
l. all other farm related sources of income?  [This may be a negative (-) number for 
hedging losses.]
Did you:
g.   Federal crop and livestock insurance payments? 
h.   other crop and livestock insurance indemnity payments? 
"0" if NO, "1" if yes
i. cooperative patronage dividends and refunds? 
j. sales of value-added goods produced (e.g. cheese, cider, jams, jellies, wines, and other 
prepared farm commodities?) EXCLUDE if this is a separate business.
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 Labor and Wages.
A.
B. 
Number of 
Employees
Total Cash 
Wages ($)
Wage Rate 
(indicate units)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11
C. What were the total cash draws on the farm business during 2012? 
D. What were the total payroll taxes for hired labor?
E.
$
$
$
Contract labor
Custom Work
Professional or Farm management 
services such as record keeping, 
accounting, tax and business 
planning, farm product advice
Total (Total cash wages should 
equal question 1).
 Interns 
Other part-time employees paid 
hourly.
Compensated Apprentices or 
Interns (please specify terms)
Section 5
What were the total cash wages paid in 2014?  Please add to this any cash bonuses paid to all hired 
workers during 2014. (Include payments to the operator, family members, and corporate officers, 
but exclude cash draw, partnership draw, contract labor, housework, custom work, and social 
security on the owner operator.)
Of the total cash wages paid (question 1), how much was paid to the following? Report the wage 
rate and units (eg., $/hour, $/week, or $/month) for the following. If no wages were paid for a line, 
please enter 0.
Total Cash Wages $
Operator(s) or Managers(s)
Family Members (not operators)
Other salaried employees
Other full-time employees paid 
hourly.
What were the total expenses for fringe benefits provided for hired workers for: life or health 
insurance, pension or retirement plans, employer’s share of social security taxes, workman’s 
compensation and unemployment compensation?  If no fringe benefits were provided, please 
enter zero.
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 Labor and Wages.
F.
G.
i. Benefit
ii. Meals or 
other food
iii. Housing iv. Fuel v. Vehicle Use
vi. 
Utiliti
es
vii. 
Farm 
Produ
viii. 
Other
H. 
Operator 1 Operator 2 Operator 3 Operator 4 Operator 5
I.
Employee 1 Employee 2 Employee 3 Employee 4 Employee 5 Employ  Employee 7
November
December
 Were any non-cash benefits provided for hired workers? 
(Meals, other foods, housing, fuel, vehicles, utilities, etc.)
Estimated 
Value ($)
April
May
June
July
August
"0" if NO, "1" if yes
May
June
July
August
September
Please estimate the average number of hours per week your hired or salaried employees worked 
on this operation during each month of 2014.  Do not include salaried personnel that were already 
listed as operators in question 6.
October
November
December
Section 5, 
cont.
Month (2014)
January
February
March
April
 If yes, enter estimated value of benefits for all workers combined below. 
On average, how many hours per week did you (the operator) and any other operators work with 
or without pay on this operation during each month of 2014?  Indicate all hours worked even if not 
paid.
Month (2014)
January
February
March
September
October
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 Labor and Wages.
J. "0" if 
NO, 
"1" if 
yes
If yes, please complete the table below.  
Worker 1 Worker 2 Worker 3 Worker 4 Worker 5 Worker 6
K.
"0" if 
NO, 
"1" if 
yes
If yes, please complete the table below.  
Worker 1 Worker 2 Worker 3 Worker 4 Worker 5 Worker 6
Month (2014)
Under 16 (ü)
November
December
June
July
August
September
October
January
February
March
April
May
Section 5, 
cont.
Did anyone else, not reported above, do farm work in 2014 on this operation without pay 
or other remuneration?  Please indicate the average number of hours worked per week 
without pay on this operation during each month of 2014. Please indicate whether labor 
was manual = "1", Professional/ farm management Services = "2", or other = "3"
Did anyone else, not reported above, do farm work in 2014 on this operation with payment 
in the form of academic credit or internship experience?  Please indicate the average 
number of hours worked per week without pay on this operation during each month of 
2014. Please indicate whether labor was manual = "1", Professional/ farm management 
Services = "2", or other = "3"
Month (2014)
Under 16 (ü)
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
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Section 
6
A.
Expenses ($)
% total Expenses 
Direct to 
Institution 
% total Expenses 
Wholesale to 
Institution
1. Car and truck expenses  (Schedule F line 10)
2. Chemicals (Schedule F line 11)
3. Conservation expenses  (Schedule F line 12)
4. Custom hire (machine work, etc.) (Schedule F line 13)
5. Depreciation  (Schedule F line 14)
6. Employee benefit other than pension and profit-sharing plans  
(Schedule F line 15)
7. Feed  (grains, hay, haylage, silage, minerals and other purchased 
feeds.) (Schedule F line 16)
8. Fertilizers and lime  (Schedule F line 17)
9. Freight and trucking (include product hauling) (Schedule F line 18)
10. Gasoline, fuel, and oil  (Schedule F line 19)
11. Insurance other than health  (Schedule F line 20)
a. Food safety liability insurance (related capital Expenses below)
12. Interest and service fees on farmland, buildings and other real 
estate debt  (Schedule F line 21a??)
13. Interest and service fees on operating loans. (Schedule F line 
21b??)
14. Labor hired (Schedule F line 22)
15. Pension and profit-sharing plans (Schedule F line 23)
16. Rent or lease of any farm machinery, equipment or structures 
(Schedule F line 24a)
17. Rent or lease of any farm land, animals, etc. (Schedule F line 24b)
18. Repair and maintenance (items a and b below should sum to this 
line) (Schedule F line 25)
a. Repair and maintenance to buildings
i) Expenses required for GAP certification or state equivalent
ii) Expenses required for Approved Vendor Status certification
iii) Expenses required for other state/ federal food safety licensing
b. Repair and maintenance to machinery and equipment
i) Expenses required for GAP certification or state equivalent
ii) Expenses required for Approved Vendor Status certification
iii) Expenses required for other state/ federal food safety licensing
19. Seeds and plants purchased(Schedule F line 26)
Farm Operating Expense.  How much was spent during 2013, including operator, partners and custom expenses for 
the categories below. Please list the cash expenses. Do not include personal living expenses such as taxes, insurance, 
repairs, etc., on your home. If no expenditure was made for a particular item, please enter 0.   Include the costs 
incurred from producing value-added products. (Note: Schedule F line numbers included below.)
Farm Operating Expenses
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Section 
6, cont.
20. Storage and warehousing (Schedule F line 27)
21. Supplies purchased such as acid, soap, paper towels, etc. 
(Schedule F line 28)
22. Taxes (items a and b below should sum to this line) (Schedule F 
line 29)
a. Real Estate Taxes
b. Other property and excise tax
23. Utilities (electricity, water, telephone, etc.) (Schedule F line 30)
24. Veterinary, breeding, hoof trimming and medicine 
expenses(Schedule F line 31)
25. Accounting and tax preparation
26. Dues
27. Other marketing expenses
28. Promotion 
29. What was the market value of commoditites produced and used 
on this operation for home or employee/ volunteer consumption?
30. What was the market value of in-kind services provided to 
community groups, employees or volunteers?
31. GAP certification  or state equivalent (Capital expense below)
a. Annual Fees
b. Consultant services 
32.Expenses associated with becoming an approved vendor for a FtI 
Distributor or Wholesaler
34. Additional expenses not recorded above (please list items)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Total (line 33 from 1040 Schedule F)
Farm Operating Expenses
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B. Capital Expenses
Expenses ($)
% total Expenses 
Direct to 
Institution 
% total Expenses 
Wholesale to 
Institution
1. Improvements on land such as land preparation, irrigation 
improvements, well drilling, ponds, feedlots, trench silos, lagoons, 
new fences etc
i) Expenses required for GAP certification or state equivalent
ii) Expenses required for Approved Vendor Status certification
iii) Expenses required for other state/federal food safety licensing
2. New Construction and remodeling of dwellings (exlcuding 
operators dwelling) barns, buildings, storage facilities, livestock 
facilities, sheds, silos, etc. 
i) Expenses required for GAP certification or state equivalent
ii) Expenses required for Approved Vendor Status certification
iii) Expenses required for other state/ federal food safety licensing
3. New construction or remodeling of the operator's dwelling, if 
owned by operation?
4. Cars and trucks (before trade)
a. What percent of this item was the farm's share?
5. Machinery, implements and livestock equipment (please list)
6. Land
7. Other Capital expenses
i) Expenses required for GAP certification or state equivalent
ii) Expenses required for Approved Vendor Status certification
iii) Expenses required for other state/ federal food safety licensing
C.
Market Value 
(January 1, 
2013)
Market Value 
(Dec. 31, 2013)
Net Change
a. Owned farm land
b. Operator dwellings (if on farm)
c. Other dwellings
d. Farm buildings and structures
e. Machinery and equipment
f. Livestock (include all types)
g. Other capital assets not listed:
Capital Assets. Please indicate the value (a fair market value) of the capital assets listed as of January 1, 2013 and as of 
December 31, 2013 and changes that occurred during 2013.
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D.
Market Value 
(January 1, 
2014)
Market Value 
(Dec. 31, 2014)
Net Change
a. Supplies (packaging, labeling,soap etc.)
b. Accounts receivable
c. Product on hand
d. Seed and plants purchased
e. Feed
f. Chemicals, Fertilizer and Lime
g. Other operating assets not listed:
E.
a. Production loans
b. Accounts payable
c. If you have an established line of farm credit with a lender, how 
much did you borrow in 2014?
d. What was the total amount of all farm business loans taken out 
and repaid in 2014?
e. How much did this operation owe money to any banks, co-ops, 
individuals, merchants or Federal agencies on december 31, 2014?
f. Other liabilities (please list):
Operating Assets. Please indicate the value of the operating assets listed as of January 1, 2014 and as of December 31, 
2014 and changes that occurred during 2014.  
Liability Value 
(January 1, 
Liability Value 
(Dec. 31, 2014)
Farm Operating Expenses
Net Change
Farm Liabilities and Debt.   Please indicate farm liabilities as of January 1, 2014 and as of December 31, 2014, and 
changes that occurred.
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Section 
7
Farm Name
Farmer(s) Name(s)
Street Address
Town
State
Zip
Telephone Number
Cell Phone Number
fax Number
Website
Email Address
Sex
Operator Information
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